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Abstract 
Outsourcing data to some cloud servers enables a massive, flexible usage of cloud 
computing resources and it is typically held by different organizations and data owners. 
However, various security concerns have been raised due to hosting sensitive data on an 
untrusted cloud environment, and the control over such data by their owners is lost after 
uploading to the cloud. Access control is the first defensive line that forbids unauthorized 
access to the stored data. Moreover, fine-grained access control on the untrusted cloud can 
be enforced using advanced cryptographic mechanisms. Some schemes have been proposed 
to deliver such access control using Ciphertext-policy attribute based encryption (CP-ABE) 
that can enforce data owners’ access policies to achieve such cryptographic access control 
and tackle the majority of those concerns. However, some challenges are still outstanding 
due to the complexity of frequently changing the cryptographic enforcements of the owners’ 
access policies in the hosted cloud data files, which poses computational and 
communicational overheads to data owners. These challenges are: 1) making dynamic 
decisions to grant access rights to the cloud resources, 2) solving the issue of the revocation 
process that is considered as a performance killer, and 3) building a collusion resistant 
system. The aim of our work is to construct an access control scheme that provides secure 
storing and sharing sensitive data on the cloud and suits limited-resources devices. 
In this thesis, we analyse some of the existing, related issues and propose a scheme that 
extends the relevant existing techniques to resolve the inherent problems in CP-ABE 
without incurring heavy computation overhead. In particular, most existing revocation 
techniques require re-issuing many private keys for all non-revoked users as well as re-
encrypting the related ciphertexts. Our proposed scheme offers a solution to perform a novel 
technique that dynamically changes the access privileges of legitimate users. The scheme 
drives the access privileges in a specific way by updating the access policy and activating a 
user revocation property. Our technique assigns processing-intensive tasks to cloud servers 
without any information leakage to reduce the computation cost on resource-limited 
computing devices. Our analytical theoretical and experimental findings and comparisons 
of our work with related existing systems indicate that our scheme is efficient, secure and 
more practical compared to the current related systems, particularly in terms of policy 
updating and ciphertext re-encryption. Therefore, our proposed scheme is suited to Internet 
of Things (IoT) applications that need a practical, secure access control scheme.  
iii 
 
Moreover, to achieve secure, public cloud storage and minimise the limitations of CP-ABE 
which mainly supports storing data only on a private cloud storage system managed by only 
one single authority, our proposed access control scheme is extended to a secure, critical 
access control scheme with multiple authorities. This scheme ought to be carefully designed 
to achieve fine-grained access control and support outsourced-data confidentiality. In 
addition, most existing multi-authority access control schemes do not properly consider the 
revocation issue due to the difficulty of addressing it in distributed settings. Therefore, 
building a multi-authority CP-ABE scheme along with addressing changes to policy 
attributes and users, have motivated many researchers to develop more suitable schemes 
with limited success. By leveraging the existing work, in this thesis, we propose a second 
CP-ABE scheme that tackles most of the existing work’s limitations and allows storing data 
securely on a public cloud storage system by employing multiple authorities which manage 
a joint set of attributes. Furthermore, the proposed scheme efficiently maintains the 
revocation by adapting the two techniques used in the first proposed single authority access 
control scheme to allow dynamic policy update and invalidate a revoked user’s secret key 
that eliminates collusion attacks. In terms of computation overhead, the proposed multi-
authority scheme outsources expensive operations of encryption and decryption to a cloud 
server to mitigate the burden on a data owner and data users, respectively. Our scheme 
analysis and the theoretical and implemented results demonstrate that our scheme is scalable 
and efficient. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1 Introduction 
An innovative technology has been introduced, developed and adopted in 1999. This 
technology is the Internet of Things (IoT) which has changed human life to a huge extent 
by optimising the techniques of intelligent, big data analysis, expanding the productivity of 
systems, and increasing the flexibility. Such services shape the industry and are adopted by 
the academic sector. However, the limited resources of the IoT devices such as battery life, 
computing power, and storage are the main issues that prevent consumers from successfully 
leveraging the IoT services and applications. 
On the other hand, the method of storing, sharing, retrieving, and processing data has 
changed with the recent advancements of technology (e.g. cloud technologies). 
Organisations and individuals are increasingly encouraged to utilise services that enable 
data sharing, availability and accessibility from everywhere and at any time. The cloud is a 
well-established technology providing this type of service. However, the expanding use of 
such services raises critical security issues, particularly in such untrusted environments like 
the cloud which has the ability to directly access the data that is stored on it, and process it.  
To protect sensitive data, data confidentiality needs to be achieved to add a restriction on 
the range of cloud functions. However, thanks to the fact that the cloud server is the only 
entity that directly interacts with service-users, it is responsible for deciding who accesses 
the data. Therefore, an access control mechanism is needed to regulate access to data and 
expressive access policies are required to be enforced to limit the trust boundaries of the 
cloud provider. 
Therefore, to leverage the merits of the above-mentioned technologies, a new, popular 
architecture has emerged which combines IoT and cloud, where IoT services and 
applications are offered and built on the top of the cloud services. In this thesis, we focus 
on the security of this integrated technology and authorization, mainly access control.   
In this chapter, Sections 1.1 presents the research motivation. The challenges, the 
methodology, requirements, research aims and objectives and the contributions of this thesis 
are introduced in Sections 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5 and 1.6, respectively. The outline of the thesis 
is presented in Section 1.7.  
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1.1 Research Motivation 
The factor that motivated us to undertake this study will be expressed in this section. Where, 
we are interested in some applications that control children’s internet activities by running 
rating systems. These applications help parents to protect their children from accessing 
unsuitable online materials.  
1.2 Research Problems and Challenges 
In untrusted cloud environments, many challenges are outlined as a result of widely 
leveraging storage and sharing services. These challenges are shown as follows:  
1- The cloud storage and sharing services are provided by multiple, unknown platforms 
to serve a great, unlimited number of users (whose identities are unknown) and who 
outsource a huge amount of their sensitive data to these untrusted servers to store on 
them. To avoid any sort of information leak, and grant limited access privileges to 
these untrusted servers which run critical works on these data, a one-to-many 
encryption scenario is needed to let an untrusted cloud server share encrypted data 
with the served users without knowing their identities.  
2- Some careful measurements have to be taken due to moving data away from owners’ 
control.  Where, making appropriate, required decisions to access the stored data 
with granting restricted privileges to an untrusted server to participate with this 
decision-making process, is a major challenge. To establish trust with an untrusted 
server and tackle the above-mentioned issue, access policies that are identified by 
data owners as a set of attributes, ought to be enforced. Therefore, granting rights to 
data owners to enforce their policies to access data and compensate the lack of 
control, is another critical challenge. 
3- Dynamically managing, driving and customising the users’ privileges that are 
changed in response to the frequent change in the values of users’ attributes are the 
key issues that have motivated a considerable number of researchers to tackle these 
challenges.   
4- In the context of encrypting data that is stored on the cloud, constructing a collusion 
resistant system is still an outstanding issue. In particular, it is essential to prevent a 
cloud server to collude with the system users who are no longer allowed to access 
data and already know the decryption key. 
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5- Distributing the keys securely to a large, dynamic number of authorized system users 
whose identities are unknown and overcoming problems with the traditional 
cryptographic approaches are essential challenging tasks. That needs to happen in a 
way that prevents malicious, authorized users to collude with each other to access a 
high level of data. 
1.3.Research Methodology 
Identifying the key cause of the problems described in section 1.2 is the first step in this 
research. Then, it followed by creating new solutions to rectify the problems. More 
specifically, the methodology for this research consists of four distinct phases: (1) literature 
review, (2) requirement analysis and specification, (3) two schemes design, and (4) 
implementation and evaluation. The scheme design phase also involves several stages as 
shown below.  
1- Literature review: to fill the knowledge gap and solve the problems identified, we 
performed a thorough literature review of cloud based access control and current 
schemes for Attribute Based Encryption (ABE). In addition, we analysed their 
limitations and tried to find appropriate solutions to overcome these restrictions. 
2- Requirements analysis and specification: in this phase, the relevant existing work 
critically analysed to determine the needs or conditions for the newly proposed 
schemes to meet, by taking account of the possibly conflicting requirements of the 
two different technologies which are cloud and IoT. Since requirements analysis is 
critical to the success of the proposed schemes, the requirements derived must be 
practical and related to identified schemes needs. Based on these considerations, the 
initial requirements selected and specified.   
3- Scheme design: based on the analysis from the previous phase, the essential 
requirements for the design of our two proposed schemes extracted. The design 
divided into two main stages: 1) designing a single-authority cloud access control 
scheme including seven algorithms to support storing data on a private cloud storage 
system, solve the revocation problem stated later, 2) designing a mature scheme of  
multi-authority cloud access control with eight algorithms to support storing data on 
a public cloud model and resolve the single-authority scheme limitations.  
4- Implementation and evaluation: the final phase of this proposed scheme consists 
of two stages that are the implementation and evaluation of the designed schemes. 
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In the implementation stage, we implemented the designed schemes including the 
algorithms and methods of each scheme and tested them according to the 
requirements specified. In the second stage of this research, the implemented 
schemes evaluated and compared against the relevant existing work to determine 
any benefits our schemes offer and any problems it may experience.  
1.4 Research Requirements 
In this section, some critical requirements that need to be met for sharing data over the 
cloud, are presented to distinguish the risks. These requirements are as follows: 
1. Data Confidentiality and Privacy: It is a set of rules that protects a certain type of 
information by placing some restrictions on it.  It is an essential requirement for 
cloud storage since the cloud service provider which stores the data, is normally 
unauthorized to access its content. Thus, the data accessibility ought to be only for 
explicitly legitimate users. That is satisfied by using cryptographic techniques to 
enable the legitimate data access even when the data encrypter is offline and 
preserving the privacy of the users’ identities.  
2. Fine-grained Access Control: It is a key mechanism that grants different access 
privileges to different users even if they are in the same group according to their 
credentials given by the associated system, and flexibly specifies individual users’ 
access rights.  
3. Expressive access structure: It is important for the access policies specified by a 
data owner to be expressive to realize fine-grained access control. Moreover, an 
encryption technique is required to support the expressiveness of these policies. This 
requirement makes the access control scheme similar to a real-life access control.  
4. Collusion Resistance: The system has to prevent any collusion attacks from 
combining their information together to illegitimately gain unauthorized data 
through collaboration [30]. In the cloud environment, this type of attack can be either 
a group of misbehaving system users who collude with each other, combine their 
information and gain higher access rights or a combination of a cloud server and 
malicious, revoked users who try to gain the original data.  
5. Forward and Backward Security: Forward security means any revoked user ought 
to be prevented from accessing data and decrypting any new published ciphertext 
after leaving the system. In terms of backward security, several types of application 
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need to achieve it. Such applications need a mechanism in which the ciphertexts 
published previously cannot be decrypted by any user who newly joins the system 
[31]. On the other hand, other applications do not need to achieve backward security 
in the sense that a user who newly joins the system can also be able to decrypt the 
data published previously [32-34]. 
6. Revocation: When a user is degraded or leaves the system, its access rights need to 
be reduced or revoked, respectively, by the related access control scheme without 
incurring significant computational cost.  In addition, attribute updating is not a 
straightforward process in ABE and it is hard to address, as updating a single 
attribute could impact a large number of users accessing the same attribute. 
7. Scalability: The performance of the system should not to be affected by the increase 
in the number of the system users. 
8. Computation overhead: It is essential to fulfil all the above requirements with 
minimal computation cost.  
1.5 Research Aims and objectives 
In this part of the thesis, the critical aims and objectives of the project are presented. 
1.5.1 Aims 
Based on the challenges and problems identified earlier, the general aim of this proposed 
project is to construct a scheme that supports a spontaneous coalition between the IoT and 
the cloud, and provides secure storing and sharing sensitive data on the cloud in a specific 
way that improves the decision-making process to access its resources. This aim will be 
useful to apply to some IoT applications that have digital contents such as e-books, videos, 
patient health records and so on. These applications are becoming pervasive in the era of 
the cloud and need a mechanism to prevent them from being obtained by inappropriate 
users.  
Offering a novel model for dynamic access to cloud resources in response to access policies 
changes will provide data owners more flexibility and security by allowing them to share 
their resources with others for easy access to them. The aim of this project will be 
accomplished by considering the current research in cloud access control strategies and then 
developing the model for novel, flexible, secure access control. Although many studies have 
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been done in this field, little work has considered all the mentioned problems in one scheme 
to enhance the decision-making process of regulating access to cloud resources.  
1.5.2 Objectives 
To accomplish the aim of this proposed project, the following objectives are set out to: 
1. Examine the current approaches to cloud access control by performing a thorough 
literature review and identify their strengths and shortcomings.  
• This objective is achieved in Chapters 2 and 3 that present the existing, 
relevant techniques, their limitations and issues, as well as some related 
fundamentals and principles. 
2. Develop an attribute-based encryption technique in a specific way and construct a 
proposed scheme that is able to handle the frequent attributes changes with reference 
to solving the user revocation problem and stores data in private storage cloud 
environments.  
• In Chapter 4, the proposed single authority scheme is designed, constructed 
and implemented. In addition, the security requirements are identified. Based 
on these requirements and the implementation results, the scheme is analysed 
and evaluated.   
3. Extend the proposed scheme to build an advanced access control scheme that deals 
with storing data on public storage cloud environments and adjust the proposed 
revocation techniques to be adapted with the modified scheme, where these two 
schemes ought to be feasible for IoT technologies. 
• The proposed decentralised multi-authority scheme is designed, constructed, 
implemented and analysed in Chapter 5. 
4. Illustrate the effectiveness of the constructed schemes. 
• The results and discussions in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 show that our proposed 
schemes address most of the existing limitations (mentioned above in 
Section 1.5) and support storing sensitive data in an untrusted cloud 
environment with dynamic privilege management. 
1.6 Research Contributions 
In this thesis, the design, theoretical details and implementation of our proposed access 
control schemes are presented. The novelty of our collusion-resistant schemes are to drive 
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the access privileges in a specific way by updating the access policy as well as user 
revocation. In this part, our core research contributions and advancements in an untrusted, 
outsourced environment are discussed as follows:   
1- Reformulating the scheme of CP-ABE and presenting a new scheme that constructs 
our novel cloud access control scheme and achieves data confidentiality, fine-
grained access control and supports expressive access policies to be secure in 
untrusted environments. In particular, our proposed scheme is constructed by 
rebuilding the most popular existing systems that have many merits but lack 
dynamicity in a dynamic storage environment. 
2- Resolving the issue of frequent attribute changes which has not sufficiently been 
addressed by the existing systems, by providing a novel technique to efficiently 
handle users’ attributes by policy updating, leading to managing and customising 
users’ privileges. This technique helps to elevate, eliminate, or even revoke users’ 
access rights by efficiently dealing with a monotone access structure without 
incurring heavy computations. 
3- Manipulating the user revocation problem by enforcing constraints and a specific 
formula into users’ secret keys which are also known to revoked-users for data 
decryption to invalidate them after the revocation event occurred. 
4- Outsourcing a computational part of the expensive encryption operation to a cloud 
server without any information leakage about the plaintext leads to minimizing the 
long-standing time that is required for encryption and policy update. That happens 
due to merging the CP-ABE with the traditional encryption techniques to efficiently 
manage a monotone access structure without incurring heavy computation. In 
addition, part of the policy update and the whole ciphertext re-encryption process 
are delegated to cloud. 
5- Adding a proxy server that activates the user revocation property, makes the scheme 
robust against collusion attacks to be a collusion resistant scheme.  
6- Further extending the proposed scheme and enhancing its security and performance 
by developing the scheme from a single attribute authority to multi-attribute 
authorities, which is suitable for more complicated cloud applications.  This 
extension leverages the power of the proposed single-authority scheme such as 
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dynamic privilege management that is considered as a significant, complicated issue 
to be achieved in a multi-authority scheme. 
7- In the proposed multi-authority scheme, secure outsourced decryption is used to 
mitigate the burden from users. 
1.7 Organisation of the Thesis 
Chapter 2 introduces related definitions, fundamentals, and principles of ABE schemes. 
Furthermore, we identify some issues and limitations as well as some related work. 
Chapter 3 briefly presents some mathematical background, relevant principles and basic 
concepts related to advanced cryptographic techniques.   
Chapter 4 proposes a new Ciphertext-Policy Attribute Based Encryption (CP-ABE) 
scheme with a single authority that can practically manage users’ access privileges. 
Moreover, the theoretical model is presented. At the end of this chapter, based on the scheme 
evaluation and experimental results, we analyse the scheme in terms of security and 
performance and show that our proposed scheme is secure against collusion attacks. 
Chapter 5 extends the proposed algorithm in Chapter4 to build a multi-authority access 
control scheme that provides higher capabilities compared with the existing work. 
Furthermore, this chapter presents the implementation of the scheme and discusses the 
experimental results. In addition, a comparison between the proposed scheme and the most 
relevant one is carried out to check the practicality of the scheme.    
Chapter 6 summarises the chapters presented and concludes the thesis. In addition, it points 
out some directions of future research extracted from this work.  
  
  
Chapter 2 
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Chapter 2: CP-ABE for Outsourcing Data to 
Cloud 
2 Introduction  
Unlimited cloud storage and data outsourcing services provide data owners and enterprises 
with capacities for storing and processing a massive amount of data. These high quality 
services enable easy accessibility, high scalability and availability [35]. Despite all the 
advantages, serious concerns about the data security and confidentiality in such a cloud  
environment have been raised [36]. To preserve data confidentiality, many techniques 
support encrypting the outsourced data stored in the cloud environment. However, these 
techniques cannot regulate access to specific stored data or enforce access policies [3].   
In an untrusted cloud environment, preserving data confidentiality, making an appropriate 
decision on data and enforcing access policies are core challenges. Therefore, many system 
models and techniques for access control based on cryptographic operations have been 
characterized and described by researchers to provide secure and efficient cloud access 
control. Although such techniques enable sharing data with a large number of users, some 
open issues still need to be addressed, particularly for Internet of Things (IoT) applications. 
Firstly, access control policies should be expressive enough to incorporate relevant 
contextual information on the properties, features or characteristics that are associated with 
users, objects, or the environment (e.g. age, position, time etc.), reﬂecting the frequently 
changing conditions and correlating with ongoing activities in the environment concerned 
[37]. 
Secondly, since IoT applications are varying widely (e.g., e-health including patients’ 
medical records management and remote diagnoses, military systems including soldiers’ 
data management and monitoring, smart vehicles including trafﬁc jam management, and 
smart cities), securing such applications by building a collusion resistant system and 
providing fine-grained access control is a key challenge. The reasons for this are the 
sensitivity of such application data and the consequences of attacking such applications 
cause great damage to systems and their users. Thirdly, the most important issue from the 
user point of view is how to flexibly join and leave a system with a low computational cost 
(i.e. efficient user revocation).  
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To address the above challenges, a considerable amount of research has been conducted to 
develop necessary cryptographic techniques.  This chapter will critically examine and 
compare these techniques to demonstrate their effectiveness and efficiency as well as 
limitations.  
In a large-scale distributed environment, particularly the cloud environment, traditional 
symmetric cryptographic techniques with the same key for both encryption and decryption 
operations suffer from a key distribution and management problem. On the other hand, 
traditional asymmetric cryptographic approaches, which utilise a public key for encryption 
and a private key for decryption, lack computational efficiency. These one-to-one schemes 
are not desirable to encrypt data and send it to a group of recipients. The reason for this is 
that a data owner needs to know who the recipients are, their identities, or their public keys, 
before encrypting its data and sending it to the corresponding authorized users separately.  
However, to eliminate the enormous computational costs of the traditional cryptographic 
operations, and to achieve the mentioned requirements (such as preserving data 
confidentiality, regulating access to stored data and using expressive policies), attribute 
based access control has been introduced, which grants access privileges to users based on 
their attributes. To perform attribute-based access control while preserving data 
confidentiality, ABE has been proposed, which is an advanced asymmetric cryptographic 
technique invented to leverage the merits of the symmetric encryption (e.g. high efficiency) 
and solve its key management and distribution problems.  
Two variants of ABE were discussed in [38]. These variants are ciphertext policy attribute 
based-encryption (CP-ABE) and key policy attribute-based encryption (KP-ABE). The 
major difference between them lies in how to associate a secret key and an access policy 
with relevant data and attributes. In KP-ABE, an access policy is associated with a secret 
key and a set of attributes are associated with the data encrypted with the key. Conversely, 
in CP-ABE, each encrypted data item is assigned with a specific access policy and a user’s 
secret key for the data decryption is assigned with a set of attributes. As a consequence of 
embedding an access policy into a user’s secret key in KP-ABE, a data owner (who encrypts 
the data) can only select a set of attributes but will not be able to decide which user can 
access its ciphertext. To decrypt the ciphertext, a key generator (i.e. an attribute authority), 
which generates the decryption key for authorized users, will be responsible for granting or 
denying access to the key [39]. Due to this property, we pay little attention to KP-ABE and 
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focus on CP-ABE in the rest of this thesis, as our objective is to give data owners full control 
of their sensitive data and CP-ABE is more suitable for this purpose.  
The criteria used to choose the related works, in this chapter, are based on selecting various 
CP-ABE schemes using different methods to solve the same problem (i.e. the revocation 
problem). In addition, covering all the existing techniques is under our consideration. This 
chapter is structured as follows: Section2.1 gives a basic description of IoT. The cloud 
computing technology is described in Section 2.2. The aspects of access control are 
discussed in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 presents the principle of context awareness. The 
background of ABE and the main problems of CP-ABE are described in Section 2.5. 
Existing single authority and multi-authority CP-ABE schemes are introduced in Section 
2.6.  Finally, Section 2.7 summarises the chapter.  
2.1 The Internet of Things (IoT) 
The Internet of Things (IoT) refers to a system of smart devices which are intelligently 
connected to the physical world collecting data by embedded sensors and then leveraging 
such data. The architecture of the IoT consists of three layers [1]. These layers are the 
recognition layer, network layer and application layer shown in Figure 2.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: The Internet of Things architecture 
In the recognition (or perception) layer, data is collected from the environment or things, to 
be transformed into a digital form. The network layer is the main layer of the IoT which 
connects the other two layers together and transmits the data from the recognition layer to 
Recognition Layer 
Network Layer
Application Layer
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the application layer which is the top layer of the architecture. The application layer provides 
the relevant services that meet users’ needs. 
Hence, this technology offers many services that enhance the quality of consumers’ life and 
increase enterprises’ productivity by improving the efficiency of education, health, decision 
making, and so on [2]. However, the IoT devices are resource–limited things. Therefore, one 
of the main IoT challenges is the huge amount of data that has to be dealt with. Storing and 
processing these data needs powerful computing and storage abilities exceeding that found 
in the IoT. Therefore, integrating the IoT with the cloud that has unlimited storage and 
computing power, is a critical issue.  
To leverage the cloud resources, IoT applications deliver their data to the cloud service 
provider which provides considerable storage and computational resources for the IoT 
devices (e.g., in e-healthcare networks). On the other hand, delivering data to the cloud 
means losing the control and the management of these data, raising serious security issues 
which form open challenges. To sum up, the combination of cloud computing and IoT (as 
illustrated in Figure 2.2) can provide a universal environment of data collecting services 
and powerful processing of such data. Whereas IoT produces rich contextual information, 
the cloud effectively serves as the brain to improve decision-making based on the 
information provided. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: The integration of the IoT and cloud. 
Virtual layer
Cloud Service Layer
Applications
Object Layer
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2.2 Cloud Computing System  
Cloud computing is a large-scale computing paradigm for a wide range of functional 
capabilities, which enables convenient, on-demand network access to a large, shared pool 
of virtualized, managed computing and storage resources[3]. These resources are delivered 
effortlessly as services to billions of consumers through the network anywhere and anytime 
[4]. These services were categorized into three various models by the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST)[5] as Software as a Service (SaaS), Platform as a Service 
(PaaS), and Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS). 
Software as a Service (SaaS) is a software distribution model. In particular, the cloud service 
provider hosts applications and makes them available to a large number of consumers over 
the internet. As a result, SaaS provides shared access to the applications running on the 
cloud infrastructure instead of running these applications on the organization’s computers 
and hardware [6]. That eliminates the expense of hardware acquisition, maintenance and the 
need for software installation. In addition, SaaS offers high scalability by giving consumers 
the option to access more or fewer features or services.  
The second model is Platform as a Service (PaaS), in which, hardware and software tools 
which are needed for application development such as java development or application 
hosting, are delivered by the provider to users through the network, which in turn allows 
shared access to tools and programming languages demanded to deploy an application. This 
is beneficial to companies and consumers by allowing them to focus on creating and 
developing applications instead of maintaining the infrastructure. The access to PaaS will 
be charged by a provider on a pay-per-use-basis that many enterprises prefer. 
The last model is Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS). It provides a virtual machine to the cloud 
users, which is overcommitted physical servers to expand profits from investing hardware. 
Where, it allows shared access to underlying hardware resources such as network, storage 
and other computing resources. The need for more physical machines is reduced by Server 
virtualization. That helps to avoid the complexity and expense of maintaining and managing 
their own physical resources. 
Generally speaking, cloud computing can be categorised into three deployment models 
based on the type of data that are dealt with and the required levels of security and 
management. These types are public, private and hybrid clouds. In a private cloud, only 
exclusive use is offered for the cloud infrastructure to a single organisation. Such 
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infrastructure and services may be managed by the organisation or a third party. While in a 
public cloud, public use is provided for the cloud infrastructure which is managed by a 
government or an academic organisation or combined organisations. The composition of 
these two models is considered as a hybrid cloud.  
Many applications which use intensive data and depend on SaaS and PaaS models, require 
logical data storage as these applications need to operate simultaneously on contiguous data. 
Cloud storage is a service in which managing, maintaining and backing up data are made 
remotely available to users over the internet. It maximises the benefits by hosting users’ data 
on the cloud servers from anywhere at any time. Recently, many companies have started to 
offer the cloud storage service.  
Due to being provided with the accessibility, flexibility and data recovery with low cost by 
the cloud storage service [7], many companies are motivated to outsource their data to cloud 
storage servers. In that way, the companies’ need for housing special equipment for storing 
their data is minimised with a guarantee that those data are protected against any natural 
disaster, stealing or system crash. In addition, scalability is one of the major benefits that 
the cloud provides. That enables the company to be enlarged to accommodate future needs. 
However, storing data on remote external servers and assigning a variety of essential 
responsibilities of managing and maintaining those data to the cloud service provider 
without any intervention from the data owners is a critical issue. Once the data is outsourced 
to the cloud servers, the data owners will lose the control of their data. Since the cloud 
service provider is not totally trusted by the cloud consumers and a large amount of the 
stored data is highly sensitive, integrity, security and privacy are major issues in cloud 
computing.  
Therefore, to maximise the adoption of the cloud storage service, some appropriate 
cryptographic techniques ought to be undertaken to satisfy two key features [8]. The first 
one is the confidentiality which ensures that the cloud service provider has no knowledge 
about the customers’ data. The second feature is the integrity which means the ability of the 
cloud customers to detect any illegitimate modification carried out on their data by the cloud 
service provider or any attackers.  
In terms of cloud users who need to access to data which is stored on the cloud, one of the 
main mechanisms used in the cloud environment to manage authorized access, is access 
control whose main responsibility is to manage users’ access rights. It grants access to 
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authorized users and forbids others access to data [9]. Due to the distributed environment 
with untrusted cloud servers, efficient mechanisms for regulating access over encrypted data 
are required. Therefore, many system models and algorithms for access control have been 
characterized and described by researchers to provide secure and efficient cloud access 
control. 
2.3 Access Control 
In the cloud environment, the sensitive, large, scalable, stored data requires a secure manner 
to protect and preserve its integrity and confidentiality without affecting the scalability and 
the performance of the system. One of the critical security mechanisms for data protection 
is access control that permits, restricts or denies access to system files by setting some 
conditions and rules which are combined together to make and enforce an access control 
decision [10].  In this way, the access control technique can ensure only authorized users 
who need to access certain data, have the ability to do that.   
Some core requirements need to be achieved in any effective cloud access control system. 
The first one is fine-grained access control [11]. In particular, each user in a system has their 
own access right which may differ from others in the same group. Due to lack of control, 
the second requirement is to assign control to the data owners after residing their data on 
the cloud without computation overhead which is the third requirement. To keep data safe 
and guarantee the security, the data has to be encrypted. That will keep data away from 
being illegitimately accessed by a cloud server or any unauthorized users. Therefore, the 
fourth requirement is confidentiality [12]. 
To meet the above requirements, attribute based access control has been introduced [13]. 
However, to hide the data from a storage server, encrypting data is essential before storing 
them on such servers. Thus, data encryption with attribute-based access control is known as 
an Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) technique. An attribute is a piece of information that 
describes the properties, features or characteristics of an object [14]. This information can 
be recognised by either automated or human approaches. For example, an attribute could be 
a department (e.g. engineering, computer science, etc.), an occupation (e.g. teacher, student, 
researcher, etc.), and experience years (e.g. two-years, five-years, etc.). In general, attributes 
are classified into two types [15]: 1) non-temporal attributes with discrete attribute values 
(e.g. age, address, email, etc.), and 2) temporal attributes with continuous values (e.g. 
interval, time, etc.).  
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Many studies have been carried out on the cloud access control using ABE with discrete 
attribute values [13, 16, 17]. These studies have a lot of problems which remain unsolved. 
For example, Yang et al. [17] proposed an access control model with low computational 
costs for decryption. However, the work incorporated weak privacy and security 
considerations. On the other hand, some schemes require intensive computations in return 
for stronger privacy and security protection, meaning that they are unsuitable for mobile 
devices with limited computation power [18, 19].  
In addition, some work has been carried out using ABE with continuous attribute values, 
which is known as temporal access control [20, 21]. The access structure can be in the form 
of time (e.g. between 8 am and 12 pm). These temporal attributes are familiar in the cloud. 
For instance, only during a particular period of time, can users access certain data. However, 
such schemes have their shortcomings. For example, the scheme of Zhu et al. [21] does not 
address user revocation, and the scheme of Yang et al. [20] manages the revocation problem 
inefficiently by refreshing an update key and sending it to all users at every time slot with a 
valid set of attributes which represent the revocation. 
Achieving data confidentiality and access control for the cloud data is a core challenge that 
needs to be taken into account. Addressing this challenge supports data security 
management, and allows data owners to regulate their data and enforce restrictions on 
accessing data. Traditional cryptographic techniques can keep data confidentiality. 
However, the other requirements (mentioned above) are hard to achieve with these types of 
techniques. 
2.4 Context awareness    
Due to rapid changes in users’ context, the use of the context information is crucial in 
interactive applications, particularly for ubiquitous computing applications [22]. Context 
can be defined as “any information that can be used to characterize the situation of an entity. 
An entity is a person, place, or object that is considered relevant to the interaction between 
a user and an application, including the user and applications themselves” [23]. If a system 
uses the context to supply relevant information to a user who uses it in a specific task, it is 
considered as context-aware [24]. 
Some critical issues have to be considered when the systems and applications intend to use 
context information gathered from the environment [25]. The first one is organizing the 
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gathered information in an effective way that is compatible with the system requirements.  
The second one is how systems can utilize contextual information to provide improved 
services to the system users [26]. 
Although different researchers have developed context-aware access control models, the use 
of context has been targeted at detecting devices and network environments that were used 
to request an access to the cloud data. This information can be useful to detect the 
computational power of the devices or to check if the requested data will be transmitted 
through insecure channels [27, 28].  
However, an active access control model requires a much broader scope of context and is 
centred on the context which consists of all the characterizing information considered 
relevant to it. This context can be identified as identities, locations, times or activities which 
are collected and labelled in some meaningful way and represented in terms of attributes 
[29].  
2.5 Attribute-based Encryption (ABE)   
ABE is one of the advanced cryptographic techniques for one-to-many encryption that 
overcomes the limited functionalities of the traditional public-key cryptographic techniques. 
This scheme was proposed by Sahai and Waters [40] as an application of fuzzy identity-
based encryption which uses human-intelligible identities (such as unique name, IP address, 
email address, etc.) as public keys, where a data sender directly encrypts its data with the 
receivers’ identity. Later, Goyal et.al. [38] present a more general construction of ABE in 
which attributes have been utilized to issue a public key and to generate a logical expression 
of these attributes called an access policy. Both the public key and access policy are used 
for encrypting data. In contrast with the traditional cryptographic systems which encrypt 
data to one particular user or group that knows the decryption key, there is no more need to 
share the same private key or store several versions of the ciphertext encrypted with different 
keys [41]. Moreover, ABE has no restriction on the number of users in the system. Based 
on these considerations, this scheme has been leveraged to regulate users’ access to cloud 
data by using attributes as an access policy.  
To apply ABE, a data owner encrypts its data using a symmetric encryption algorithm with 
a symmetric key and then encrypts the key using an ABE scheme with a public key. The 
encrypted key is distributed to a group of recipients/users as a ciphertext. Each user obtains 
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the private key 𝑠𝑘 for the encrypted key decryption from a key generator that calculates the 
key according to the user’s attributes. In this case, the data owner does not need to know the 
identities of the legitimate users and their dynamicity. Figure 2.3 illustrates the above 
operational process. Applying ABE to the two variants (i.e. CP-ABE and KP-ABE) follows 
the same procedure (as shown in Figures 2.4 and 2.5). The main difference is, in KP-ABE, 
users' secret keys are issued using an access policy that defines the access privileges of the 
authorised user, and the symmetric key is encrypted over a set of attributes. However, CP-
ABE uses access policies to encrypt data (i.e. symmetric key) and secret keys of the 
legitimate users are generated over a set of attributes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Using ABE to encrypt a symmetric key 
Many KP-ABE and CP-ABE schemes were proposed with some notable examples listed in 
Table 2.1.  
Table 2.1: Summary of the proposed ABE schemes 
Scheme Description Revocation Access Policy 
Bethencourt et al.[39]  The first CP-ABE 
scheme using a tree 
access structure. 
Lack of 
revocation 
Less expressive 
Waters[42]   The first fully expressive 
CP-ABE scheme using a 
linear secret sharing 
access structure. 
Lack of 
revocation 
Full expressive 
Wang et al.[43]   The first hierarchical 
ABE scheme with a 
disjunctive normal form 
(DNF) policy. 
Addressing 
revocation  
Not expressive 
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Figure 2.4: The procedure of KP-ABE 
2.5.1 Ciphertext–policy Attribute Based Encryption (CP-ABE) 
The most popular variant of ABE techniques is CP-ABE. Four entities are responsible for 
running this scheme. These entities are attribute authority, data owner, data user and cloud 
server. The role of the attribute authority is to generate secret keys for users according to 
their attributes to decrypt data. In addition, it is responsible for generating a public key and 
a master key. A data owner’s role is to define an access policy that describes who can access 
its data as well as encrypting those data under this access policy. Firstly, the data owner uses 
a symmetric encryption technique (e.g. AES) to encrypt its data. After that, the owner 
encrypts the symmetric key under its access policy using CP-ABE by selecting a random 
value as a secret which is shared using a linear secret sharing (LSS) technique to generate 
some values associated with each corresponding attribute in the ciphertext according to the 
owner’s access policy. This policy is determined over a set of attributes by the data owner 
and can be demonstrated as a Boolean function with (AND, OR) gates between attributes 
(e.g. (lecturer AND experience >= 2 years) OR Professor). Then the encrypted data is sent 
to the designated cloud for storage including the data ciphertext, the CP-ABE ciphertext and 
the access policy. Associating the access policy with the ciphertext means that the ciphertext 
chooses which key can recover the plaintext, giving the data owner more control of its 
outsourced data [44]. The eligible users who possess the required attributes in a right 
combination (i.e. satisfy the access policies) can successfully decrypt the encrypted data. As 
PK: Public Key 
MSK: Master Key 
SK: Secret Key 
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a result, the main benefit from using CP-ABE  is that sensitive data can be stored on an 
untrusted server without performing authentication checks for the data access [45].  
A common framework of a CP-ABE scheme includes four algorithms as demonstrated in 
Figure 2.5: Setup, Encryption, Key Generation and Decryption [42], which are defined 
below: 
• 𝑺𝒆𝒕𝒖𝒑(𝝀,𝑼) → (𝑴𝑺𝑲,𝑷𝑲): Takes a set of attributes 𝑼 in the system and an 
implicit security parameter 𝝀 (such as the type of the elliptic curve group used and 
the base finite field) as inputs to generate a public key 𝑷𝑲 and a master key 𝑴𝑺𝑲 as 
outputs.  
• 𝑬𝒏𝒄𝒓𝒚𝒑𝒕(𝑷𝑲,𝑨,𝑴 ) → 𝑪𝑻: Takes as inputs a public key 𝑷𝑲, an access 
structure 𝑨, and a message 𝑴 to be encrypted. The output will be a ciphertext 𝑪𝑻.   
• 𝑲𝒆𝒚𝑮𝒆𝒏(𝑴𝑺𝑲, 𝑺) → 𝑺𝑲: In this algorithm, a master key 𝑴𝑺𝑲 and a set of 
attributes 𝑺 are taken as inputs. A user’s secret key 𝑺𝑲 is generated as output.     
• 𝑫𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒚𝒑𝒕 (𝑪𝑻, 𝑺𝑲) → 𝑴: This algorithm takes as inputs a user’s secret key 𝑺𝑲 and 
a ciphertext 𝑪𝑻. It returns a message 𝑴 when the user’s attributes satisfy the access 
structure.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5: The CP-ABE mechanism 
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There are some appealing merits of the CP-ABE technique over other one-to-one traditional 
encryption techniques that enable coarse-grained access control. First, CP-ABE is to enable 
fine-grained access control in an encrypted form. This is desirable for many access control 
applications that run some cloud services such as storage and sharing services. Secondly, it 
supports highly expressive policies representing any access structures. Thirdly, it offers a 
good solution to data confidentiality. As generating a secret key for a user happens only 
once but it can be used to decrypt all the subsequent ciphertexts, CP-ABE  reduces 
communication overhead [44]. Fourthly, it is collusion resistant against misbehaving 
authorized users, which is achieved by associating a random number or polynomial with 
each attribute of  a user’s secret key so that only the attributes with the same random value 
can be used for decryption, leading to preventing different legitimate users from colluding 
with each other [46]. Finally, it is possible to integrate CP-ABE with a proxy re-encryption 
technique in cloud in order to increase security by re-encrypting  ciphertexts without 
disclosing the plaintexts to the cloud [44].  
However, there are some weaknesses related to the CP-ABE scheme. These include that 
CP-ABE only works ﬁne when attributes are descriptive [11]. In other words, temporal 
attributes are not well handled by CP-ABE. In addition, this technique is difficult to handle 
the attribute/user revocation problem [47] without trusting the cloud service provider that 
already hosted the data, particularly in dynamic environments where users’ attributes can 
change over time. Trusting a cloud server raises another issue which is a collusion attack. 
This attack involves revoked users colluding with the cloud server to combine their 
information together to gain access to unauthorized data. Therefore, the adoption of CP-
ABE requires additional refinements.  
Based on the entities that a user can obtain authorization from, CP-ABE is classified into 
two different categories [48]. They are single authority CP-ABE, where all attributes are 
handled by a single authority, and multi-authority CP-ABE in which different authorities 
manage the attributes in a distributed manner. However, in multi-authority systems, many 
complicated issues can be experienced when the CP-ABE systems are built. For example, 
to tie the work of all authorities together, some existing systems use either a central authority 
that could cause a bottleneck problem and is contradictory to the distributed control 
principle [49], or coordination between the authorities, which increases communication and 
computational costs. In addition, each authority needs to be aware of each other, running 
the risk of collusion by combining their information to figure out unauthorised information. 
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In addition, the revocation process is more complicated to manage in this type of system 
[41, 49].  
On the other hand, some issues can be encountered in any single authority systems. The first 
one is the key escrow problem that happens due to the ability of the authority in this type of 
the system to gain access to all users’ keys. This ability is obtained by the authority as it 
possesses the master key from which the users’ keys are derived. The second issue is the 
limited ability of any single authority system to handle a wide range of different attributes. 
Moreover, it represents a single-point bottleneck on security. Once an adversary 
compromises the system, the authority’s master key is easy to obtain.  
To efficiently exploit the advantages of CP-ABE and avoid most of its drawbacks, we need 
to construct a new scheme of CP-ABE that mitigates the difficulties in the existing schemes, 
uses sufficient, alternative solutions that dynamically change users’ privileges without 
entrusting information to a cloud server, and builds a collusion resistant system. The main 
issues that we are concerned about, are:  
• Resolving the revocation problem. 
• Covering a wide range of attributes needed by any system, and eliminating a single 
point failure. 
• Reducing the computation overhead.  
2.5.2 The Revocation Problem   
Revocation is a property to change the access rights of users when unexpected events occur 
such as malicious behaviour from a user, or an expired service that a user had purchased 
[41]. There are two scenarios where the revocation can be conducted. The first one is called 
attribute revocation that happens when some of a user’s attributes are removed from the 
current set due to being degraded in the system. For example, degrading a manager of an 
organization to a normal employee role leads to losing some of its possessed attributes and 
hence access rights. The second scenario occurs when a user leaves the system; its access 
rights have to be revoked so that the user is no longer able to access the system and decrypt 
any stored data on it, which is called user revocation [50]. Based on these considerations, 
designing a mechanism to revoke the user’s certain access rights must be embedded in the 
system from the beginning. Otherwise, the whole system has to be rebuilt with the advent 
of each revocation event.   
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In attribute-based access control schemes, the attribute revocation is a severe problem and 
very costly to apply for two reasons. The first one is the same attribute may be associated 
with different users’ secret keys, causing significant computational overhead throughout the 
revocation process. This happens due to the need for updating all relevant keys for the non-
revoked users and re-encrypting the related ciphertexts [41]. The second reason is most of 
the existing proposed attribute revocation methods are based on a semi trusted server, but 
this is an unrealistic assumption [50]. This is because the server could breach the trust and 
even be compromised, resulting in permitting unauthorized users to access the data stored 
in the cloud for gaining profits, e.g. when the cloud illegitimately permits a company to 
access the data of its competitors. 
Therefore, the following crucial requirements are needed to handle the revocation problem:  
1) Permit instantaneous banning of a malicious user,  
2) Resist collusion attacks or invalidate the secret keys of the revoked users [41] (which 
means the cloud cannot collude with a revoked user to illegally obtain encrypted 
data),  
3) Minimise the computation overhead of a revocation process,  
4) Support forward security which means any newly published ciphertext cannot be 
decrypted by any revoked user with revoked attributes [51]. 
Although considerable research has been devoted to solving the revocation issue, most of 
the existing studies lack practicality and the revocation process is considered as the major 
hindrance (Table 2.2 illustrates the main existing systems). The current strategies and 
assumptions utilised for the revocation are either considering that the server used is a trusted 
entity that can be assigned critical, essential, auxiliary processes of access control or, in the 
worse-case scenario, assuming that the data owner and a private key generator (attribute 
authority) stay online all the time [50]. 
Some studies have been done to handle the revocation problem periodically [52, 53].  Wan 
et al. [52] propose a hierarchical attribute-set-based encryption scheme with user revocation. 
To cope with user revocation, they added an attribute expiration time to a user’s key. This 
time indicates the validity period of the user’s key. However, this causes serious 
vulnerabilities due to the uncontrolled period from the revocation time of a user to the 
expiration time of its key, as well as bringing an extra computational burden to the authority 
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for frequent key updating and maintaining secure channels for all transactions. On the other 
hand, other schemes have also been proposed with instantaneous attribute revocation [41, 
50, 54, 55].        
Several researchers have worked to build systems that resist collusion attacks [56, 57]. 
These schemes [56, 57] use a secret sharing scheme in order to prevent the server from 
decrypting the ciphertexts or illegitimately granting permissions to revoked users to access 
the data. In addition, they achieve dynamic, immediate attribute and user revocation without 
updating keys of non-revoked users. However, these schemes can only revoke a limited 
number of users. On the other hand, some schemes can revoke an  unlimited number of 
users [45]. In [45], a unique identifier is associated with every user’s secret key, which is in 
turn used to construct the revocation information to be embedded in the ciphertext. 
However, the ciphertext size increases linearly with the number of revoked users, which has 
a negative impact on available storage capacities, particularly when the amount of data is 
large. 
Moreover, applying the revocation process consumes a lot of computing resources. The 
attribute revocable system proposed in [54] needs to update all keys for the non-revoked 
users and re-encrypt the related ciphertext, which leads to low scalability and high 
computational overheads. Other recent studies have utilized a refereed delegation of 
computation models to alleviate the computation overhead of the identity-based encryption 
during the revocation process [58, 59]. These schemes introduce an aided server which is a 
Key Update Cloud Service Provider, to outsource most operations of the key generation 
related to the revocation process. They assign, for each user, a hybrid private key which 
contains two types of component, identity and time components which are combined 
together using the AND gate. The users need periodically to contact the Key Update Cloud 
Service Provider to update their time components according to a revocation list. However, 
this approach requires the server to be honest.  
Moreover, some studies have developed an attribute revocation process using techniques 
based on issuing versions of users’ secret keys [50, 55]. In [55], each user uses the old 
versions of its secret key to get the newest one, which leads to  storing all versions of updated 
keys in the cloud to avoid a stateless receiver problem which happens when users lose their 
previous keys needed to compute their updated secret keys. However, keeping records of 
all the previous secret keys leads to a storage overhead. To overcome this problem, another 
CHAPTER 2: CP-ABE FOR OUTSOURCING DATA TO CLOUD 
25 
 
mechanism has been proposed. Only the latest secret key needs to be held by its 
corresponding users in [50]. Instead of updating all the non-revoked users’ secret keys and 
re-encrypting the ciphertexts, only the components in the secret keys and ciphertexts 
associated with the revoked attributes need to be updated. The workload of ciphertext update 
will be delegated to a server. Although this system improves the efficiency of the attribute 
revocation mechanism and reduces the storage overhead, it requires the cloud server to be 
semi-trusted in the sense that although the cloud does not have knowledge about the 
plaintexts, it has to possess parts of secret information and thus has to be trusted to deal with 
these secrets properly. 
A dynamic user revocation scheme was proposed by Xu et al. [60]. In this scheme, the cloud 
server is in charge of re-encrypting ciphertext by using its assigned delegation key. 
However, this scheme does not handle the attribute revocation. So, the user will lose its 
access right of accessing data in the system, when it is put on the revocation list even if it 
still has other access attributes. However, some studies have enabled CP-ABE with proxy 
re-encryption which transforms a ciphertext of a message into another ciphertext of the same 
message by a semi-trusted proxy server using a re-encrypting key without any knowledge 
of the underlying plaintext [61], to achieve the attribute and user revocation [62]. In the 
scheme of Zu et al.[62], two master keys are generated by the authority. One of them is sent 
to the cloud server to deal with the revocation process, and the other is used to derive the 
secret keys of users. So, when the revocation event occurs, the non-revoked users’ access 
rights would not be affected. Although this scheme does not need to update keys in the case 
of attribute revocation, there is a need to re-encrypt the ciphertext.  
In addition, some studies have been proposed to accelerate the revocation process by 
applying a mechanism to change  just the affected part of data instead of the entire one [63]. 
In such a scheme, the data is split into a number of slices using the variant of a secret sharing 
scheme (SSS) which is called All or Nothing, and then it is outsourced to the cloud. When 
a revocation process happens, only one slice needs to be retrieved by the data owner in order 
to re-encrypt and then re-upload it. However, the data owner must conduct the revocation 
process. To overcome the problem of the owner having to stay online all the time, the 
revocation process may not be executed immediately and also requires additional 
computation costs. 
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Recently, some works have been concerned about the attribute revocation issue.  In [64], 
the authors proposed a system which addresses the problem of revoking users and attributes 
dynamically. The revocation process is executed by the cloud server which re-encrypts the 
ciphertext according to the revocation list using the proxy re-encryption techniques, 
responds to the queries of the non-revoked users and partially decrypts the ciphertext for 
them. Moreover, the cloud server has additional shares of the system attributes that are used 
for attribute revocation. In this way, revoking one attribute from some users’ privileges will 
not affect the access of other legitimate users. Although the system outsources heavy 
computational tasks to a cloud server (in particular, re-encryption and a part of decryption 
operations) and addresses the problem of revoking users and attributes dynamically, the 
cloud is required to be semi-trusted. Therefore, the system does not resist against collusion 
attacks and partly grants the cloud server more control over data access. Moreover, the 
ciphertext size in this system increases linearly with the number of revoked users due to an 
additional ciphertext header and other components. 
Furthermore, adding new attributes to the updated access policy is a critical mission which 
some of the existing systems do not manage. However, the work in [65] addresses this 
problem. Although the access policy is enforced cryptographically, it can be changed 
dynamically without updating users’ secret keys. A dynamic policy update process is needed 
to transform an old LSS matrix to an updated one corresponding to their relevant policies. 
When the two matrices are compared, the attributes changed by the access policy updating 
and the corresponding vectors in the matrix will be recognised to change only the ciphertext 
components associated with those updated attributes. The distribution of the re-encrypted 
ciphertext after updating the policy is similar to the distribution of the old ciphertext. 
However, many changes frequently occur in a set of ciphertext components and these 
changes are done by the data owner. That means an additional computational burden on the 
data owner.  Moreover, the system re-randomizes the ciphertext before updating it. The re-
randomization cost is similar to the cost of the whole encryption ciphertext process which 
leads to communication and computation overhead. 
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Table 2.2: Classifying main existing systems based on the revocation type. 
Scheme Description Revocation type The problem 
[52, 53] 
Add an attribute 
expiration time to a 
user’s key 
User revocation Periodically 
[56, 57] 
Resist collusion 
attacks 
Attribute and 
user revocation 
Limited number 
[45] 
Revoke an unlimited 
number of users 
User revocation 
The Ciphertext size increases 
linearly with the number of 
revoked users 
[54] 
Consume a lot of 
computing resources 
Attribute 
revocation 
High computation overhead 
[58, 59] 
Alleviate the 
computation overhead 
Periodic attribute 
revocation 
Collusion attack 
[50, 55] 
Issue versions of users’ 
secret keys 
Attribute 
revocation 
Collusion attack 
[60] Dynamic revocation User revocation No attribute revocation 
[61] 
Enable CP-ABE with 
Proxy Re-Encryption 
Attribute 
revocation 
Collusion attack 
[62] Use two master keys 
Attribute and 
user revocation 
Collusion attack 
[63] 
Accelerate the 
revocation 
User revocation 
Computational burden on a data 
owner 
[64] Dynamic revocation 
Attribute and 
user revocation 
Collusion attack 
[65] Updated access policy 
Attribute 
revocation 
Computational burden on a data 
owner 
Moreover, some schemes have been built in a multi-authority cloud environment, where the 
attribute revocation problem is a more complicated issue. Most of the existing revocation 
techniques are either not efficient or based on a trusted server. So it is not sufficient to apply 
them to multi-authority schemes [66]. The scheme of Abraham and Sriramya [48] does not 
require a server to be totally trusted, because updating keys is carried out by each attribute 
authority and not by the cloud server. However, in this revocable scheme, the burden of the 
revocation process is shifted to the authorities which in turn are exposed to corruption due 
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to periodically communicating to system users. On the other hand, the identity-based 
revocation technique in a multi-authority system is introduced [41] which leads to 
distributing the computational overhead over a large number of users when they run the 
encryption and decryption algorithms. However, the computational burden for revocation 
has negative effects on the users.  
In cloud storage systems, granting trust to the server that is curious about a user’s privacy, 
or maintaining the data owner online all the time, is not an appropriate situation. In addition, 
the shortcomings of the existing schemes are: a) a lazy revocation process implying delay 
in revocation, b) issuing new secret keys to the non-revoked users, c) re-encrypting 
ciphertexts during user /attribute revocation, or d) expanding the ciphertext size.  All these 
issues highlight the real need for building a system, which securely outsources expensive 
computations to a server without any leakage of private information so as to achieve 
privacy-preserving revocation. This will achieve two essential perquisites. The first one is 
to prevent the cloud from colluding with the revoked users or gaining any information about 
the plaintext, and the other is to reduce the computation cost on the data owner.  
2.6 The Types of CP-ABE Scheme 
In terms of distributed control in an untrusted cloud environment and based on the way of 
granting authorization to users (i.e. depending on gaining secret keys by users from a single 
trusted entity or from a group of independent, cooperative entities), the CP-ABE schemes 
can be classified into two categories that are described below. 
2.6.1 The Single Authority Scheme 
Most of the existing systems employ one entity to have the power of generating the 
decryption private keys for all system users. In such schemes, one attribute authority 
administrates all system attributes. This authority has the master secret key that is used to 
derive all users’ decryption secret keys. These keys are distributed to the system users via 
secret channels. The inherent issue of this type of scheme is the key escrow problem that 
occurs due to the ability of an attribute authority to recover any ciphertext using its master 
key. However, the security assumption that such systems is based on, is that the authority is 
fully trusted. On the other hand, crashing or corrupting this entity affects the availability of 
the whole system. 
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In addition to the key escrow issue, due to the lack of schemes that can efficiently address 
some issues of CP-ABE, such as revocation and collusion resistance, many researchers have 
been motivated to construct a practical CP-ABE system using a single authority scheme 
(Table 2.3 shows a summary of these studies). Notably, some approaches have been 
introduced to eliminate the computation cost [67] for lightweight devices. This type of study 
uses a CP-ABE scheme to offer a constant size for both ciphertexts and secret keys. It uses 
one-way hash functions and an encryption algorithm to produce a ciphertext and a special 
polynomial function to generate a secret key by a key generation algorithm. However, it 
supports the AND-gate access structure. In addition, in this proposed scheme, the revocation 
problem is not taken into account. 
Furthermore, some recent work has been proposed to alleviate the computations to be 
appropriate for resources-limited mobile devices [68-70]. In [68], the system is introduced 
with a large attribute universe-based access control, when the space and number of system 
attributes are flexible and not limited in the setup phase, and outsources decryption to the 
cloud. This single-authority system uses the LSSS access structure. While in [69, 70] the 
online-offline technique is used to eliminate most  computations. The online/offline CP-
ABE scheme in [69] is proposed to mitigate the online-encryption computation burden on 
an e-healthcare record (EHR) owner by splitting these computations into offline 
computations which are performed before knowing the data and specifying the access 
policy, and few online computations which are required to keep the battery life long-lasting. 
In this scheme, LSS is used to encode the access policy. However, these systems [68-70] do 
not address the revocation problem.  
In the scenario of encrypting medical records where a data owner (patient) ought to generate 
a secret key to system users, outsourcing the operation of key generation is desirable. 
Therefore, some researchers have proposed a fully outsourced ABE scheme [71] that 
achieves outsourced key generation, encryption and decryption. The system supports the 
LSSS access structure. In terms of outsourcing the key generation and reducing the 
communication cost (e.g. battery consumption), the server will generate an intermediate 
secret key with only knowing the public key which can be downloaded later by the user 
after charging its mobile without draining the battery (i.e. the outsourcing operation is 
offline).  To protect the master secret key and the private keys, the data owners hire two 
different servers to generate secret keys. However, the two servers colluding with each other 
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means the whole system is under collusion attacks. Furthermore, the revocation problem is 
not considered in this system. 
Moreover, outsourcing the heavy operations of CP-ABE to fog computing has also attracted 
a lot of researchers’ attention [34]. Fog computing is a paradigm extended from the cloud 
computing. Such a scheme [34] uses the access tree as an access structure. The system 
proposes an approach to outsource part of the encryption and decryption operations to fog 
nodes in order to minimise the computational burden on the data owners and system users, 
respectively. In addition, the system addresses the attribute change by updating the secret 
keys for all affected-system users who share the updated attribute. However, sending the 
updated key to those users via a secure channel causes communication and computation 
overheads. Furthermore, the system assumes that the cloud service provider, fog nodes and 
the attribute authority are semi trusted. 
On the other hand, some studies have been carried out to reduce the computation cost of the 
ABE by using a pairing-free ABE system [72, 73]. In [72], the system also eliminates the 
transmission overhead on the secure channel by sending the large part of a secret key on a 
public channel to the users while sending only the blinding factor via a secret channel. 
However, using the pairing instead is more reliable and secure. In addition, this scheme does 
not use the LSSS to distribute the attributes in the users’ secret keys, which is a more 
expressive access structure than the threshold scheme that this scheme used. Moreover, the 
revocation problem is not taken into account by the authors. 
In [73], beside reducing the complexity of ABE by using pairing-free ABE, invalidating the 
leaked keys of non-revoked users and the revoked keys is considered. When a key of a non-
revoked user is accidently leaked or revoked upon attribute revocation, a key-insulation 
technique is utilised to divide the system lifetime into several periods. At each period of 
time, only one part of the secret key can be updated by the authority which computes the 
updating components and sends them to the authorized users. The authority uses a random 
number for each period of time. The system supports the tree access structure. However, the 
system does not support an instant key invalidation operation. Alternatively, the revocation 
happens periodically. Furthermore, a heavy computation cost is imposed on data owners 
thanks to re-encrypting a plaintext at each period of time.  
Furthermore, work has been done not only to outsource the decryption operation to a cloud 
server but also go further to verify that the outsourced decryption carried out by the cloud, 
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is correct [74]. The verification technique transforms a ciphertext using some processes with 
the blinded secret key. Then before computing the plaintext, a user compares each 
transformed ciphertext component with the corresponding, original ciphertext component 
to retrieve the blinded value. In this case, the outsourced decryption is verified. The tree 
access structure is used in this system. However, the system uses a big size of ciphertext as 
well as incurring a heavy computation cost. In addition, the revocation problem facing any 
access control system is not addressed. 
As a result of the importance of protecting health information which may be revealed by 
access policies, some studies have been proposed to hide an access policy in CP-ABE 
schemes [75]. This system [75] uses a large attribute universe and partially hides an access 
policy. The system handles any expressive access policies represented as LSSS. However, 
some additional computational operations are added before the decryption phase for testing 
whether a user’s attributes satisfy the access policy, imposing more burdens on a user. 
Furthermore, the scheme does not consider the revocation problem. 
In addition, recent studies have been proposed to achieve more security by hiding the access 
policy [76, 77]. In [77], the authors present a CP-ABE scheme that provides two features. 
The first one is to hide the attribute values from the attribute authority. That happens by 
utilising the 1-out-of-n oblivious transfer technique that can send attributes in a fuzzy 
selection manner to the authority; in this case, the authority can generate the secret key 
without knowing the attribute value. The second one is to protect the type of attribute in the 
access policy that is embedded in the ciphertext using the attribute bloom filter approach to 
check whether an attribute belongs to the hidden access policy without revealing it. The 
LSSS access structure is supported in this system. However, more computational operations 
are incurred by a data owner and users. These operations increase linearly with the 
complexity increase of the access structure and the number of the users’ attributes. 
Furthermore, in terms of communication overhead, more information needs to be sent to the 
attribute authority. In addition, the revocation problem is not managed. 
Although most of the existing systems can hide access structures and support restricted 
access structures with a composite order group of which the order is a product of two large 
primes, the scheme in [76] introduces a mechanism to partially hide  access structures with 
enabling the expressive LSSS access structure in a prime-order group which is a cyclic 
group with a prime-number order. Pairing performance in a  scheme with a composite order 
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group is about 50 times lower than the same pairing in the prime order group [78]. In general, 
each attribute consists of a name and a value. In this scheme [76], the attributes’ values in 
the access policy are hidden by the data owner due to their sensitivity. The authors use the 
randomness splitting mechanism to protect the values of the attributes by hiding them in the 
ciphertext. However, the revocation problem is not dealt with. Furthermore, expensive 
operations are needed to compute the ciphertext and each user’s private key as well as 
increasing size of the ciphertext.  
Table 2.3: Summary of main existing systems and their limitations 
Scheme Description Access Structure The problem 
Odelu et al [67] Eliminate the computation 
cost for lightweight devices 
AND-gate  Lack of 
revocation 
Fu et al [68] Provide large attribute 
universe-based access 
control 
LSSS Lack of 
revocation 
Liu et al and Li et al  
[69, 70] 
Offer online-offline 
techniques to eliminate 
most computations 
LSSS  Lack of 
revocation 
Zhang et al. [71] Propose a fully outsourced 
ABE scheme 
LSSS Lack of 
revocation 
Zhan et al. [34] Outsource the heavy 
operations of CP-ABE to 
fog computing 
Access Tree   Inefficient 
revocation 
Karati et al.[72] Reduce the computation 
cost of ABE by using 
pairing-free ABE 
Threshold  Lack of 
revocation 
Hong and Sun [73] Reduce the computation 
cost of ABE by using 
pairing-free ABE 
Access Tree   Periodical 
revocation  
Kumar et al. [74] Outsource and verify the 
decryption operation 
Access Tree   Lack of 
revocation 
Zhang  et al. [75] Hide an access policy in 
CP-ABE schemes 
LSSS  Lack of 
revocation 
Cui et al. and Han et 
al. [76, 77] 
Hide an access policy in 
CP-ABE schemes 
LSSS  Lack of 
revocation 
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However, it is essential to consider the problems that single authority schemes create. These 
include 1) the diversity of attributes that are hard to manage by only one authority, 2) the key 
escrow problem that occurs when the single authority is not totally trustworthy and has the 
ability to gain access to all users’ keys, and 3) the security failure that creates a serious 
problem when the authority is compromised by an adversary that gains the system’s master 
key. A multi-authority scheme is suitable for resolving these weaknesses. 
2.6.2 The Multi-Authority Attribute based Access Control System 
To tackle the single authority schemes’ problems, an effective way is introduced to minimize 
the trust level of the single authority, strengthen the privacy of user data and enhance the 
system security and performance by replacing the single authority with multiple ones for 
disjoint attribute management that becomes much harder for an adversary to compromise. 
Therefore, in this section, the type of scheme that allows securely storing data on a public 
cloud storage system and employs multiple authorities which manage sets of attributes, is 
presented.  
A critical challenge of current multi-authority access control systems (also all single 
authority schemes) is the inefficiency of the key generation process. This issue occurs in the 
single authority systems when one authority manages all attributes in a system and issues 
secret keys for all system users. Therefore, compromising or crashing this authority makes 
the whole system unavailable. The same issue happens in multiple authorities schemes, 
when each authority in the system administrates a disjoint attribute set (i.e. each authority 
administrates a different set of attributes), which presents a performance bottleneck. To 
mitigate the effects of this issue, all attribute sets ought to be managed by all system attribute 
authorities individually (i.e. joint attribute sets).  
Although many recent multi-authority CP-ABE schemes have been proposed [79, 80], some 
limitations are still not considered. The existing multi-authority access control systems can 
be classified into three categories with their limitations summarised below:  
• The first type of scheme (e.g. a scheme by Han et al. [81]) contains many 
authorities that have to work together, resulting in a high communication cost and 
lack of scalability since it is hard for authorities to join or leave freely. 
Furthermore, these authorities might collude with each other and combine their 
information to gain unauthorized data about the users. 
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• The second type needs a central authority to tie the work of all authorities together, 
and to be involved in issuing users’ secret keys besides having the master key (e.g. 
the work by Liu et al. [82]). The drawbacks of this type of scheme are that the 
concept seems contradictory to distributed control and it incurs low performance 
and a security bottleneck.  
• Decentralized systems are the third type of the multi-authority access control 
system, which remove any central authority and employ independent attribute 
authorities, where the systems are scalable (e.g. the system proposed by Ruj et al. 
[83]). For this type of system, user revocation is hard to address, which incurs a 
heavy computational cost. 
The first multi-authority access control system was proposed by Chase et al. [84]. This 
system uses a central authority as an active entity, which generates users’ secret keys, co-
operates with the system attribute authorities that manage disjoint attribute sets and 
distribute the secret keys. The problem with this system is the central authority has the 
master key that can be used to decrypt all ciphertexts. This means that the central authority 
represents a performance and security bottleneck. The system also does not address the 
revocation problem. 
Yang et al. [17] proposed a decentralized access control model by using  multi authorities 
with a semi-active central authority which is only in charge of initialising the system. In their 
system, part of the decryption operation is outsourced to a cloud server to mitigate the burden 
of decryption on a user. Moreover, the system supports the revocation process. However, in 
the revocation phase, heavy computation is put on attribute authorities (AAs) for computing 
an update key for each non-revoked user. Since the attributes change frequently, this 
approach becomes a performance killer and not practical in cloud access control systems. In 
addition, the attribute set in this system is divided into various disjoint subsets where each 
one is driven by one authority. Once an authority is compromised, the adversary can gain the 
corresponding private keys of its attributes, which in turn affects the performance of the 
whole system.   
Another multi-authority scheme has been proposed [85] to advance the system in [17] by 
jointly managing a system attribute set. In this work, a verifiable threshold multi-authority 
access control model with a semi-active central authority is introduced using a secret sharing 
approach to generate a shared master key among multiple authorities, where all the attribute 
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authorities collaborate with each other to create the key. In this scheme, users’ secret keys 
can be generated by contacting a threshold number of attribute authorities. However, this 
system does not address the revocation problem. In addition, some communication and 
computation are needed among the authorities to exchange their shares and reconstruct the 
master key. Furthermore, a heavy computational workload is placed on users.  
Moreover, some researchers have claimed that they propose a revocable threshold multi-
authority access control system with the management of joint attribute sets [86] to advance 
the system in [85]. However, the theoretical model that is presented in this work, uses an 
access tree as an access structure, unlike the scheme in [85], which uses LSSS as an access 
structure. Moreover, the theoretical model shows that the system is performed as a single 
authority access control system, not as the authors have claimed. Furthermore, the system 
does not address the attribute revocation problem. In addition, the experimental results are 
vague. The same issue occurs with another study [87] which is not as its authors have 
claimed.  
Administrating joint attribute sets is advocated in [88]. This system adopts the technique in 
[85] and employs a framework to eliminate communication costs by efficiently assigning a 
part of the secret key generation task to the central authority. Since this assigning operation 
is based on receiving intermediate keys from 𝑡 attribute authorities where these keys are 
associated with attributes, this operation does not affect negatively on solving the single-
point performance bottleneck problem with the other systems. However, the system does not 
address the revocation problem and assumes that the central authority is fully trusted and has 
the master key, meaning that the compromised central authority with one corrupted attribute 
authority can break the system security. 
Although CP-ABE schemes give data owners more control over their data, a decentralised 
system with multiple, uncoordinated authorities has been proposed to increase data owners’ 
control over the data by giving them more privileges to restrict access to a fraction of data 
[89]. In this scheme, even if the user’s attribute set fulfils a data owner’s access policy, the 
user can decrypt a fraction of a related ciphertext according to how many fractions are 
specified by the data owner. The data owner encrypts its whole data once using one policy 
and different symmetric keys. The approach utilized is chunk based encryption which 
divides data into several chunks and a different symmetric key is used to encrypt each chunk. 
This scheme uses LSSS as an access structure. However, although the scheme improves the 
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encryption process, it makes the key generation process more complicated. In addition, it 
does not manage the revocation problem. 
Recently, some studies have  been carried out to devise a decentralized multi-authority 
system with no central authority and without any interactions among the authorities involved 
[90], where the attribute sets are disjoint. The authors proposed an approach to hide the 
access policy and resolve the revocation problem. However, upon each revocation event, 
expensive computational operations are needed. These include updating the secret keys for 
all non-revoked users after generating an updated key (containing the new version of the 
revoked attributes) by the authorities and re-encrypting the components of the ciphertext 
already stored on the cloud server and associated with the revoked attributes. Furthermore, 
heavy computations are put onto the data owner due to its heavy responsibilities. These 
include the data owner’s responsibilities for encrypting the ciphertext, hiding the access 
policy by replacing each attribute in the access policy by a value of pairing between the hash 
value of that attribute and the public key of the authority that drives this attribute, re-
encrypting the cipher-text, and sending it again to the cloud server.   
Another recent work is proposed in [91]. It uses a decentralized multi-authority scheme with 
accountability to trace the misbehaving users who leak their decryption keys. In the system, 
each attribute authority deals with a disjoint attribute set. Although there is no central 
authority in the system, there are some interactions among the authorities to share a secret 
function. In addition, the system hides the attribute information in the ciphertext. However, 
the system uses an AND-gate access policy in an inflexible way and also managing the 
accountability leads to an increased ciphertext size because part of the ciphertext that deals 
with an access policy, is specified to include authorized users’ identities with ‘*’ used if no 
specific identity is required. Furthermore, the number of authorities is defined in the system 
initialization phase, which means the system is not scalable afterwards. Moreover, in this 
system, the most critical revocation issue is not addressed.  
Some recent studies have claimed to solve the problem of key escrow, prevent the key-abuse 
attack and minimise the level of single authority trust by proposing an accountable authority 
[92, 93] instead of using a multi-authority scheme. The work in [92] proposes two 
accountable, revocable systems that manage the problem of accountability, traceability and 
privilege revocation of malicious users. However, in these two systems, the researchers use 
two techniques for revocation. The first one uses a revocation list and embeds it in the 
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ciphertext leading to an increase in the ciphertext size, while the second approach 
implements periodical key updating that comes with an additional cost of communications 
and computations by issuing an updated key for non-revoked users. Moreover, it is not an 
effective solution to use an accountable authority as an alternative of multiple authorities 
due to the lack of administrating a wide range of attributes. The work uses a composite order 
group, which needs complicated processes and makes the system less efficient than a prime 
order group.  
In addition, some researchers proposed a multi-authority scheme with a hidden-structure 
attribute based encryption [94]. They use a tree access structure and disjoint attribute set. In 
this system, a central authority plays a main role of creating the system master key sent to all 
attribute authorities. This concept works similarly to a single authority approach, which lacks 
decentralisation and represents a security bottleneck. Moreover, the system inefficiently 
addresses the revocation problem. After each revocation process, the central authority has to 
update the revocation list and re-issue a new master secret key and send it to all authorities 
in the system in a secure manner. These authorities regenerate new secret keys for all non-
revoked users. 
To sum up, a multi-authority CP-ABE scheme is an appropriate solution to addressing 
security and privacy issues as well as enhancing the performance in the cloud environment. 
However, the current work has several limitations with notable ones listed in Table 2.4, 
including inefficient revocation, high communication and computation costs, and inefficient 
key generation. These challenges highlight an urgent need to propose a multi-authority 
scheme that can not only securely outsource expensive computations to cloud without 
revealing private information but also efficiently control user access privileges. Outsourcing 
computations to the cloud reduces the computation costs on data owners and users while 
allowing user access privileges to be efficiently elevated or revoked according to a policy 
update process.  
2.7 Summary 
Some mentioned benefits, requirements and weaknesses in this section are summarized as 
follows: 
1- Traditional cryptographic techniques suffer some problems. These include a key 
distribution and management problem, lack of efficiency of the computational 
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operations and lack of proper usability in cloud environments (where there is a group 
of recipients). 
2- The CP-ABE technique is chosen to be a promising technique for access control due 
to its benefits. The main benefits are to enable fine-grained access control in an 
encrypted form, support highly expressive policies, offer a good solution to data 
confidentiality, and provide collusion resistance between misbehaving authorized 
users. 
Table 2.4: Summary of main of the existing systems and their limitations 
Scheme Description The problem Attribute 
set 
Han et al.[81] The authorities have to work with 
each other 
High communication 
cost 
Disjoint 
Liu et al.[82] Using an active central authority to 
administrate attributes 
Security bottleneck Disjoint 
Lin et al.[95] Decentralized threshold authorities 
work together without a central 
authority 
Lack of revocation Disjoint 
Ruj et al. [83] Decentralized system without a 
central authority  
Lack of revocation Disjoint 
Li et al.[96] 
 
The central authority is not involved 
in generating secret keys 
Support AND access 
structure which is not 
expressive 
Disjoint 
 
3- There are some issues related to the CP-ABE scheme. The first issue is that it is 
difficult to handle the attribute/user revocation problem. The second one is that the 
collusion attack issue may arise due to trusting a cloud server that may collude with 
the revoked users and combine their information together to access unauthorized 
data. 
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4- Crucial requirements are needed to handle the revocation problem. These 
requirements are to a) permit instantaneous banning of a malicious user, b) invalidate 
the secret keys of the revoked users to prevent collusion attacks, c) remove or even 
reduce the computation overhead of a revocation process, and d) support forward 
security. 
5- The shortcomings of dealing with the revocation issue in the existing schemes are: 
a) a lazy revocation process implying delay in revocation, b) high computation 
overhead due to updating all secret keys of the non-revoked users and re-encrypting 
ciphertexts, or d) expanding the ciphertext size. 
6- In the existing work, to avoid the collusion attack, the orientation is to maintain the 
data owner online all the time or to grant trust to the server that is curious about a 
user’s privacy, or. 
7- Based on the distributed control, CP-ABE schemes can be classified into two 
different schemes. The first type is a single authority CP-ABE scheme, where all 
attributes are handled by a single authority. The second one is a multi-authority CP-
ABE scheme in which different authorities manage the system attributes. 
8- The security assumption that single-authority systems are based on, is that the 
authority is fully trusted. The issues, which single authority schemes create, include 
a) the difficulty of handling the diversity of attributes by only one authority, b) the 
key escrow problem, and 3) the security failure that creates a serious problem when 
the authority is compromised by an adversary.  
9- To minimize the trust level of the single authority, strengthen the privacy of user data 
and enhance the system security and performance, the single authority is replaced 
with multiple ones to make it harder for an adversary to compromise a system. 
10- A multi-authority CP-ABE scheme is an appropriate solution for addressing security 
and privacy issues as well as enhancing the performance in the cloud environment. 
However, the current work has several limitations including the difficulty of 
efficiently addressing the revocation problem, high communication and computation 
costs, and the inefficiency of the key generation process. 
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Chapter 3: Preliminaries, Basics and 
Technical Approaches 
3 Introduction 
The high-level mathematical background of pairings and some basic principles of pairing-
based cryptography, which CP-ABE is built on, are reviewed in this chapter. In addition, a 
brief study of techniques that deal with access-control policies and the ways to embed these 
policies in ciphertexts is provided, especially, those that are relevant to our proposed work. 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.1 introduces some relevant mathematical 
tools. Pairing-based cryptography is presented in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 describes 
Shamir’s secret sharing scheme (SSSS). Section 3.4 provides the types of access structure, 
its representation approaches and an example of how to represent an access policy using a 
linear secret sharing scheme (LSSS). The complexity assumptions, the selective security 
model, the Waters’ system that our proposed scheme in Chapter 4 is based on, and the 
summary of this chapter are discussed in Sections 3.5, 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8, respectively. 
3.1 Mathematical Tool 
To understand the cryptographic algorithms that will be presented in the subsequent 
chapters, some mathematical methods need to be introduced. In this section, these methods 
are briefly described. For a more extensive introduction of the methods, please refer to the 
relevant references given throughout the chapter for details.  
3.1.1 Group 
A group (𝐺,∗) is a set of elements 𝐺 which is associated to a binary operation (*) which 
takes any two elements in the group, and combines them to form a third element in that 
group [97]. If the set and the operation satisfy the four group properties, it will qualify as a 
group. These properties are described as follows:  
1. Closure: Ɐ𝑎, 𝑏 ∈ 𝐺, then 𝑎 ∗ 𝑏 ∈ 𝐺   
2. Associativity: Ɐ𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐 ∈ 𝐺, 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑎 ∗ (𝑏 ∗ 𝑐)  =  (𝑎 ∗ 𝑏) ∗ 𝑐  
3. Identity element: There exists one identity element 𝑒 which has the property such 
that    Ɐ𝑎 ∈ 𝐺, 𝑎 ∗ 𝑒 =  𝑎  
4. Inverse: Every element has an inverse, that is: Ɐ𝑎 ∈ 𝐺, ∃𝑏 ∈ 𝐺 such that 𝑎 ∗ 𝑏 =
 𝑒  
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A group is finite when it has a finite number of elements. |𝐺| or #𝐺 is the order of a finite 
group, which is the number of elements in its set. A group is called an abelian group, if it 
has an additional property as follows:  
• Commutative: Ɐ𝑎, 𝑏 ∈ 𝐺, (𝑎 ∗ 𝑏)  =  (𝑏 ∗ 𝑎) 
In most cases in cryptography, this property is used because it makes the groups 
cryptographically useful (for example,𝑔𝑥𝑦 = 𝑔𝑦𝑥). 
An abelian group is called a cyclic group if there is a single element 𝒈, from which all other 
elements in the group can be obtained by frequently applying the group operation to 𝒈. Such 
an element 𝒈 is called the generator of the group and is mathematically denoted as 〈𝑔〉. 
3.1.2 Finite Fields 
A ﬁnite ﬁeld (F) is a mathematical group with a ﬁnite number of elements and two binary 
operations and satisfies the usual arithmetic properties: 
1. (𝐹, +) is an abelian group with additive identity denoted by 0. 
2. (𝐹\{0}, . ) is an abelian group with its multiplicative identity denoted by 1. 
3. The distributive law holds: Ɐ𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐 ∈  𝐹   (𝑎 + 𝑏). 𝑐 = (𝑎. 𝑐) + (𝑏. 𝑐)   
 An example of a ﬁnite ﬁeld is all the integers modulo a prime number 𝑝. This ﬁnite ﬁeld is 
denoted by 𝑍𝑝 (e.g Z5\{0}={1,2,3,4} is a finite field ). 
Any two fields of the same number of elements (order) are said to be isomorphic, meaning 
that they are structurally the same. It is possible to map between two isomorphic fields (for 
example, F1 and F2) using a field isomorphism Փ: 
                                      Փ: F1→F2 
3.1.3 Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) 
The discrete logarithm problem (DLP) [98] is the basis for a one–way function. DLP is a 
logarithm defined with regard to cyclic groups. If G is a cyclic group of order n and g is a 
generator of G, then from the definition of cyclic groups, any element h in G can be 
calculated as gx for some x. The discrete logarithm of h to the base g in the group G is 
defined to be x. We denote that as 𝑥 =  𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑔 h. For example, if the group is Z5 , and the 
generator is 2, then the discrete logarithm of 1 is 4 because 24  ≡  1 𝑚𝑜𝑑 5. Discrete 
logarithm problem is not always hard. The hardness of finding discrete logarithms depends 
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on the groups. In the conventional cryptographic schemes, the order of the group n must be 
prime and very large (usually at least 1024-bit) to make the cryptographic systems safe.  
3.1.4 The Diffie-Hellman Protocol (DHP) 
DHP is one of the existing standard protocols that uses the discrete logarithm problem to 
work in finite fields and elliptic curves. The Diffie-Helman problem is closely related to the 
hardness of computing the discrete logarithm problem over a cyclic group. For instance, 
Alice and Bob are two people who want to exchange their keys using the Diffie-Hellman 
protocol. They pick a cyclic group 𝐺 with order 𝑝 and a generator 𝑔. Then they randomly 
choose 𝑎, 𝑏 ∈ [1, 𝑝] and start exchanging 𝑔𝑎, 𝑔𝑏. In that case, the secret key equals 𝑔𝑎𝑏. 
The Diffie-Hellman function that is hard to be computed by any passive attack is defined 
as: 
𝐷𝐻(𝑔𝑎, 𝑔𝑏) =  𝑔𝑎𝑏 
That is what is called Computational Diffie-Hellman Assumption (CDHA). However, this 
assumption alone cannot provide a sufficient level of security [99] due to the ability of the 
attacker to collect useful information and predict a big part of the secret key. Therefore, 
alternatively, most of the existing cryptographic systems capture a stronger assumption, 
which is the Decisional Diffie-Hellman Assumption (DDHA). In particular, it is hard to 
distinguish between two tuples  〈𝑔𝑎, 𝑔𝑏 ,  𝑔𝑎𝑏〉 and 〈𝑔𝑎, 𝑔𝑏 ,  𝑔𝑐〉. 
3.2 Pairing-Based Cryptography 
Pairing-Based Cryptography (PBC) [100] is an area that uses pairings to construct complex 
cryptographic schemes. This type of cryptography is based on elliptic curve cryptography. 
The main idea of such schemes is to create a function that takes two points on an elliptic 
curve group to output an element in a finite field, which is called a pairing 𝑒. This mapping 
allows reducing the Decisional Diﬃe-Helman problem in one group to an easier, different 
problem (i.e. Computational Diﬃe-Helman problem) in another group, where many 
cryptographic schemes are based on this reduction process. 
3.2.1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography 
Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is a type of public key encryption based on elliptic curve 
groups over ﬁnite ﬁelds [101]. An elliptic curve 𝐸 is the set of points (𝑥, 𝑦) with 𝑥 and 𝑦 
elements of a finite field 𝐹𝑞 described by the equation: 
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                                       𝑦2  =  𝑥3  +  𝑎𝑥 +  𝑏  
where 𝑎 and 𝑏 are parameters which determine the shape of the curve. In addition, it requires 
that the discriminant ∆= 4𝑎3 + 27𝑏2 is nonzero. Equivalently, the polynomial 𝑥3  +  𝑎𝑥 +
 𝑏 has distinct roots. This ensures that the curve is non-singular. Moreover, there is a need 
to a point at inﬁnity 𝜑. So 𝐸 is the set of: 
  𝐸 =  {(𝑥, 𝑦): 𝑦2  =  𝑥3  +  𝑎𝑥 +  𝑏} ∪ {𝜑} 
Geometry can be used to make the points of an elliptic curve into a group. An elliptic curve 
group G consists of the elliptic curve points and a group operation called addition, denoted 
by ’+’. Furthermore, the point at inﬁnity serves as the identity element, where adding points 
on an elliptic curve is closure. The addition law on the elliptic curve group has properties 
that are shown as follows:  
(a) 𝑃 +  𝜑 =  𝜑 + 𝑃 = 𝑃                       Ɐ P∈E. 
(b) 𝑃 + (−𝑃)  =  𝜑                                 Ɐ P∈E  
(c) 𝑃 + (𝑄 + 𝑅)  =  (𝑃 + 𝑄)  + 𝑅          Ɐ P, Q, R ∈E. 
The addition operation of elliptic curve groups has the property of being commutative, i.e. 
Ɐ P,Q ∈G then P + Q = Q + P. Elliptic curve groups could enable shorter keys, while 
providing a similar level of security to the conventional multiplicative group of a finite field.  
Due to the small key sizes of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) and relatively fast 
computations, ECC becomes the most popular choice for public key encryption at many 
applications especially those which use sensors (e.g. to achieve a 80-bit security level, there 
is a need to use 1024-bit key in RSA while a 160-bit curve in ECC is needed).  
The difficult issues that most elliptic-curve cryptographic schemes are based on are DLP 
and CDH problems. These problems can provide a sufficient level of security if the related 
parameters are chosen properly. While the security assumption that the pairing based 
cryptography relies on is the decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem and up to now 
there are no known attacks breaking this problem. 
3.2.2 Bilinear Pairing 
Let 𝐺0 and 𝐺𝑇 be bilinear, cyclic groups of prime order p, and 𝑔 be a generator of 𝐺0 [102]. 
A map 𝑒 ∶  𝐺0  ×  𝐺0  → 𝐺𝑇 denotes a bilinear map if the following properties are satisfied: 
1. 𝐁𝐢𝐥𝐢𝐧𝐞𝐚𝐫𝐢𝐭𝐲: for all 𝑔 ∈ 𝐺0 and 𝑎, 𝑏 ∈ 𝑍𝑝,     𝑒(𝑔
𝑎, 𝑔𝑏)  =  𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝑎𝑏 = 𝑒(𝑔𝑏 , 𝑔𝑎)  
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2. Non-degeneracy: 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)  ≠  1, where 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)  is a generator of 𝐺𝑇. 
There are two common types of bilinear pairings, which are Tate pairing and Weil pairing. 
These pairings become useful due to the bilinearity property. The main difference between 
them is the speed of computation where Tate pairing is faster. 
3.3 Shamir’s Secret Sharing Scheme (SSSS) 
Shamir's secret sharing scheme [103] is a threshold scheme in which the secret is divided 
into several parts (shares) and it requires just some of these parts to reconstruct the whole 
secret. If someone has fewer than the required parts, the secret will not be determined. This 
scheme is based on polynomial interpolation, where the basic idea of this scheme is to use 
𝑘 points to define a (𝑘 − 1) degree polynomial (e.g. two points are required to uniquely 
define a line which is a one-degree polynomial). SSSS consists of the following two 
protocols: 
• The distribution protocol, where a data owner with a secret 𝑆 generates and 
distributes the shares of 𝑆 amongst n users in a (𝑘 𝑜𝑓 𝑛) threshold fashion with 𝑘 < 𝑛. The 
protocol allows the owner to pick a random (𝑘 − 1) degree polynomial 𝑓(𝑥) = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑥 +
⋯+ 𝑎𝑘−1𝑥
𝑘−1 and set 𝑓(0) = 𝑆, where 𝑎0 = 𝑆 and (𝑎1, 𝑎2, … 𝑎𝑘−1) are randomly chosen. 
Each share (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑓(𝑥𝑖)) (1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛) is then created by computing 𝑛 points on the polynomial.   
• The reconstruction protocol, where an authorized set of k users recover secret 𝑆 by 
binding their shares together using the Lagrange interpolation. 
3.3.1 Lagrange Polynomial 
The Lagrange interpolating polynomial is the unique polynomial 𝑃(𝑥) which passes through 
a set of 𝑛 given points {(𝑥1, 𝑦1), (𝑥2, 𝑦2),… , (𝑥𝑛, 𝑦𝑛)} where  𝑦𝑖 = 𝑃(𝑥𝑖)  {Ɐ𝑖: 1 ≤  𝑖 ≤  𝑛}. 
The degree of this polynomial is the least degree that assumes these points (i.e. 𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒 ≤
 (𝑛 − 1)). The Lagrange polynomial 𝑃(𝑥) is computed (as in Equation 3.1): 
𝑃(𝑥) = ∑ 𝑃𝑗(𝑥)
𝑛
𝑗=1
, where                                                  (3.1) 
𝑃𝑗(𝑥) = 𝑦𝑗 ∏
𝑥 − 𝑥𝑘
𝑥𝑗−𝑥𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=1,𝑘≠𝑗
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3.4 The Access Structure and its Representation Approaches 
The CP-ABE scheme is almost like a real access control scheme due to its expressiveness. 
This technique allows a data owner to formulate its policies over a set of attributes and 
credentials for different groups of users. These policies that can be represented by an access 
structure are mandatory to be applied in a cryptographic manner by the owner who uses 
these policies to encrypt its data and store it on the cloud.  
An attribute is a piece of information that describes the properties, features or characteristics 
of an object [14]. This information can be recognised by either automated or human 
approaches. For example, an attribute could be a department (e.g. engineering, computer 
science, etc.), an occupation (e.g. teacher, student, researcher, etc.), and experience years 
(e.g. two-years, five-years, etc.). 
To illustrate the approach of CP-ABE, for example, suppose a data owner encrypts a 
message under a policy indicated as (Physics AND (Master Student OR PhD Student)), 
where “Physics”, “Master Student”, and “PhD Student” are attributes. In this way, the 
owner is able to gain more control over the outsourced encrypted data without needing to 
know the identities of the eligible users. Once a user’s attributes satisfy the access policy 
associated with the encrypted data, it is able to recover the associated plaintext.  
There are two types of access structure, which are the monotone and non-monotone access 
structures [104]. The monotone access structure is defined as:  
Definition 3.1: “Suppose a set of parties 𝒫 = {𝑃1, 𝑃2, … . , 𝑃𝑛}.  A collection 𝔸 ⊆ 2
{𝑃1,𝑃2,….,𝑃𝑛} 
is monotone if for any B and C: if B ∈  𝔸 and B ⊆ C then 𝐶 ∈  𝔸. A monotone access 
structure is a collection 𝔸 of non-empty subsets {𝑃1, 𝑃2, … . , 𝑃𝑛}. The sets in 𝔸 are called the 
authorized sets, and the sets not in  𝔸 are called unauthorized sets” [105]. 
The non-monotone access structure is to indicate that the absence of attributes in the 
ciphertext ought to be included explicitly, where the negative word ”NOT” is used to 
describe every such attribute. For example, in a teaching hospital, to allow only doctors and 
medical students to access data, we need to explicitly add the attribute “NOT: nurses AND 
NOT: staff members AND NOT: optometrist”, and any negative attributes to the access 
policy express that such users are not allowed to decrypt the ciphertext, without mentioning 
doctors and medical students, because all attributes in this type of access structure should 
be negative. However, using this type of access structure has some drawbacks. The most 
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important ones are storage and computation overheads due to the increase in the sizes of the 
ciphertext, an access policy and the secret key.  
Therefore, in our thesis, we suppose that attributes are similar to parties and only monotone 
access structures are considered. Three common, monotone access structures are used for 
representing any access policy in CP-ABE systems. Where any monotone Boolean formulas 
involve AND, OR and threshold operations, an access policy can be transformed into one 
of these methods: 1) a monotone AND-gate access structure, 2) a (𝑡, 𝑛)-threshold access 
tree and 3) LSS matrices. Table 3.1 shows a brief summary of various schemes with 
different access structure representations. 
Table 3.1: Summary of the complexity of the access structures in various CP-ABE 
schemes 
Scheme Access structure representation approach 
Phuong et al.[106] AND-gate 
Nishide et al.[107] AND-gate 
Li et al.[108] Tree 
Lai et al.[109] LSSS 
Cui et al.[110] 
 
LSSS 
 
To describe the methods of access structures realization, the AND-gate access structure is a 
restricted, inexpressive form of the access structure due to supporting only policies with 
logical conjunction. On the other hand, although the tree access structure is a more flexible, 
expressive form than the AND-gate one because it supports “AND”, “OR”, and “threshold” 
operations (as illustrated in Figure 3.1), it is hard to be applied to a multi-authority system. 
The LSSS access structure is a more flexible, expressive, popular and efficient tool because 
each attribute (that is already connected with other attributes in the access structure) can be 
dealt with independently and it is easier to apply some mathematical operations to a matrix 
than a tree structure. 
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Figure 3.1: Threshold access tree with five attributes located in the leaf nodes and the 
Boolean AND gate and the threshold gate in the non-leaf nodes 
These realization methods are used for describing the access policy and enforcing it into the 
ciphertext. In our scheme, the ciphertext-policy attribute based encryption scheme uses 
LSSS matrices to implement monotone access structures, which are included in each 
ciphertext. The reasons for that are when the access policy is represented as an LSSS matrix, 
it is difficult to be comprehended by anyone who is not an expert (as shown in Equation 
3.2). In addition, this tool is highly expressive. 
𝑊 =
[
 
 
 
 
1 1 0
1 2 1
1 2 2
1 2 3
1 2 4 ]
 
 
 
 
 
𝜌(1) = 𝐴
𝜌(2) = 𝐵
𝜌(3) = 𝐶
𝜌(4) = 𝐷
𝜌(5) = 𝐸
                    (3.2) 
Where W is a matrix and the function 𝜌 maps the rows of the matrix 𝑊 to the corresponding 
attributes (A, B, C, D, E).  The LSSS matrix size equals to the number of the attributes in 
the access tree (i.e. leaf-nodes). The Boolean formula of the access policy that specifies an 
authorized user who has an attribute A and two other attributes in {𝐵, 𝐶, 𝐷, 𝐸}, is:  
 (𝑨 𝑨𝑵𝑫 ((𝑩 𝑨𝑵𝑫 𝑪) 𝑶𝑹 (𝑩 𝑨𝑵𝑫 𝑫) 𝑶𝑹 (𝑩 𝑨𝑵𝑫 𝑬) 𝑶𝑹 (𝑪 𝑨𝑵𝑫 𝑫)  𝑶𝑹 (𝑪 𝑨𝑵𝑫 𝑬) 𝑶𝑹 (𝑫 𝑨𝑵𝑫 𝑬)))  
where it is desirable to transform the access policy to the shortest, equivalent Boolean 
formula to reduce the size of LSSS.  
3.4.1 Linear Secret Sharing Matrix Generation 
To understand how we can generate an LSSS matrix that will use it in our proposed schemes 
in the next chapters, in this section, some principles of LSSS are described. In addition, an 
example illustrating the process is presented as below:  
AND
A 2 of 4
B C D E
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A) Linear Secret Sharing Scheme (LSSS) 
A secret sharing scheme Ԥ is linear if the following properties are satisfied [105, 111, 112]: 
1- The shares of a secret of each party form a vector over a finite field 𝑍𝑝. 
2- The scheme includes a matrix 𝑊(𝑙 × 𝑛) with 𝑙 rows and 𝑛 columns. For each row 
𝑊𝑖 of matrix 𝑊 (1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑙), there is a function 𝜌(𝑖) mapping this row to the corresponding 
party (e.g. in the case that a party is an attribute “Student”, 𝜌(1) = "𝑆𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡" maps the first 
row of W to “Student”). A vector 𝑣⃑⃑⃑   is defined as 𝑣 = (𝑠, 𝑟2, … , 𝑟𝑛) where 𝑠 is the secret to 
be shared, 𝑠 ∈ 𝑍𝑝, and  𝑟2, … , 𝑟𝑛  ∈ 𝑍𝑝 are randomly chosen to hide secret 𝑠. The result of 
𝑊.𝑣⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑  = (𝜆1, … , 𝜆𝑙) is the vector of shares where each party 𝜌(𝑖) possesses share 𝜆𝑖. 
In every LSSS, for any authorized set 𝑆 (e.g. authorized attributes) in an access structure 𝐴, 
 𝐼 ⊆ {1, … , 𝑙} is defined as   𝐼 = {𝑖: 𝜌(𝑖) ∈ 𝑆 }. There is a set of constants, {𝑤𝑖 ∈ 𝑍𝑝}𝑖∈𝐼, 
which are used with valid shares to reconstruct the secret ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝜆𝑖 = 𝑠𝑖∈𝐼 . Here, {𝑤𝑖}𝑖∈𝐼 can 
be computed in polynomial time, satisfying: 
∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑊𝑖 = (1,0, … ,0)𝑖∈𝐼        (3.3) 
B) Example: 
Let us have an access policy that can be described using the following Boolean formula: 
(𝑌 𝑨𝑵𝑫(((𝑋 𝑨𝑵𝑫 𝑀)𝑶𝑹(𝐹 𝑨𝑵𝑫 𝑅)) 𝑶𝑹 ((𝑁 𝑶𝑹 𝑆) 𝑨𝑵𝑫 (𝑉 𝑶𝑹 𝑊))) 
The access tree that can be represented from this formula, is illustrated in Figure 3.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: A threshold access tree structure 
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The access tree in Figure 3.2 is a threshold gate access tree where an interior node is a 
threshold gate and the leaf nodes are the attributes.  An access tree could represent a Boolean 
formula which contains AND and OR gates instead of threshold gates where a Boolean 
formula access tree is a special case of a threshold gate access tree (e.g. the AND gate is a 
(2, 2)-threshold gate while the OR gate is a (1, 2)-threshold gate). 
To generate the corresponding LSS matrix with a built-in threshold before enforcing this 
matrix into the ciphertext in CP-ABE, some steps are needed to derive the LSSS access 
structure from the above formula using Lewko-Waters Algorithm [113]. This algorithm 
takes any monotone Boolean formula of an access policy as an input and outputs an LSSS 
matrix (as illustrated below). First of all, the number of rows in the generated LSS matrix 
ought to be equal to the number attributes in the formula and equal to the number of leaf 
nodes in the access tree in Figure 3.2 
The steps of the Lewko-Waters algorithm  [111, 113] used in this thesis are briefly 
presented below: 
1- The vector (1,0, … ,0) is used as the sharing vector. Where the root node of 
the tree is labelled with vector 𝑣 =  (1) and initializes a counter 𝑐 = 1. As 
shown in Figure 3.3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3: The first step of the Lewko-Waters algorithm is to label the root node 
 
AND
Y OR
OR
AND
AND AND
OR
OR
X
M F R N S V W
C=1
V=(1)
CHAPTER 3: PRELIMINARIES, BASICS AND TECHNICAL APPROACHES 
50 
 
2- Then all other nodes are labelled in a specific way. When the labelled node 
with vector 𝑣   is an OR-gate, its child nodes are labelled with 𝑣  and keeps 
the counter 𝑐 without changing. 
3- When the labelled node with vector 𝑣   is an AND-gate, the value of c is 
increased with one, where the value of 𝑐 represents the length of the vector 𝑣 . 
Therefore, the vector 𝑣   is padded with 0’𝑠 (if it is necessary) at the end to 
make it of length 𝑐. Then its right child node is labelled with  𝑣  concatenated 
with one. As a result, the right child node is labelled with the vector 𝑣 |1 (as 
illustrated in Figure 3.4). While the left child node is labelled with the vector 
(0, . . ,0)| − 1, the length of the vector(0, . . ,0) depends on the value of 𝑐. 
Therefore, the summation of the right and left children at each level equals 
to 𝑣 |0. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4- After labelling the entire tree, the vectors of the leaf nodes represent the rows 
of the LSS matrix (as shown in Equation 3.4), where the length of all rows 
must be the same. Therefore, the short rows are padded with 0’s at the end. 
 
Figure 3.4: Labelling the interior nodes and leaf nodes of the access tree 
using the Lewko-Waters algorithm 
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𝑊 =
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 −1 0 0 0
0 0 0 −1 0
1 1 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 −1
1 1 0 0 1
0 0 −1 0 0
0 0 −1 0 0
1 1 1 0 0
1 1 1 0 0 ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝜌(1) = 𝑌
𝜌(2) = 𝑋
𝜌(3) = 𝑀
𝜌(4) = 𝐹
𝜌(5) = 𝑅
𝜌(6) = 𝑁
𝜌(7) = 𝑆
𝜌(8) = 𝑉
𝜌(9) = 𝑊
                  (3.4) 
In this matrix, each authorised subset of the rows (e.g. Y AND (X AND M) includes 
(1,0,0,0,0) in its span (as in Equation 3.3) on the condition that the below Boolean formula 
is satisfied by the corresponding attributes. 
(𝑌 𝐴𝑁𝐷 (((𝑋 𝐴𝑁𝐷 𝑀)𝑂𝑅(𝐹 𝐴𝑁𝐷 𝑅)) 𝑂𝑅 ((𝑁 𝑂𝑅 𝑆) 𝐴𝑁𝐷 (𝑉 𝑂𝑅 𝑊))) 
3.5 The Complexity Assumptions 
In this section, some assumptions that enable us to build a cryptographic system with 
advanced security are introduced, particularly those that the CP-ABE schemes are based on. 
These assumptions are described as below. 
3.5.1 Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Helman (BDH) Assumption  
Definition 3.2. (Decisional BDH) assumption: A group 𝐺 denotes a bilinear group of prime 
order , and a generator of 𝐺 is 𝑔. The parameters 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑧 are selected randomly in 𝑍𝑝. The 
decisional BDH assumption is that it is still hard for adversary 𝒜 to distinguish (𝐴 =
𝑔𝑎, 𝐵 = 𝑔𝑏 , 𝐶 = 𝑔𝑐, 𝑍 = 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝑎𝑏𝑐) from (𝐴 = 𝑔𝑎, 𝐵 = 𝑔𝑏 , 𝐶 = 𝑔𝑐, 𝑍 = 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝑧) 
without a non-negligible advantage. 
3.5.2 Decisional 𝑞-Parallel Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent Assumption 
Definition 3.3. (Decisional 𝑞-parallel BDHE) assumption [42]: A group 𝐺 denotes a bilinear 
group of prime order 𝑝, and a generator of 𝐺 is 𝑔. The parameters 𝑎, 𝑠, 𝑏1, . . . , 𝑏𝑞 are selected 
randomly in 𝑍𝑝. The decisional 𝑞-Parallel BDHE assumption is that once an adversary 𝒜 is 
given: 
𝒚⃗ =  𝑔, 𝑔𝑠,  𝑔𝑎, . . . ,  𝑔(𝑎
𝑞) ,  𝑔(𝑎
𝑞+2), . . . ,  𝑔(𝑎
2𝑞) , 
          𝑔𝑠.𝑏𝑗 , 𝑔
𝑎
𝑏𝑗 , . . . ,  𝑔
(
𝑎𝑞
𝑏𝑗
)
,  𝑔
(
𝑎𝑞+2
𝑏𝑗
)
, … ,  𝑔(𝑎
2𝑞/𝑏𝑗) ∀1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑞, 
                𝑔
𝑎.𝑠.
𝑏𝑙
𝑏𝑗  , . . . ,  𝑔
(𝑎𝑞.𝑠.
𝑏𝑙
𝑏𝑗
)
 ∀1 ≤ 𝑗, 𝑙 ≤ 𝑞, 𝑙 ≠ 𝑗                         (3.5) 
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it is still hard for 𝒜 to distinguish 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝑎
𝑞+1𝑠 from a random element ℛ in 𝐺𝑇. Furthermore, 
a polynomial time algorithm ℬ will use the output 𝑧 ∈ {0,1} of 𝒜 to make a guess, and we 
define the advantage 𝜀 of ℬ to solve the 𝑞-Parallel BDHE assumption in 𝐺 and 𝐺𝑇 as:  
|𝑃𝑟 [ℬ(?⃗?, 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝑎
𝑞+1𝑠) =  0] −  𝑃𝑟 [ℬ(?⃗?, ℛ) =  0]| ≥ 𝜀 .          (3.6) 
Once no polynomial time algorithm has a non-negligible advantage to solve the 𝑞-Parallel 
BDHE assumption, we can say that the assumption holds in 𝐺. 
3.6  Selective Security Model 
In this part, the security model in a single-authority access control system is considered, 
where an attempt has been made to decrypt a ciphertext that is encrypted over an access 
policy, by the adversary 𝒜 with secret keys that have attributes which do not satisfy that 
access policy. This game includes the roles played by the challenger who is in charge of 
generating secret keys and hiding the details, and an adversary 𝒜 who can ask for any secret 
keys whose attributes cannot satisfy the access policy that is later embedded into a 
challenged ciphertext. The security game is defined as below: 
Init. The adversary sends its challenge access policy 𝑊∗ to the challenger. 
Setup. The challenger generates the system parameters by running the Setup algorithm. 
Then, the challenger sends the public parameters to the adversary and keeps the master key 
secret.    
Query 1. Many secret keys queries are made by the adversary using an attribute set that 
does not match the access policy 𝑊∗   
Challenge. The challenger receives two equal-length messages (𝑀0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑀1) from the 
adversary.  One of the submitted messages is chosen randomly by the challenger who 
encrypts it under 𝑊∗. This message is denoted as  𝑀𝑏 where 𝑏 ∈ {0,1}. Then the encrypted 
message is sent to the adversary.  
Query 2. More secret keys queries are made by the adversary with the same restriction of 
the Query 1 phase where none of these queries match the challenged access policy examined 
in the Challenge phase.  
Guess. The adversary outputs its guess ?̅? for 𝑏. In this game, the advantage of an adversary 
is described as: [ ?̅? = 𝑏] − 1
2
 . 
3.7 Waters’ CP-ABE Scheme (W-CP-ABE) 
Based on Waters’ scheme [42], the algorithms of CP-ABE are defined below:  
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𝑺𝒆𝒕𝒖𝒑(𝑼) → (𝑷𝑲, 𝑴𝑺𝑲). The setup algorithm is run by the attribute authority which takes 
the number of attributes in the system as input. The authority generates public and master 
keys (i.e. 𝑃𝐾 and 𝑀𝑆𝐾 respectively): 
𝑃𝐾 =  𝑔, 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝛼  ,  𝑔𝑎 ,  ℎ1, . . . , ℎ𝑈 . 
                                                          𝑀𝑆𝐾 =  𝑎, 𝑔𝛼 
Where, it chooses 𝐺 as a group of prime order 𝑝, 𝑔 is set as a generator, 𝑒 ∶  𝐺 ×  𝐺 → 𝐺𝑇 
is a bilinear map and 𝑈 is the number of group elements ℎ1, . . . , ℎU  ∈  𝐺 that are randomly 
chosen and associated with the 𝑈 attributes in the system. In addition,  𝛼, 𝑎 ∈  𝑍𝑝 are 
randomly chosen exponents.    
𝑬𝒏𝒄𝒓𝒚𝒑𝒕(𝑷𝑲, (𝑾, 𝝆),𝑴 ) → 𝐂𝐓. This algorithm is run by a data owner. The public 
key 𝑃𝐾, a message 𝑀 and LSSS access structure (𝑊, 𝜌) are taken as inputs. Where, 𝑊 is a 
matrix and 𝜌 is the function that maps rows of 𝑊 to attributes. A random vector 𝑣 =
 (𝑠, 𝑦1, . . . ,  𝑦𝑛)  ∈  𝑍𝑝
𝑛 is chosen randomly. The values of this vector’s elements will be used 
to share the secret 𝑠. The value 𝜆𝑖 =  𝑣 · 𝑊𝑖 is calculated for ∀𝑖 =  1 𝑡𝑜 𝑙 , where 𝑊𝑖 is the 
𝑖𝑡ℎ row vector of 𝑊. 𝑟1, . . . ,  𝑟𝑙  ∈  𝑍𝑝 are blinded random numbers. The ciphertext is:  
𝐶𝑇 = ( (𝑊, 𝜌), 𝐶 =  𝑀𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝛼𝑠 , 𝐶0  =  𝑔
 𝑠 , (𝐶1  =  𝑔
𝑎𝜆1   ℎ𝜌(1)
−𝑟1   , 
                            𝐷1  =  𝑔 
𝑟1  ), . . . , (𝐶 𝑙 = 𝑔
𝑎𝜆𝑙  ℎ𝜌(𝑙)
−𝑟𝑙   , 𝐷𝑙 = 𝑔
𝑟𝑙   ) 
𝑲𝒆𝒚𝑮𝒆𝒏(𝑴𝑺𝑲, 𝑺) → 𝐒𝐊. The user secret key is generated using this algorithm according 
to a set  of attributes 𝑆 which is taken together with master secret key 𝑀𝑆𝐾 as inputs. The 
user’s private key is: 
𝑆𝐾 = (𝐾 =  𝑔 𝛼 𝑔 𝑎𝑡 , 𝐿 =  𝑔𝑡, ∀𝑥 ∈ 𝑆     𝐾𝑥 = ℎ𝑥
𝑡  ) . 
Where, 𝑡 ∈  𝑍𝑝is a random number. This algorithm is executed by the attribute authority. 
𝑫𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒚𝒑𝒕 (𝑪𝑻, 𝑺𝑲) → 𝑴. A ciphertext CT and the user’s private key are the algorithm’s 
inputs. Once the user’s attributes in its secret key satisfy the access structure in the 
ciphertext, the output will be the recovered message 𝑀.  {𝜔𝑖  ∈  𝑍𝑝}𝑖∈𝐼 are supposed to be a 
set of constants such that when {𝜆𝑖} are valid shares of a secret 𝑠 which corresponds to 𝑊𝑖, 
then ∑ 𝜔𝑖𝜆𝑖 𝑖∈𝐼 =  𝑠. Firstly, the decryption algorithm computes 𝐵1 as: 
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𝐵1 =
𝑒(𝐶0 , 𝐾)
(∏ (𝑒(𝐶𝑖, 𝐿)𝑒(𝐷𝑖, 𝐾𝜌(𝑖) ))𝑖∈𝐼
𝜔𝑖
   
= 
𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝛼𝑠𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔) 𝑎𝑠𝑡
∏ (𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝑡𝑎𝜆𝑖𝑒(𝑔, ℎ𝜌(𝑖) )−𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒(𝑔, ℎ𝜌(𝑖))𝑟𝑖𝑡)
𝜔𝑖
𝑖∈𝐼
 
= 
𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝛼𝑠𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔) 𝑎𝑠𝑡
∏ (𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝑡𝑎𝜔𝑖𝜆𝑖)𝑖∈𝐼
 
                                                      𝐵1 = 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)
𝛼𝑠  
Then the decryption algorithm can compute the message 𝑀 as: 
𝑀 =
𝐶
𝐵1
=
 𝑀𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝛼𝑠
𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝛼𝑠
 
Notably, Waters’ scheme [42] does not support the revocation process. In this thesis, we 
adopt this CP-ABE scheme and extend it to resolve many of its limitations. 
3.7.1 Security Proof of BW-CP-ABE 
To prove that Waters’ scheme [42] is secure, the author encounters one obstacle. This 
obstacle is indicated when the same attribute is duplicated in the challenge access matrix 
𝑊∗. That means multiple rows in the access matrix represent the same attribute.  To resolve 
this issue, the author uses the term of the decisional q-Parallel Bilinear Diffie-Hellman 
assumption instead of the term of the parallel BDHE assumption in order to assign multiple 
rows in 𝑊∗ to a one-element group that corresponds to an attribute. Where,  𝑞 is a 
polynomial degree which is embedded into a single group element as in Gentry’s reduction 
[114]. The author proves: 
Theorem 1:  Once the decisional 𝑞-Parallel BDHE assumption holds, all polynomial time 
adversaries have negligible time to selectively break the proposed CP-ABE scheme (i.e. 
there is no adversary that can break the system), where the challenge LSSS matrix is 
𝑊∗(𝑙∗  ×  𝑛∗) with 𝑙∗, 𝑛∗ ≤  𝑞. 
In the selective security game, let 𝒜 be an adversary with non-negligible advantage against 
Waters’ scheme [42]. The adversary 𝒜 selects 𝑊∗ as a challenge matrix where each of its 
row number  𝑙∗ and column number 𝑛∗ is less than or equal to 𝑞.  The decisional 𝑞-Parallel 
BDHE problem is played by a simulator ℬ as follows: 
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Init.  As in (Section 3.5.2), ?⃗?, T are taken by the simulator ℬ, while the adversary 𝒜 sends 
(𝑊∗, 𝜌∗) to ℬ where 𝑊∗ has 𝑙∗ rows and  𝑛∗ columns. 
Setup. An element ?́? is randomly chosen by the simulator ℬ where 𝛼 ́ ∈  𝑍𝑝. The simulator 
ℬ sets 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝛼 = 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)?́?. 𝑒(𝑔𝑎, 𝑔𝑎
𝑞
) = 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)?́?. 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝑎
𝑞+1
 that means implicitly 𝛼 =
?́? + 𝑎𝑞+1.  
In terms of computing each group element ℎ𝑥 that corresponds to an attribute 𝑥 where 1 ≤
𝑥 ≤ 𝑈 , a number 𝑧𝑥 is selected randomly for each 𝑥. Let 𝐼
∗is a set where 𝐼∗ = {𝑖: 𝜌∗(𝑖) =
𝑥}: 
ℎ𝑥 = 𝑔
𝑧𝑥 ∏𝑔𝑎𝑊𝑖,1
∗ /𝑏𝑖 . 𝑔𝑎
2𝑊𝑖,2
∗ /𝑏𝑖 …𝑔𝑎
𝑛∗𝑊𝑖,𝑛∗
∗ /𝑏𝑖
𝑖∈𝐼
 
Notably, when 𝐼∗is an empty set, then  ℎ𝑥 = 𝑔
𝑧𝑥. 
Query 1. Many secret key queries are made by the adversary 𝒜 in which attribute set 𝑆 
does not satisfy the matrix  𝑊∗.   
In the context of LSSS, as a result of querying an unauthorized set of attributes by the 
adversary 𝒜, the simulator ℬ finds a vector ?⃑⃑? = (𝑤1, 𝑤2, … , 𝑤𝑛∗) ∈ 𝑍𝑝 where 𝑤1 =
−1, and ∀𝑖, 𝜌∗(𝑖) ∈ 𝑆, ?⃑⃑? .𝑊𝑖
∗ = 0. Moreover, the simulator ℬ randomly selects r ∈ 𝑍𝑝. 
Implicitly, the simulator ℬ defines 𝑡 as: 
 
𝑡 = 𝑟 + 𝑤1. 𝑎
𝑞 + 𝑤2. 𝑎
𝑞−1 + ⋯+ 𝑤𝑛∗ . 𝑎
𝑞−𝑛∗+1 
Therefore, to compute 𝐿: 
𝐿 = 𝑔𝑡 = 𝑔𝑟 ∏ (𝑔𝑎
𝑞−𝑖+1
)𝑤𝑖
𝑖=1,..,𝑛∗
 
To generate 𝐾: 
𝐾 = 𝑔?́?. 𝑔𝑎𝑟 ∏ (𝑔𝑎
𝑞−𝑖+2
)
𝑤𝑖
𝑖=2,..,𝑛∗
 
At this step, for each 𝑥 ∈ 𝑆 that is not used in the access structure, 𝐾𝑥 is calculated as: 
𝐾𝑥 = 𝐿
𝑧𝑥 
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When 𝑥 ∈ 𝑆 and 𝑥 is used in the access structure, computing 𝐾𝑥 becomes a hard task. As a 
restriction, the terms in the form 𝑔
𝑎𝑞+1
𝑏𝑖
⁄
 must not exist. On the other hand, since ?⃑⃑? .𝑊𝑖
∗ =
0, all these terms will be cancelled. Therefore, the simulator generates 𝐾𝑥 as: 
𝐾𝑥 = 𝐿
𝑧𝑥 ∏ ∏ (𝑔(𝑎𝑗/𝑏𝑖)
𝑟
 ∏ (𝑔𝑎
𝑞+1+𝑗−𝑘/𝑏𝑖)𝑤𝑘
𝑘=1,..,𝑛∗,𝑘≠𝑗
)
𝑊𝑖,𝑗
𝑗=1,..,𝑛∗
∗
𝑖∈𝐼
 
Challenge. To build the ciphertext components, two equal-length messages 𝑀0, 𝑀1 are 
prepared by the adversary 𝒜 and sent to the simulator ℬ. The simulator ℬ selects one of 
them 𝑀𝑐 where 𝑐 ∈ {0,1}. The simulator ℬ generates the ciphertext components 𝐶 =
𝑀𝑐𝑇. 𝑒(𝑔
𝑠, 𝑔?́?) and ?́? = 𝑔𝑠.  
To generate the component 𝐶𝑖, the simulator ℬ selects a vector 𝑣  where the first element in 
this vector will be the secret 𝑠 that needs to be shared. So, 𝑣 = (𝑠, 𝑠𝑎 + 𝑦2́, 𝑠𝑎
2 +
𝑦3́, … , 𝑠𝑎
𝑛−1 + 𝑦𝑛∗́ ) ∈ 𝑍𝑝
𝑛∗, where 𝑦2́, … , 𝑦𝑛∗́  are randomly chosen. Moreover, the 
simulator randomly chooses 𝑟1́, … , 𝑟?́?. 
The simulator generates a set 𝑅𝑖, where 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛
∗. This set contains all indices of rows 
that are assigned to similar attributes as row 𝑖 (i.e. 𝜌∗(𝑖) =  𝜌∗(𝑘) 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑖 ≠ 𝑘). 
Therefore, the generated ciphertext components are as follows: 
𝐷𝑖 = 𝑔
−𝑟?́? . 𝑔−𝑠𝑏𝑖 
𝐶𝑖 = ℎ𝜌∗(𝑖)
𝑟?́? ( ∏ (𝑔𝑎)𝑊𝑖,𝑗
∗ 𝑦?́?
𝑗=2,…,𝑛∗
) . (𝑔𝑠.𝑏𝑖)−𝑧𝜌∗(𝑖) . (∏ ∏ (𝑔𝑎
𝑗𝑠.(𝑏𝑖/𝑏𝑘))𝑊𝑘,𝑗
∗
𝑗=1,…,𝑛∗𝑘∈𝑅𝑖
) 
Query 2. It is the same procedure as Query 1. 
Guess. At this phase, the adversary 𝒜 outputs its guess ?́? of 𝑐.  If ?́? = 𝑐, then the simulator 
 ℬ outputs 0 that means that 𝑇 = 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝑎
𝑞+1𝑠. In this case, we have: 
𝑃𝑟 [ℬ(?⃗?, 𝑇 = 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝑎
𝑞+1𝑠) =  0] =
1
2
+ Adv𝒜  
Otherwise, the simulator outputs 1 which means that 𝑇 is a random group element in 𝐺𝑇 
and 𝑀𝑐 is totally concealed from the adversary. In this case, we have: 
𝑃𝑟 [ℬ(?⃗?, T = ℛ) =  0] =
1
2
 
As a result, the decisional 𝑞-Parallel BDHE game can be played by a simulator ℬ with 
non-negligible advantage. 
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3.8 Summary 
In this chapter, some mathematical principles required in our project have been briefly 
described. The following explanation elaborates the main points:  
• In terms of elliptic cryptography, the discrete logarithm problem has not been solved 
yet by any known sub-exponential type algorithm.  
• The Computational Diffie-Hellman Assumption (CDHA) is when the Diffie-
Hellman function is hard to be computed by any passive attack as defined below:                    
𝐷𝐻(𝑔𝑎, 𝑔𝑏) =  𝑔𝑎𝑏 where it is hard to compute  𝑔𝑎𝑏. 
• The Decisional Diffie-Hellman Assumption (DDHA) is hard to distinguish between 
two tuples  〈𝑔𝑎, 𝑔𝑏 ,  𝑔𝑎𝑏〉 and 〈𝑔𝑎, 𝑔𝑏 ,  𝑔𝑐〉. 
• The difficult issues that most elliptic-curve cryptographic schemes are based on are 
DLP and CDH problems. These problems can provide a sufficient level of security 
if the related parameters are chosen properly. While the security assumption that the 
pairing based cryptography relies on is the decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman 
problem and up to now there are no known attacks breaking this problem. 
• Any access policy can be transformed into one of these methods: 1) a monotone 
AND-gate access structure, 2) a (𝑡, 𝑛)-threshold access tree and 3) LSSS matrices. 
• The access policy that is represented as an LSSS matrix, is difficult to be 
comprehended by anyone who is not an expert. In addition, this tool is highly 
expressive. 
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Chapter 4: The Proposed Single 
Authority Access Control Scheme 
4 Introduction 
The design of our proposed single authority CP-ABE scheme is discussed in this chapter, 
where our proposed scheme extends the relevant existing techniques to resolve the inherent 
problems in CP-ABE, which is users’ credential management according to access privilege 
customization. The novelty of our collusion-resistant scheme is to drive the access privileges 
in a specific way by updating the access policy as well as user revocation.  
Therefore, as a first step towards solving the attribute revocation problem besides tackling 
the mentioned issues, we present a technique to assign heavy tasks to a cloud service 
provider. Once the attribute revocation process needs to be enabled, updating the access 
policy will be carried out by the data owner, while the cloud server will be responsible for 
re-encrypting the ciphertext components that the attributes are embedded in. In this case, 
the cloud server will be in charge of re-encrypting the ciphertext without any information 
leaking to the server. Finally, in this scheme, security and theoretical performance analysis 
is carried out showing that our scheme can securely and efficiently offload the 
computational burden from the attribute authority and the data owner. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.1 presents the requirements 
and the security assumptions that our scheme is based on. Section 4.2 discusses the general 
explanation of our proposed scheme, the scheme entities, the relationship between these 
entities and the scheme algorithms. Section 4.3 describes the scheme analysis in terms of 
security and performance. The experimental results are discussed in Section 4.4. Finally, 
Section 4.5 outlines our conclusions. 
4.1 The Scheme Security Requirements and Assumptions   
In this section, the security assumption of each party’s role and requirements in our proposed 
single-authority CP-ABE system is defined. The main security assumptions are discussed 
below: 
1- The cloud server is honest to carry out the tasks that are assigned to it, but curious to 
find out as much unauthorized information as possible. Moreover, we apply the 
strong security assumption where it is possible that the cloud server colludes with 
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revoked users. Furthermore, the access control is enforced cryptographically by 
embedding access policies in the ciphertext without cloud intervention.  
2- The attribute authority is assumed to be a fully trusted entity, but it can be attacked 
by an adversary.   
3- Any user can gain the encrypted data stored on the cloud server. However, only the 
users whose attributes satisfy the access policy and whose identities are not in the 
revocation list, can properly decrypt the corresponding ciphertexts. Furthermore, the 
system assumes that there are misbehaving users who try to collude with other entities 
in the system, excluding the data owner, or with each other to access unauthorized 
data. 
4- The data owner is a fully trusted entity. 
5- A proxy server is a minimal-trusted entity which receives a different proxy key upon 
each user revocation event from the attribute authority to update one of the non-
revoked users’ secret key components in order to recover the message. Therefore, the 
potential risk of the proxy server colluding with revoked users is minimised. It is not 
allowed for this entity to decrypt data because it does not have an attribute decryption 
key.  
Based on the above assumptions, the security requirements that our proposed scheme ought 
to achieve, are stated as follows:  
1- Data confidentiality: Data content is protected against access by any unauthorized 
users or the cloud server. 
2- Fine-grained access control: Different users with various privileges must access 
different ciphertexts. 
3- Collusion resistance: The cloud server is prevented from colluding with revoked or 
malicious users to gain unauthorized data by combining their information.  
4- Forward security: Any revoked user is forbidden to decrypt any new ciphertext after 
leaving the system.  
4.2 Our Proposed Scheme 
Our proposed CP-ABE system involves five entities. These entities are responsible for 
running seven algorithms as shown in Figure 4.1. These entities and algorithms are 
described in detail below in separate sub-sections. 
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4.2.1 The Scheme Entities 
The entities of our proposed scheme and the relationship between them are presented in this 
section as follow: 
Attribute authority. This trusted entity is responsible for generating the system parameters, 
such as a master key and a public key. In addition, it is in charge of creating a secret key for 
each user in the system based on the user’s attributes. Moreover, upon each revocation event 
and according to the list of revoked users, the attribute authority issues a proxy key to the 
proxy server to be introduced later.  
Data owners. This party defines an access policy that describes who can access to its data 
as well as encrypting those data under this access policy. Firstly, a data owner uses a 
symmetric encryption technique (e.g. AES) to encrypt its data. After that, the owner encrypts 
the symmetric key under its access policy using CP-ABE by selecting a random value as a 
secret which is shared using the linear secret sharing scheme (LSSS) technique to generate 
some values associated with each corresponding attribute in the ciphertext according to the 
owner’s access policy. Finally, the encrypted data is outsourced to the cloud including the 
data ciphertext, the CP-ABE ciphertext and the access policy. In addition, the data owner is 
responsible for updating the access policy. 
Data users. Each of them receives its secret key which contains its attributes, from the 
attribute authority. This secret key is used to decrypt any ciphertext uploaded by the data 
owner whenever the user’s attributes satisfy the owner’s access policy. Thus, it can recover 
the plaintext. 
Cloud server. This server is an untrusted entity which stores and shares encrypted data that 
is still useless information to the server even if it colludes with some malicious data users. 
Those data can be downloaded by any data users. Since the cloud server is untrusted, 
assigning some tasks to this entity is a critical challenge because the cloud could be curious 
to extract secret information from the stored data to gain some benefits from the data owner’s 
competitors. However, to leverage the cloud resources, in our model, we assign heavy 
missions to the cloud to partially encrypt data that is uploaded by a data owner and gives 
access to that data to various data users. Additionally, the cloud server is able to securely 
transform the ciphertext components related to the old access policies to the new ones 
according to the new policies.  
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Figure 4.1: The architecture of the proposed system scheme 
Proxy server: The proxy server is a minimal-trusted server which is provided with a proxy 
key by the attribute authority when each revocation process takes place. This key is 
embedded in each non-revoked user’s key which in turn helps these users to recover the 
message and limits the control privileges of the cloud server to prevent it from colluding 
with the revoked users. 
The relationship and interaction among the entities described above will be explained in the 
subsequent two sub-sections. 
4.2.2 Scheme Entities Relationship  
In this subsection, a summary of our proposed work is briefly presented to describe the 
responsibilities of the system entities and the relationship among them as well as some 
relevant, existing tools which our scheme has extended. The scheme works as follows: 
• First, the system parameters are generated by the attribute authority. These parameters 
are used in all scheme algorithms. When the data owner decides to outsource his data 
to the cloud server, he encrypts a message into two separate ciphertext 
components (𝐶, 𝐶0). These components are encrypted with a message and the secret to 
be shared, respectively. The other components, which have to be associated with secret 
encrypted shares, are securely generated by the cloud server, where these encrypted 
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shares have already been distributed over a monotone access structure realized by a 
LSSS matrix generated over a set of legitimate attributes, before encrypting by the data 
owner using a traditional cryptographic technique. After outsourcing the resulting 
encrypted shares by the data owner, these shares are encrypted again to be associated 
with the authorized attributes by the cloud server using CP-ABE. In that case, only the 
eligible users can decrypt and recover the message correctly if they meet the following 
conditions: (a) they already received their secret keys from the attribute authority, (b) 
their legitimate attributes satisfy the access policy, and (c) they are not in the revocation 
list, which is indirectly derived by the proxy server. Granting the control privileges of 
these encrypted shares to the cloud server results in that most operations of our 
technique are delegated to the cloud server while guaranteeing no information leakage 
to the server. These operations linearly increase with the number of attributes and the 
frequency of revocation events. 
• Then, some extra layers of security are added where the attribute and user revocation 
problems are addressed by extracting some ideas from some of the relevant existing 
techniques. Once a user revocation event occurs, the attribute authority sends a set of 
the revoked users’ identities and the corresponding secret shares as a proxy key to the 
proxy server, which in turn updates a part of the secret key for only the authorized users. 
In that case, revoking a user happens by developing and adjusting the technique in [57] 
to invalidate the key which a revoked user already has. It prevents the revoked users 
from colluding with the cloud server. Therefore, our scheme resists against any 
collusion attacks at the same time. It customises users’ privileges by updating a policy. 
In our proposed scheme, this secret is used to generate new shares. This results in 
expanding the capability of handling the attribute revocation process and adds the 
ability of elevating user privileges, where the updating process happens in two 
directions. The first one is to generate a new LSSS matrix which corresponds to the 
updated policy without changing the value of the data owner’s secret. This is carried 
out by the data owner. The second orientation is to update the ciphertext components 
which are already stored on the cloud after calculating the new ones. These updating 
and calculating processes are performed by the cloud server. It leads to exploiting cloud 
storage and sharing services while mitigating computation and communication 
overheads. 
CHAPTER4: THE PROPOSED SINGLE AUTHORITY ACCESS CONTROL SCHEME 
 
63 
 
4.2.3. A Scheme Overview 
To build an efficient, trustworthy access control system for storing data on untrusted 
environments, our single-authority CP-ABE scheme (as shown in Figure 4.1) is proposed. 
In particular, a single, fully trusted attribute authority generates the public system 
parameters that are later used by all scheme entities to run the system algorithms. Once the 
data owner needs to outsource its data to a cloud server, encrypting those data over a set of 
selected, combining attributes known as an access policy is the first procedure considered. 
In terms of mitigating the encryption burden on the data owner, some expensive operations 
are securely outsourced to the cloud server. After generating ciphertexts, the data owner 
stores them on the cloud. Whenever the data owner decides to grant some data users more 
privileges or withdraw some privileges from others, it can feasibly change its access policy, 
generate the updated components and send them to the cloud server which in turn re-
encrypts the stored ciphertexts.   
For other entities such as users and a proxy server, the procedures are often restricted, in 
which the attribute authority generates different decryption secret keys for all authorised 
data users depending on their attributes. In addition, once the attribute authority decides to 
revoke some users who have misbehaved, or their services are expired, it generates a 
revocation list, which contains a limited number of revoked users, and issues a new proxy 
key based on such a list. This proxy key is sent to the proxy server that updates only the 
secret keys of the non-revoked users. In terms of users, a user can be authorised to decrypt 
a ciphertext if its attributes satisfy the data owner’s access policy and its identity is not in 
the revocation list.    
4.2.4. Scheme Algorithms 
Our proposed scheme is constructed by seven algorithms which are defined below. The 
parties who run these algorithms are illustrated in Figure 4.1 and the main notations used 
are listed in Table 4.1. 
𝑺𝒆𝒕𝒖𝒑(𝑼) → (𝑷𝑲, 𝑴𝑺𝑲): The attribute authority randomly chooses a polynomial 𝑃 of a 
degree 𝑐 over 𝑍𝑝 to use it for blinding each user’s secret key which in turn facilitates 
revocation of a set of users. Moreover, the authority generates a public key 𝑃𝐾 (as shown 
in Figure 4.2) which is published for access by all the scheme parties, and a master secret 
key 𝑀𝑆𝐾 kept secret to itself, i.e. 𝑃𝐾 = ( 𝑔, 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝛼  ,  𝑔𝑎 , ℎ1, . . . , ℎ𝑈) and    𝑀𝑆𝐾 =
( 𝑎, 𝑔𝛼, 𝑃). 
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Table 4.1: Main notations used in our proposed single authority CP-ABE scheme. 
Symbol Description 
PK  The system public key. 
𝑴𝑺𝑲 The system master key. 
SK The user secret key. 
𝑷 A secret polynomial of degree 𝑐 which is selected by the attribute authority. 
𝒈 A generator of an elliptic curve group 𝐺. 
𝒑 A large prime number that represents the order of group 𝐺. 
𝜶, 𝒂 Randomly selected exponents belonging to the finite field 𝑍𝑝. 
𝑼 The number of attributes in the system. 
𝒉𝟏, . . . , 𝒉𝑼 Random group elements representing the corresponding attributes. 
𝑾 The 𝑙 × 𝑛-LSS matrix that represents the access structure. Here, the 
threshold of the access policy is embedded into it.  In addition, 𝑙 is the 
number of rows which represent the attributes, and 𝑛 is the number of 
columns (i.e. it is the same value of the counter c in pp 48, Section 3.4.1).   
𝝆 A function mapping each row in 𝑾 to the corresponding attribute.  
𝑴 The message 𝑀 ∈ 𝐺𝑇 which is randomly chosen to represent the key to be 
encrypted by CP-ABE.   
𝒔 The secret to be shared, which is selected by the data owner. 
𝑹 The revocation list created by the attribute authority. This list contains the 
identities {𝑢𝑖} of the revoked users, with 𝑖 ∈ {1, … , 𝑐} and c as the selected, 
secret polynomial degree of 𝑃. 
𝑷(𝒖𝒊) The random share which is extracted from polynomial 𝑷 selected by the 
attribute authority for each user 𝒖𝒊. This share is used later to de-activate the 
key when the user 𝒖𝒊 is revoked.  
?̅?𝒊 A plain secret share. 
?̂?𝒊 The encrypted version of ?̅?𝑖. 
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Figure 4.2: The flowchart of the Setup algorithm 
Here, the input to this algorithm is 𝑈 which represents the number of attributes in the system. 
𝑔 is a generator of the selected group 𝐺 with |𝐺| = 𝑝, and ℎ1, . . . , ℎ𝑈  ∈  𝐺 are random group 
elements associated with the 𝑈 attributes in the system. The exponents 𝛼, 𝑎 ∈  𝑍𝑝 are 
randomly selected. 
𝑬𝒏𝒄𝒓𝒚𝒑𝒕(𝑷𝑲, (𝑾, 𝝆),𝑴 ) → 𝑪𝑻: A data owner, before migrating its data to the cloud 
server, encrypts a message 𝑀 (where 𝑀 ∈  𝐺𝑇 ), using the public key 𝑃𝐾 and LSSS access 
structure (𝑊, 𝜌) specified in Section 3.7. To execute the encryption, the owner selects a 
random vector  𝑣⃑⃑⃑  =  (𝑠, 𝑦2, . . . ,  𝑦𝑛) where 𝑦2, . . . ,  𝑦𝑛 ∈ 𝑍𝑝 are used to share the secret  𝑠. 
The algorithm computes each value ?̅?𝑖 as ?̅?𝑖   =  𝑣 · 𝑊𝑖, where 𝑊𝑖 is the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ row vector 
of 𝑊 (1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑙). These shares {?̅?𝑖}𝑖∈𝑙 will be encrypted by the owner before outsourcing 
them to the cloud (as shown in Figure 4.3). Thus, the ciphertext is outsourced to the cloud 
server as: 𝐶𝑇 = ( (𝑊, 𝜌), 𝐶 =  𝑀𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝛼𝑠 , 𝐶0  =  𝑔
 𝑠), together with two other vectors. 
The first one is 𝑣 ̃⃑⃑⃑  = (?̂?1, … , ?̂?𝑙 ), which represents the vector of the encrypted secret shares 
that will be embedded by the cloud server in the ciphertext components associated with the 
attributes (as illustrated in Figure 4.4). These components are then published by the cloud 
as:  { 𝐶𝑖̀  =  𝑔
𝑎?̂?𝑖   ℎ𝜌(𝑖)
−𝑟𝑖   ,  𝐷𝑖̀  =  𝑔 
𝑟𝑖}𝑖=1
𝑙 where the blind numbers 𝑟1, . . . ,  𝑟𝑙  ∈  𝑍𝑝 are chosen 
randomly by the cloud server.   
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The second vector is  𝑄⃑⃑  ⃑ = (𝑔−𝑎𝑓1 , … , 𝑔−𝑎𝑓𝑙), in which its elements correspond to the 
encrypted shares in 𝑣 ̃⃑⃑⃑⃑ . Both  𝑣 ̃⃑⃑⃑⃑  and  𝑄⃑⃑  ⃑ are used to recover the plain-shares {?̅?𝑖}𝑖∈𝐼 by 
authorized users. For instance, the first element 𝑔−𝑎𝑓1 in  𝑄⃑⃑  ⃑ is used with the first encrypted 
share ?̂?1 in  𝑣 ̃⃑⃑⃑⃑  to recover the first plain share ?̅?1. Here, {𝑓𝑖 ∈ 𝑍𝑝}𝑖=1
𝑙  are randomly selected 
by the data owner for encrypting the plain-shares {?̅?𝑖}𝑖∈𝐼 in the vector 𝑣.𝑊⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑  ⃑. So, an encrypted 
share ?̂?𝑖 is resulted from ?̂?𝑖 = ?̅?𝑖 + 𝑓𝑖 mod 𝑝 for 𝑖 = 1 to 𝑙. The elements of  𝑄⃑⃑  ⃑ are included 
as ciphertext components. Finally, the ciphertext is published by the cloud server as:     
𝐶𝑇 = (𝐶 = 𝑀𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝛼𝑠, 𝐶0 =  𝑔
𝑠, {𝐶𝑖̀  =  𝑔
𝑎?̂?𝑖   ℎ𝜌(𝑖)
−𝑟𝑖   ,  𝐷𝑖̀  =  𝑔 
𝑟𝑖 ,  𝑇𝑖 = 𝑔
−𝑎𝑓𝑖  }
𝑖=1
𝑙
) 
Since the ciphertext components associated with attributes are partially encrypted by the 
cloud server, the outsourcing of computation offered by the cloud is efficiently exploited.   
 
Figure 4.3: The steps of the Encrypt algorithm carried out by the data owner. 
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Figure 4.4: The steps of the Encrypt algorithm carried out by the cloud server. 
𝑲𝒆𝒚𝑮𝒆𝒏(𝑴𝑺𝑲, 𝑺) → 𝑺𝑲: The master secret key 𝑀𝑆𝐾 and attribute set  𝑆 are used by the 
attribute authority to generate a secret 𝑆𝐾 𝑢𝑘 for each user 𝑢𝑘, which is securely received by 
𝑢𝑘 via a secure channel (as illustrated in Figure 4.5). The secret key is defined as:  
𝑆𝐾 𝑢𝑘 = ( 𝐾 =  𝑔 
𝛼𝑔 𝑎𝑡𝑃(0) , 𝐿 =  𝑔𝑎𝑡 , 𝐿1́ = 𝑔
𝑡𝑃(𝑢𝑘), ∀𝑥 ∈ 𝑆     𝐾𝑥 = ℎ𝑥
𝑡𝑃(𝑢𝑘)) 
Here, the exponent 𝑡 ∈  𝑍𝑝 is randomly chosen, and the exponent 𝑃(𝑢𝑘) represents a 
random share selected by the attribute authority for each user 𝑢𝑘 to recover the secret 𝑃(0) 
that needs 𝑐 +  1 shares to recover. To ensure the collusion resistance property, upon each 
user revocation event, the attribute authority generates a proxy key that contains a set of 
pairs of 𝑐 secret shares (i.e. points of the secret polynomial) and the corresponding identities 
of the revoked users 𝑢𝑖 , 𝑖 ∈ {1,2, … , 𝑐}. These shares are embedded by the proxy server in a 
piece of the user’s secret key to transform it for decryption. Therefore, the proxy key will 
be as follows: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑦 𝐾𝑒𝑦 = ∀𝑢𝑖 ∈ 𝑅:< 𝑢𝑖 , 𝑃(𝑢𝑖) >, where 𝑅 is the set of revoked users. 
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Figure 4.5: The steps of the KeyGen algorithm 
𝑲𝒆𝒚𝑻𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎(𝑳,𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒙𝒚 𝑲𝒆𝒚) → 𝑳
𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒙𝒚𝒌𝒆𝒚: The proxy server takes the component 𝐿 of 
the user’s secret key and then transforms it by embedding the shares of the revoked users in 
that piece using its 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑦 𝐾𝑒𝑦. Using the revoked shares will prevent them from using these 
shares to recover the associated plaintext. In addition, the proxy uses its information and the 
identity of the non-revoked user 𝑢𝑘 to compute: 
∀𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ {1, … , 𝑐}, 𝑘∉{1,…,c},       𝜆𝑖 =
𝑢𝑘
𝑢𝑘−𝑢𝑖
.∏
𝑢𝑗
𝑢𝑗−𝑢𝑖
𝑗≠𝑖                 (4.1)  
For every non-revoked user 𝑢𝑘, the proxy calculates 𝜆𝑘 using the equation (4.1) and then 
sends it to 𝑢𝑘. In this case, the collusion attack happens only when the revoked users collude 
with the cloud and proxy servers together.  
∀𝑢𝑘 ∉ 𝑅, (𝐿𝑘)
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑦𝑘𝑒𝑦 = ( 𝐿𝑘 )
∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑃(𝑢𝑖)
𝑐
𝑖=1 = (𝑔𝑎𝑡)∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑃(𝑢𝑖)
𝑐
𝑖=1 = 𝑔𝑎𝑡 ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑃(𝑢𝑖)
𝑐
𝑖=1  
𝑫𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒚𝒑𝒕 (𝑪𝑻, 𝑺𝑲, 𝑳𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒙𝒚𝒌𝒆𝒚) → 𝑴: The decryption algorithm inputs are a ciphertext CT, 
the user’s private key and the output of the 𝐾𝑒𝑦𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚 algorithm. Once a user’s 
attributes satisfy the access structure in the ciphertext and it is not on the revocation list (as 
shown in Figure 4.6), it can recover the message M as detailed below. The values 
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 {𝜔𝑖  ∈  𝑍𝑝}𝑖∈𝐼 are supposed to be a set of constants such that when {?̅?𝑖}𝑖∈𝐼 are valid shares 
of a secret 𝑠 which correspond to 𝑊𝑖, then ∑ 𝜔𝑖?̅?𝑖 𝑖∈𝐼 =  𝑠. The decryption algorithm 
computes 𝑀 as follows:  
𝐵1 =
𝑒(𝐶0 , 𝐾)
(∏ (𝑒 (𝐶𝑖̀ , 𝐿1́
𝜆𝑘) 𝑒(𝐷𝑖̀ , 𝐾𝜌(𝑖)
𝜆𝑘  )𝑒 (  𝑇𝑖, 𝐿1́
𝜆𝑘))𝑖∈?̀?
𝜔𝑖
). 𝑒(𝐶0, 𝐿
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑦𝑘𝑒𝑦)
 
=
𝑒( 𝑔𝑠 , 𝑔 𝛼𝑔 𝑎𝑡𝑃(0))
(∏ (𝑒 (𝑔𝑎𝜆?̂? . ℎ𝜌(𝑖)
−𝑟𝑖 , 𝑔𝑡𝑃(𝑢𝑘)𝜆𝑘) 𝑒(𝑔 𝑟𝑖 ,   ℎ𝜌(𝑖) 𝑡𝑃
(𝑢𝑘)𝜆𝑘)𝑒(𝑔−𝑎𝐹𝑖 , 𝑔𝑡𝑃(𝑢𝑘)𝜆𝑘))𝑖∈?̀?
𝜔𝑖
). 𝑒(𝑔𝑠, 𝑔𝑎𝑡 ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑃(𝑢𝑖)
𝑐
𝑖=1 )
 
= 
𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝛼 𝑠𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔) 𝑎 𝑠𝑡𝑃(0)
(∏ (𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝑎𝜆?̂?𝑡𝑃(𝑢𝑘)𝜆𝑘𝑒(𝑔, ℎ𝜌(𝑖))−𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑃(𝑢𝑘)𝜆𝑘𝑒(𝑔, ℎ𝜌(𝑖))𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑃(𝑢𝑘)𝜆𝑘𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)−𝑎𝐹𝑖𝑡𝑃(𝑢𝑘)𝜆𝑘)
𝜔𝑖
). 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝑎𝑠𝑡 ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑃(𝑢𝑖)
𝑐
𝑖=1𝑖∈?̀?
 
= 
𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝛼 𝑠𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔) 𝑎 𝑠𝑡𝑃(0)
(∏ (𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝑎𝜆?̂?𝑡𝑃(𝑢𝑘)𝜆𝑘𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)−𝑎𝐹𝑖𝑡𝑃(𝑢𝑘)𝜆𝑘)
𝜔𝑖
). 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝑎𝑠𝑡∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑃(𝑢𝑖)
𝑐
𝑖=1𝑖∈?̀?
 
= 
𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝛼 𝑠𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔) 𝑎 𝑠𝑡𝑃(0)
(∏ (𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝑡𝑎(𝜆?̂?−𝐹𝑖)𝑃(𝑢𝑘)𝜆𝑘)
𝜔𝑖
). 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝑎𝑠𝑡∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑃(𝑢𝑖)
𝑐
𝑖=1𝑖∈?̀?
 
= 
𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝛼 𝑠𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔) 𝑎 𝑠𝑡𝑃(0)
𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝑡𝑎𝑃(𝑢𝑘)𝜆𝑘 ∑ ( 𝜆𝑖
̂ −𝐹𝑖)𝜔𝑖𝑖∈?̀? . 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝑎𝑠𝑡 ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑃(𝑢𝑖)
𝑐
𝑖=1
 
Where {?̅?𝑖 = ?̂?𝑖 − 𝐹𝑖}𝑖∈𝑙 
𝐵1 = 
𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝛼 𝑠𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔) 𝑎 𝑠𝑡𝑃(0)
𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝑡𝑎𝑠𝑃(𝑢𝑘)𝜆𝑘 . 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝑎𝑠𝑡 ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑃(𝑢𝑖)
𝑐
𝑖=1
 
𝐵1 = 
𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝛼 𝑠𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔) 𝑎 𝑠𝑡𝑃(0)
𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝑎𝑠𝑡(∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑃(𝑢𝑖)+𝑃(𝑢𝑘)𝜆𝑘
𝑐
𝑖=1 )
 
𝐵1 = 
𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝛼 𝑠𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔) 𝑎 𝑠𝑡𝑃(0)
𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑃(0)
 
𝐵1 = 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)
𝛼 𝑠 
Then the decryption algorithm can calculate the message 𝑀 as: 
𝑀 =
𝐶
𝐵1
=
𝑀𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝛼𝑠
𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝛼𝑠
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Figure 4.6: The steps of the Decrypt algorithm 
𝑷𝒐𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒚𝑼𝒑𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆(𝑷𝑲,𝑲𝑶𝒘𝒏𝒆𝒓, 𝑨, ?́? ) → (𝑬𝑺,  ?̀?⃑⃑  ⃑): The data owner runs this algorithm (as 
illustrated in Figure 4.7), once there is a need to update the policy. The public 
parameters 𝑃𝐾, the data owner’s secret parameter 𝐾𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟 used in the encryption 
algorithm, an access policy 𝐴 (i.e.(𝑊, 𝜌)) and its updated access policy ?́? (i.e.(?̈?, ?̈?)) are 
the inputs of this algorithm. The outputs are a vector of updated, encrypted shares 𝐸𝑆 
according to ?́? and its associated formulated vector ?̀?⃑⃑  ⃑. Re-sharing the same secret has to be 
correctly performed using the LSS matrix technique to compute the new shares of the same 
secret.   
As a result, the outcome of this algorithm is the vector ?̃?1⃑⃑⃑⃑  that consists of the updated shares. 
As a consequence of the need to frequently change the shares of the corresponding, updated 
attributes, the associated ciphertext components that are already stored on the cloud storage 
server also needs to be updated. Thus, the owner only encrypts the resulted vector ?̃?1⃑⃑⃑⃑  in the 
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same way as in the original encryption algorithm to generate ES, and then sends it with its 
associated formulated vector  ?̀?⃑⃑  ⃑ to the cloud server to re-encrypt the related components. 
This provides communication and computation offloading without any information leakage 
to the cloud server. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.7: The steps of the PolicyUpdate algorithm. 
𝑹𝒆 − 𝑬𝒏𝒄𝒓𝒚𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏(𝑷𝑲, 𝑬𝑺,  ?̀?⃑⃑  ⃑, ?́?) → 𝑪?́?: The cloud server runs the algorithm that takes 
the public parameters 𝑃𝐾, the encrypted shares ES resulted from the 𝑷𝒐𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒚𝑼𝒑𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆 
algorithm, its associated formulated vector  ?̀?⃑⃑  ⃑ and the new access policy ?́? as inputs (as 
illustrated in Figure 4.8). The cloud server uses these inputs to output the updated 
ciphertext  𝐶𝑇́  using the same criteria in the original encryption algorithm and then 
publishes  𝐶𝑇́  as:     
𝑪?́?  = (𝐶 = 𝑀𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝛼𝑠, 𝐶0 =  𝑔
𝑠, {𝐶?̿?  =  𝑔
𝑎𝜆?̂?   ℎ𝜌(𝑖)
−𝑟𝑖   ,  𝐷𝑖̿̿̿̿  =  𝑔 
𝑟𝑖 ,  𝑇𝑖́ = 𝑔
−𝑎𝑓𝑖  }
𝑖=1
𝑙
) 
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4.3 Scheme Analysis 
The description of our scheme construction in the previous section demonstrates that our 
scheme manages a user’s privileges in accordance with the updating of the data owner’s 
access policy and addresses the user revocation problem. In this section, our construction is 
analysed in terms of its security and performance. 
4.3.1 Security Analysis 
This sub-section considers how our proposed scheme meets the security requirements set 
out in Section 4.1, which are data confidentiality, collusion resistance, fine-grained access 
control and backward and forward security. These requirements are enforced on outsourcing 
sensitive data to an untrusted environment and handling the attributes with their values 
changed frequently. The following explanation shows how our scheme fulfils these 
requirements:  
Data Confidentiality. In terms of data confidentiality, our scheme allows the cloud server 
to re-encrypt ciphertexts without being authorised to decrypt them. Therefore, the data 
confidentiality is guaranteed against the cloud server. Furthermore, beside the security of 
Waters’ system [42] (see Section 3.7.1) that we use as a base of our scheme, we need to 
prove the security of our policy update, user revocation and proxy operations. Since both 
Figure 4.8: The Re-Encryption algorithm step. 
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the original ciphertext and the updated one have the same distribution, only the security of 
the original ciphertext with Proxy Revocation is considered. 
Definition 4.1. Our proposed single-authority CP-ABE scheme is selectively secure against 
chosen ciphertext attacks if all polynomial time adversaries have at most a negligible 
advantage in the same game of Section 3.6. 
Theorem 4.1. If the security of the basic scheme of Waters’ system [42] holds, all 
polynomial time adversaries have negligible time to selectively break our proposed scheme. 
 Proof. Suppose that an adversary 𝒜 with a non-negligible advantage can break the security 
of our scheme in a polynomial time. If this adversary wins the selective security game, then 
a simulator ℬ can break the security of Waters ‘system [42] (i.e. solve the decisional 𝑞-
Parallel BDHE problem). 
Assume two bilinear, cyclic groups of prime order 𝑝, 𝐺0 and 𝐺𝑇 where |𝐺| = 𝑝, and 𝑔 as a 
generator of 𝐺0. A map 𝑒 ∶  𝐺0  ×  𝐺0  → 𝐺𝑇 denotes a bilinear map. The instance of the 
decisional 𝑞-Parallel BDHE problem  𝒚⃗ = ( 𝑔, 𝑔𝑠,  𝑔𝑎, . . . ,  𝑔(𝑎
𝑞) ,  𝑔(𝑎
𝑞+2), . . . ,  𝑔(𝑎
2𝑞), … ) 
is given to the simulator ℬ. When the message is hidden from 𝒜, the value of 𝑇 will be any 
random element in 𝐺𝑇 and otherwise 𝑇 equals to 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)
𝑎𝑞+1𝑠 (i.e. 𝑇 = 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝑎
𝑞+1𝑠). 
Init. The adversary 𝒜 sends the challenge access policy  (𝑊∗
𝑙∗ × 𝑛∗
, 𝜌∗) to the simulator ℬ, 
where 𝑙∗, 𝑛∗ ≤  𝑞.  
Setup. Some parameters are chosen by the simulator ℬ to generate the public and master 
keys. An element ?́? is randomly chosen by the simulator ℬ where 𝛼 ́ ∈  𝑍𝑝. The simulator 
ℬ sets 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝛼 = 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)?́?. 𝑒(𝑔𝑎, 𝑔𝑎
𝑞
) = 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)?́?. 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝑎
𝑞+1
 that means implicitly 𝛼 =
?́? + 𝑎𝑞+1.  
In terms of computing each group element ℎ𝑥 that corresponds to an attribute 𝑥 where 1 ≤
𝑥 ≤ 𝑈 , a number 𝑧𝑥 is selected randomly for each 𝑥. Let 𝐼
∗ be a set where 𝐼∗ = {𝑖: 𝜌∗(𝑖) =
𝑥}: 
ℎ𝑥 = 𝑔
𝑧𝑥 ∏𝑔𝑎𝑊𝑖,1
∗ /𝑏𝑖 . 𝑔𝑎
2𝑊𝑖,2
∗ /𝑏𝑖 …𝑔𝑎
𝑛∗𝑊𝑖,𝑛∗
∗ /𝑏𝑖
𝑖∈𝐼∗
 
Notably, when 𝐼∗ is an empty set, ℎ𝑥 = 𝑔
𝑧𝑥. Then ℬ randomly chooses  𝑃(0) ∈  𝑍𝑝. 
In addition, the simulator generates the proxy key and the revocation list 𝑅 ∗with 𝑐 random 
users and their shares (i.e. 𝑅 ∗ = {(𝑢1
∗, 𝑃(𝑢1
∗)), … , (𝑢𝑘
∗ , 𝑃(𝑢𝑘
∗))} where 𝑘 ∈ {1, … , 𝑐}. Then 
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the simulator sends the public parameters 𝑃𝐾 = ( 𝑔, 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝛼  ,  𝑔𝑎 , ℎ1, . . . , ℎ𝑈) to the 
adversary and keeps the master 𝑀𝑆𝐾 = ( 𝑎, 𝑔𝛼 , 𝑃) and proxy keys secret. 
Query 1. In this phase, the simulator ℬ responds to all restricted secret keys queries made 
by the adversary for users (𝑢1
∗ , … , 𝑢𝑛
∗ ) , where 𝑢𝑛
∗ ∈ 𝑍𝑝. Whilst 𝒜 sends a new list of the 
revoked identities 𝑅𝐿 ∗ = (𝑢1
∗, … , 𝑢𝑘
∗ ) where 𝑘 ∈ {1,… , 𝑐} to the simulator, the simulator 
updates its revocation list 𝑅 ∗ (by computing the shares 𝑃(𝑢𝑘
∗) of the corresponding 
identities in 𝑅𝐿 ∗) and proxy key and sends the generated secret keys to 𝒜 unless their 
attributes satisfy the access policy (𝑊∗, 𝜌∗) and 𝑢𝑖
∗ ∉ 𝑅 ∗. Therefore, the ℬ’s responses will 
be as follows: 
1- If the attribute set 𝑆 satisfies the access policy (𝑊∗, 𝜌∗) and 𝑢𝑖
∗ ∉ 𝑅 ∗, then abort. 
2- If the attribute set 𝑆 does not satisfy the access policy (𝑊∗, 𝜌∗) and 𝑢𝑖
∗ ∉ 𝑅 ∗, the 
simulator ℬ finds a vector ?⃑⃑? = (𝑤1, 𝑤2, … , 𝑤𝑛∗) ∈ 𝑍𝑝 where 𝑤1 = −1  ∀𝑖, 𝜌
∗(𝑖) ∈
𝑆, ?⃑⃑? .𝑊𝑖
∗ = 0. Moreover, the simulator ℬ randomly selects r ∈ 𝑍𝑝. 
Implicitly, the simulator ℬ defines 𝑡 as below: 
𝑡 = 𝑟 + 𝑤1. 𝑎
𝑞 + 𝑤2. 𝑎
𝑞−1 + ⋯+ 𝑤𝑛∗ . 𝑎
𝑞−𝑛∗+1 
 
Therefore, to compute 𝐿 
𝐿 = 𝑔𝑎𝑡 = 𝑔𝑎𝑟 ∏ (𝑔𝑎
𝑞−𝑖+1
)𝑤𝑖
𝑖=1,..,𝑛∗
 
𝐿1́ = 𝑔
𝑡𝑃(𝑢𝑘) = 𝑔𝑃(𝑢𝑘)𝑟 ∏ (𝑔𝑎
𝑞−𝑖+1
)𝑤𝑖
𝑖=1,..,𝑛∗
 
To generate 𝐾:  
𝐾 = 𝑔?́? . 𝑔𝑃(0)𝑎𝑟 ∏ (𝑔𝑎
𝑞−𝑖+2
)
𝑤𝑖
𝑖=2,..,𝑛∗
 
At this step, for each 𝑥 ∈ 𝑆 and 𝑥 does not use in the access structure, 𝐾𝑥 is calculated 
as: 
𝐾𝑥 = 𝐿1́
𝑧𝑥
 
for each 𝑥 ∈ 𝑆 and 𝑥 is in the access structure, 𝐾𝑥 is hard to calculate. Since the term 
of the form 𝑔𝑎
𝑞+1 𝑏𝑖⁄  ought not to be computed and hard to be defined. 
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𝐾𝑥 = 𝐿1́
𝑧𝑥 ∏ ∏ (𝑔(𝑎𝑗/𝑏𝑖)
𝑟
 ∏ (𝑔𝑎
𝑞+1+𝑗−𝑘/𝑏𝑖)𝑤𝑘
𝑘=1,..,𝑛∗,𝑘≠𝑗
)
𝑊𝑖,𝑗
𝑗=1,..,𝑛∗
∗
𝑖∈𝐼
 
The adversary tries to interact with ℬ to transform part of its secret keys by calling 
the Key transform algorithm. Then the simulator runs this algorithm using its proxy 
key and responses to its request as not belonging to the revocation list. 
3- If the attribute set 𝑆 satisfies or does not satisfy the access policy (𝑊∗, 𝜌∗) and 𝑢𝑖
∗ ∈
𝑅 ∗, then 𝐾  , 𝐿 , 𝐿1́, and  𝐾𝑥 are computed as the same way in case 2 by ℬ. 
However, ℬ does not response to 𝒜’s requests to transform its secret keys whose 
identities belong to the revocation list. In this case, 𝒜 cannot recover the value of 
𝑃(0) even if its secret keys are computed correctly because these keys are 
invalidated by ℬ.   
Challenge. The adversary sends two equal-length messages (𝑀0, 𝑀1  ∈ 𝐺𝑇) to ℬ. One of 
the submitted messages is chosen randomly by the simulator who encrypts it 
under (𝑊∗, 𝜌∗). The challenged ciphertext is set as below: 
- The simulator selects one of the received messages 𝑀𝑐 where 𝑐 ∈ {0,1} and 𝑠 ∈ 𝑍𝑝 . 
ℬ generates the ciphertext components 
𝐶 = 𝑀𝑐 . 𝑒(𝑔
𝑠, 𝑔?́?. 𝑔𝑎
𝑞+1
) = 𝑀𝑐 . 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)
𝑎𝑞+1𝑠. 𝑒(𝑔𝑠, 𝑔?́?) = 𝑀𝑐𝑇. 𝑒(𝑔
𝑠, 𝑔?́?) 
?́? = 𝑔𝑠 
-  To generate the component 𝐶𝑖, the simulator ℬ computes a vector 𝑣  where the first 
element in this vector will be the secret 𝑠 that needs to be shared. So, 𝑣 = (𝑠, 𝑠𝑎 +
𝑦2́, 𝑠𝑎
2 + 𝑦3́, … , 𝑠𝑎
𝑛−1 + 𝑦𝑛∗́ ) ∈ 𝑍𝑝
𝑛∗, where 𝑦2́, … , 𝑦𝑛∗́  are randomly chosen. 
ℬ encrypts 𝑣  using the formula ?̂?𝑖 = 𝑊𝑖
∗(𝑠𝑎𝑖+1 + 𝑦𝑛∗́ ) + 𝑓𝑖  𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝 , where 𝑓𝑖  ∈ 𝑍𝑝 
is selected randomly and  ?̂?𝑖 represents the encrypted share. Moreover, the simulator 
randomly chooses  𝑟1́, … , 𝑟?́? and generates a set 𝑅𝑖, where 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑛
∗. This set 
contains all indices of rows that are each assigned to a similar attribute as row 
𝑖 (i.e. 𝜌∗(𝑖) =  𝜌∗(𝑘) 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑖 ≠ 𝑘). Therefore, the generated ciphertext 
components are as follows: 
𝐷𝑖 = 𝑔
−𝑟?́? . 𝑔−𝑠𝑏𝑖 
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𝐶𝑖 = ℎ𝜌∗(𝑖)
𝑟?́? ( ∏ (𝑔𝑎)(𝑊𝑖,𝑗
∗ 𝑦𝑗)+́ 𝑓𝑗
𝑗=2,…,𝑛∗
) . (𝑔𝑠.𝑏𝑖)−𝑧𝜌∗(𝑖) . (∏ ∏ (𝑔𝑎
𝑗𝑠.(𝑏𝑖/𝑏𝑘))𝑊𝑘,𝑗
∗
𝑗=1,…,𝑛∗𝑘∈𝑅𝑖
) 
 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑔
−𝑎𝑓𝑖 
Query 2. It is the same procedure as Query 1. 
Guess. At this phase (as in Section 3.7.1), the adversary 𝒜 outputs its guess ?́? of 𝑐 .  If  ?́? =
𝑐, then the simulator  ℬ outputs 0 which means that 𝑇 = 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝑎
𝑞+1𝑠. In this case, we have: 
𝑃𝑟 [ℬ(?⃗?, 𝑇 = 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝑎
𝑞+1𝑠) =  0] =
1
2
+ Adv𝒜  
Otherwise, the simulator outputs 1 which means that 𝑇 is a random group element in 𝐺𝑇 and 
𝑀𝑐  is totally concealed from the adversary. In this case, we have: 
𝑃𝑟 [ℬ(?⃗?, T = ℛ) =  0] =
1
2
 
Consequently, the simulator ℬ would break the security of Waters’ system [42], if the 
adversary wins the game with a non-negligible advantage.  
𝑃𝑟 [ℬ(?⃗?, 𝑇 = 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝑎
𝑞+1𝑠) =  0] − 𝑃𝑟 [ℬ(?⃗?, T = ℛ) =  0] = Adv𝒜  
 Based on Definition 4.1 and Definition 3.3 (in Section 3.5.2), we can observe that the 
previous hypothesis is contradicted. That means, in the selective security game, there is no 
adversary 𝒜 with a non-negligible advantage. Regarding the theorem, our proposed scheme 
is secure. 
Collusion Resistance. In terms of collusion resistance, most existing systems are based on 
a common assumption that the cloud server is honest but curious, indicating that the cloud 
server could collect information correlated to the stored data on it, even if such outsourced 
data is encrypted. However, the collected information may be used to infer private 
information by analysing some basic information. Hence, any proposed systems ought to be 
resistant against any collusion attacks, particularly between the cloud service provider and 
any revoked users.  
To bridge the above-stated gap, our proposed scheme uses the principle of a SSSS to restrict 
any collusion attacks by embedding an independent random secret share into every user’s 
secret key. This approach ensures that our scheme is collusion resistant and able to securely 
revoke the main part of the secret key of each revoked user. Therefore, there is no potential 
of malicious collusion attacks between the revoked users and the cloud server, which is 
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achieved by invalidating the keys of the revoked users. In addition, only limited restricted 
steps could be taken by the curious untrusted cloud server. Based on these considerations, 
our scheme is secure. 
Consequently, we have compared our scheme with the most relevant existing works [64, 
65] and concluded that our scheme is more practical than the existing ones. This is because 
the authors in [64] assume that the cloud server is semi-trusted and assign essential tasks to 
it, meaning that their system does not resist against collusion attacks. To avoid such attacks, 
the system in [65] assigns most of the heavy operations to the data owner, resulting in 
heavier communication and computation overheads for the data owner. Table 4.2 
summarises the above comparison. 
Table 4.2: Comparison of scheme abilities to resist collusion attacks. 
Fine Grained Access Control. This requirement is enabled by using CP-ABE that 
cryptographically enforces expressive access policies by data owners. This type of access 
control grants data owners the ability to choose with fine granularity who can access their 
data. 
Forward and Backward Security. In terms of backward security, our proposed scheme 
does not need to achieve it, instead it keeps the distribution of the updated ciphertexts in the 
same form as the distribution of the original ciphertext. In the context of forward security, 
this security requirement is achieved by activating two processes. First, our technique 
dynamically updates a data owner’s policy, leading to eleviating or revoking some users’ 
privileges. This prevents the users with their attributes revoked, from accessing the same 
level of the subsequent data. Secondly, a user revocation process revokes all privileges of 
any revoked user and prevents them from decrypting any newly published data. 
Scheme Most of Operations Run by Collusion 
Resistance 
PU-CP_ABE [65] Data owner Yes 
Guangbo Wang and Jianhua Wang[64] Cloud server No 
Our scheme Cloud server Yes 
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4.3.2 Performance Analysis 
In this subsection, we compare our scheme with the most relevant schemes in [64, 65], in 
terms of communication, computation and storage costs. The comparison illustrates that our 
scheme is more practical as shown in the following discussions. 
Communication cost. The communication cost between the key attribute authority (AA) 
and the system users (SU) is generated by transmitting the secret keys and handling updating 
events, which is similar in all the compared systems. The communication cost for the policy 
update and the ciphertext re-encryption operations between the data owner (DO) and the 
cloud server (CS) is mainly due to transmitting the ciphertext and any changed information 
after each access privilege setting. In addition, there are extra communicating operations 
needed in the two other systems, where in [64], the system users need to send their 
transformation keys to the cloud server to perform partial decryption for them, whereas in 
the re-randomization operation in [65], the data owner downloads ciphertext, re-randomizes 
it, and then transmits it back to the cloud server. That means that the communication cost of 
just the re-randomization operation in [65] equals to the cost of sending the original 
ciphertext. As illustrated in Table 4.3, in [64], upon each revocation event, the revocation 
list is sent to the cloud server (where the size of this list increases linearly with the number 
of revoked users), affecting the communication bandwidth. In our scheme, two vectors have 
to be sent through the channel between the cloud server and the data owner where the 
number of elements in each vector is equal to the number of the attributes in the access 
policy (where this number is obviously less than the number of revoked users in [64]). 
Computation and storage cost. The two relevant systems [64, 65] introduce almost the 
same computational cost in all their algorithms except in the ciphertext re-encryption phase. 
In terms of policy update and ciphertext re-encryption operations, as shown in Table 4.4, 
the computation burden of generating the updated access policy and updating the ciphertext 
and additional re-randomization operation (that equals to the cost of the original encryption 
operation) in [65] is put on the data owner. Although the work in [64] delegates part of the 
decryption operation and revocation process to the cloud server by granting more control 
privileges to the cloud server (i.e. at the expense of not being a collusion-resistance system), 
its ciphertext size increases linearly with the revocation list size, leading to the increase in 
the storage cost. In our scheme, the process for updating the access policy is the data owner’s 
responsibility, which is clearly less than the data owner’s responsibilities in [65], while the 
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re-encryption operation corresponding to the updated policy is run by the cloud service 
provider.  
Table 4.3: Comparative summary of communication costs of our scheme against related 
work. 
Scheme Communications between the data owner and the cloud 
upon each revocation event 
PU-CP_ABE [65] The updated ciphertext components and the whole re-
randomized ciphertext 
Guangbo Wang and 
Jianhua Wang [64] 
Revocation list 
Our scheme Two vectors, one for the encrypted shares and another for the 
corresponding formula, where the number of elements in 
each vector is equal to the number of attributes in the access 
policy 
 
Table 4.4: Comparative summary of computation and storage costs of our scheme against 
related work. 
The spread of the updated ciphertext. The spread of the updated ciphertext in our scheme 
and the PU-CP_ABE scheme in [65] is the same as the spread of the original ciphertext 
which is the core challenge. However, the spread of the two corresponding ciphertexts in 
[64] is different. 
Scheme  Owner  Cloud  
PU-CP_ABE [65] Update the access policy, 
compute the updated 
ciphertext components and re-
randomize the whole 
ciphertext 
 
Guangbo Wang and 
Jianhua Wang[64] 
Generate the revocation list Generate new shares and headers, 
re-encrypt the ciphertext with an 
increased size, and partially 
decrypt the encrypted data 
Our scheme Update the access policy  Re-encrypt the ciphertext and 
partially encrypt ciphertexts 
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4.4 The Experiment Results and Evaluation 
We implemented the proposed scheme specified in Section 4.2.4. The CP-ABE system in 
[42] was taken as the base and developed to adapt to our proposed scheme. The experiment 
supports dynamic policy update processes, user revocation and relieves the encryption 
burden on the data owner. 
The implementation uses the Java Pairing Based Cryptography (JPBC) library [115] which 
is built using Java. A 160-bit Elliptic curve group of type (A) curves ( 𝑦2 = 𝑥3 + 𝑥 ) of 
JPBC is used with a 512-bit base field. The experiment is executed on Intel(R) Core(TM) 
i7-2006, 3.40 GH CPU, where pairing takes about 31 milliseconds. 
In the CP-ABE scheme, the time consumed in the Encryption process is mainly linear with 
the number of attributes involved in an access policy. Therefore, the computation overhead 
results from using a complex access policy. To examine the efficiency of our proposed 
scheme, we have considered access policies from simple to complex forms with various 
numbers of attributes (i.e. 4, 10 and 20 attributes in our experiment). 
In terms of encryption, comparisons between our scheme and the most relevant scheme PU-
CP-ABE in [65] were carried out via simulations. Due to outsourcing some expensive 
operations (i.e. computing the ciphertext components associated with attributes) to the cloud 
server, the simulation results match our expectations and show that our scheme is more 
scalable and efficient than the compared one. Also, the efficiency gain of our scheme 
increases when the number of attributes in the access policy increases, as evidenced in 
Figure 4.9 A. For example, the compared PU-CP-ABE system takes 136% more time than 
our solution in the case of 4 attributes and 191% more time when the number of attributes 
increases to 20. 
Similarly, the time consumption of the policy update process is compared between our 
scheme and PU-CP-ABE in [65]. After the first implementation of the experiment, the time 
of the policy update process is computed by changing the number of attributes in the access 
policy from 4 to 10 attributes and then from 10 to 20 attributes, respectively. Although the 
two systems outsource partial operations to the cloud server, the performance evaluation 
results presented in Figure 4.9 B illustrate that our scheme consumes less time, where the 
scheme of PU-CP-ABE takes 96% and 80% more time than our policy update process in 
the cases of 10 and 20 attributes, respectively. The main reason for this is that the compared 
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system delegates just affordable operations to the cloud server, while a data owner carries 
out the expensive ones.  
 
Figure 4.9 A: Encryption performance comparison between our scheme and PU-CP-ABE. 
In terms of a decryption operation, the time consumed in a CP-ABE scheme mainly depends 
on the complexity of the access structure and the attributes set involved (i.e. the maximum 
number of attributes in a user’s decryption key, which satisfy the access policy embedded 
in a ciphertext). Our scheme offers performance slightly lower than the compared system, 
as shown in Figure 4.9 C. For instance, our scheme consumes 44% more time than the PU-
CP-ABE scheme when the access policy consists of 4 attributes, and takes 33% and 34% 
when the numbers of attributes in the access policy are 10 and 20, respectively. The 
variations in percentages are affected by changing the number of the involved attributes. 
Note that even if 20 attributes are used, not all the attributes are involved in an access policy, 
which reflects a small time increase from 10 to 20 attributes. The reason for our scheme 
performance degradation is that unlike the compared system, our scheme needs additional 
cryptographic operations to solve the user revocation problem that is not considered in the 
compared system, leading to more computation. Alternatively, the compared system assigns 
heavy operations to a data owner, who has to stay online, to avoid colluding between the 
revoked users and the cloud server. In this case, the compared system does not need to 
address this property. 
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Finally, the re-encryption operation in our scheme and the compared one is carried out by 
the cloud server. For this reason, there is no need to illustrate any comparisons between 
them, because evaluating the efficiency of our proposed scheme is mainly on measuring the 
burden on data owners and users due to their limited computing resources. Although the 
overall performance evaluation of our scheme is higher than the compared one, we intend 
to improve the time consumed by a decryption operation in our future work.  
  
Figure 4.9 B: Policy update performance comparison between our scheme and PU-CP-ABE 
Despite the expensive pairing operations of CP-ABE, many of the existing systems [116, 
117] prove the feasibility of CP-ABE that suits many IoT applications. Due to the efficiency 
of our scheme that already enhances the efficiency of CP-ABE, our proposed scheme is 
practical. We tried to implement our scheme on a mobile phone. However, the JPBC Library 
that our proposed scheme is built on, is inefficient on mobile phones. It can only be run on 
Android 2.2 or lower. Moreover, only a few elliptic curve cryptography libraries support 
pairing operations written in Java. Most of these libraries are not compatible for mobile 
phone operating systems (such as Android) and only available for desktop-based 
applications [118, 119]. We intend to perform the above experiment when the facilities 
required become available. 
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Figure 4.9 C: Decryption performance comparison between our scheme and PU-CP-ABE 
4.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter, some essential issues have been considered, including outsourcing 
computation to the cloud in a secure manner, constructing a scheme that resists against 
collusion attacks, and addressing the revocation problem. The consideration of these issues 
is due to the lack of appropriate solutions in the existing work. We have thus exploited the 
merits of some existing systems to introduce a novel technique that efficiently processes 
attribute revocation by updating access policies dynamically. In particular, the tasks for re-
encrypting ciphertext and invalidating the secret keys for the revoked users are distributed 
between a cloud server and a proxy server, respectively, to support attribute and user 
revocations. In our proposed scheme, a light load is placed on the attribute authority to grant 
minimal control privileges to the cloud server without revealing any useful information 
when access privilege customization takes place. The scheme analysis demonstrates that our 
proposed scheme is secure and more practical. Further work on extending our scheme to a 
multi-authority access control scheme and outsourcing part of the decryption operation to 
the cloud server will be covered in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5: The Proposed Multi-authority, 
Revocable Access Control Scheme 
5 Introduction 
For secure, public cloud storage, an access control scheme is critical, which ought to be 
carefully designed to achieve fine-grained access control and support outsourced-data 
confidentiality. CP-ABE is introduced as one of the most beneficial, powerful techniques 
that can be leveraged to construct a secure access control system. However, this type of 
technique mainly supports storing data only on a private cloud storage system in which the 
service is managed by only one single authority.  In addition, CP-ABE does not properly 
consider revocation issues to address changes to policy attributes and users. These two 
issues have motivated many researchers to develop more suitable schemes with limited 
success.  
By leveraging the existing work, in this chapter, we propose a new CP-ABE scheme that 
extends the scheme in Chapter 4, tackles most of the existing work’s limitations and allows 
storing data on a public cloud storage system securely by employing multiple authorities 
that manage a joint set of attributes. Furthermore, the proposed scheme efficiently addresses 
the revocation issue by presenting two techniques that allow policy update and invalidate a 
user’s secret key to eliminate collusion attacks. In terms of computation overhead, the 
proposed scheme outsources expensive operations of encryption and decryption to a cloud 
server to mitigate the burden on a data owner and data users, respectively. Our security and 
performance analysis of the scheme demonstrates that our scheme is practical and secure.   
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. The requirements and security assumptions 
that our scheme relies on are presented in Section 5.1. Our proposed multi-authority scheme, 
its entities and algorithms are introduced in Section 5.2. The scheme security and 
performance are analysed and discussed in Section 5.3. Some experimental results are 
demonstrated in Section 5.4. Finally, our work is concluded in Section 5.5. 
5.1 Scheme Security 
The main security assumptions, security requirements and the security model in our proposed 
multi-authority access control scheme are presented in this section. 
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5.1.1 Security Requirements and Assumptions 
There are several security assumptions and requirements for our proposed multi-authority 
scheme. In addition to those for our single-authority scheme in Section 4.1, it also follows 
the assumption and requirement stated below: 
1- A central authority CAA is assumed to be a semi-trusted entity, but it can be attacked 
by an adversary. Due to the decentralised setting, it ought not to be involved in 
generating secret keys for users. 
2- Minimising the trust level of attribute authorities and tackling the key escrow problem 
are considered by hiding part of the master key from all the scheme entities including 
the attribute authorities that use the implicit value of the master key to generate users’ 
secret keys. Also, each attribute authority generate share of a user’s secret key not the 
whole secret key.  
5.1.2 Security Model 
In this part, the security model in a multi-authority access control system is considered in 
two phases. In the first phase, the adversary 𝒜 attempts to compromise the attribute 
authorities to obtain the master secret key. The second phase is similar to a system in [42], 
where an attempt has been made to decrypt a ciphertext encrypted over an access policy, by 
the adversary with secret keys that do not have the attributes satisfying the access policy 
(the details are similar to those stated in section 3.6).  
Definition 5.1. Our proposed multi-authority scheme is secure against chosen ciphertext 
attacks if all polynomial time adversaries have at most a negligible advantage in the selective 
security game. 
5.2 Our Proposed Scheme 
In this section, we present the scheme model, which involves six entities that run eight 
scheme algorithms. Some details of these entities (as shown in Figure 5.1) and algorithms 
are described below. 
5.2.1 Scheme Entities    
Our multi-authority scheme consists of one central authority, multiple attribute authorities, 
data owners, data users, a cloud server, and a proxy server: 
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Central authority (CAA). This entity establishes the scheme public parameters, part of the 
master key and a public key for each attribute in the scheme as well as assigning the 
identities to authorized data users and attribute authorities. Moreover, CAA identifies the 
threshold number of required attribute authorities involved in generating users’ secret keys. 
In addition, once a revocation event occurs, the central authority issues a proxy key to the 
proxy server according to the list of revoked users, which will be introduced later.  
Attribute authority (AA). This entity is one of multiple authorities involved in key 
generation as well as jointly managing the scheme attribute set. All attribute authorities 
(AAs) in the scheme are responsible for dealing with joint attribute sets and sharing a part 
of the scheme master secret key, where only a threshold number of these authorities are able 
to generate users’ secret keys. Here, each AA communicates with all the other authorities 
when they need to share the scheme master key, but no communication is required among 
the authorities to generate a user’s secret key.   
Data users. Each user receives its identity from the central authority and its secret key, 
which contains its attributes, from a threshold number of attribute authorities. This secret 
key contains the attribute set that the user possesses. Once this set satisfies the embedded 
access policy, the user can gain access and recover the original data. Otherwise, the 
ciphertext cannot be decrypted.  
Data owners. This party has the same role as the data owner in our proposed single-
authority scheme in sub-section 4.2.1. 
Cloud server. This server plays the same role as the one in sub-section 4.2.1 for the multi-
authority model to leverage its computing and storage resources. We assign heavy missions 
to the cloud to partially encrypt data that is uploaded by a data owner, partially decrypt a 
ciphertext and securely update the ciphertext according to the new access policy after a 
policy update process. These tasks are assigned with a guarantee that no information is 
revealed to the cloud server.  
Proxy server. The proxy server is a semi-trusted server which is provided with a proxy key 
by the central authority CAA when each revocation process takes place. This server deals 
with this key as in sub-section 4.2.1. 
The structure of our scheme is summarised in Figure 5.1. Firstly, in the scheme initialisation 
phase, each authorised user and authority interacts with CAA to obtain their identities. Then 
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CAA and AAs work together in a specific way to initialise the scheme parameters. To 
compute a user’s secret key, the user communicates with any m out of n authorities that run 
the key generation algorithm, to gain its secret key 𝑆𝐾. Then the data owners, who intend to 
outsource their data to a cloud server, execute the encryption algorithm to encrypt their data 
𝐶𝑇, and run the policy update algorithm when their access policy is changed. Any authorised 
user can access the encrypted data and recover the plaintext unless its identity is in the 
revocation list or its attributes do not satisfy the access policy embedded in 𝐶𝑇. When a user 
revocation event occurs, CAA generates a proxy key and sends it to the proxy server which 
in turn updates each authorized user’s secret key unless such user’s identity is in the 
revocation list. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Interactions between the multi-authority scheme entities 
5.2.2 Scheme Algorithms 
The scheme consists of eight algorithms illustrated in Figure 5.2. These algorithms are 
described as below. All main scheme notations used in this chapter are indicated in Table 
5.1 and Table 4.1. 
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Setup: This algorithm contains three sub-algorithms. These algorithms are Setup1CAA, 
Setup2AA, and Setup3CAA. Where, the scheme contains 𝑛 attribute authorities 𝐴𝐴𝑖 (𝑖 =
1,2, … . , 𝑛). The establishment of the scheme parameters and the registration of users and 
the attribute authorities AAs are carried out in the Setup1CAA algorithm by central 
authority CAA. In the second algorithm Setup2AA, generating the master secret key is run 
securely by AAs that contact each other to share the master key MSK. The third algorithm 
Setup3CAA is responsible for reconstructing the scheme public key PK that corresponds to 
the master secret key MSK. This algorithm is executed by central authority CAA. The 
details of these sub-algorithms are presented below:  
Table 5.1:  Main notations used in Chapter 5 
Symbol Description 
𝑷 A secret polynomial of degree 𝑐 which is selected by the central 
authority. 
𝒏 The number of attribute authorities. 
𝑨𝑨𝒊 An attribute authority 𝑖 (where, 𝑖 = 1,2, … . , 𝑛). 
𝒂 Randomly selected exponent belonging to the finite field 𝑍𝑝. 
𝒖𝒌, 𝒂𝒊𝒅 Random elements in 𝑍𝑝 that are chosen by the central authority as unique 
identities of a user and an authority, respectively. 
𝒎 The threshold that represents the required number of the attribute 
authorities to generate each user’s secret key. 
𝜶𝒊 A random number chosen by the attribute authority 𝐴𝐴𝒊 to be its secret 
key where 𝛼𝑖  ∈  𝑍𝑝 for 𝑖 = 1,2, … . , 𝑛. 
𝜶 The summation of 𝛼𝑖  for all attribute authorities will be 𝑝2𝑀𝑆𝐾 = 
∑𝑖=1
𝑛  𝛼𝑖 = 𝛼, where 𝛼 will be implicitly part of the master key of the 
scheme. 
𝑴𝑺𝑲𝒊 The master secret share of attribute authority 𝐴𝐴𝒊 (𝑖 = 1,2, … . , 𝑛). 
𝑷(𝒖𝒊) The random share which is extracted from polynomial 𝑷 selected by the 
central authority for each user 𝒖𝒊. This share is used later to de-activate 
the key when user  𝒖𝒊 is revoked.  
?̅?𝒊 A plain secret share. 
?̂?𝒊 The encrypted version of ?̅?𝑖. 
𝑺𝒆𝒕𝒖𝒑𝟏𝑪𝑨𝑨(𝑼) → (𝒑𝑴𝑺𝑲, 𝒑𝑷𝑲): CAA selects two bilinear, cyclic groups of prime 
order 𝑝, 𝐺0 and 𝐺𝑇 where |𝐺| = 𝑝, and 𝑔 as a generator of 𝐺0. A map 𝑒 ∶  𝐺0  ×  𝐺0  → 𝐺𝑇 
denotes a bilinear map. Then CAA randomly chooses a polynomial 𝑃 of a degree 𝑐 over 
𝑍𝑝 to later use it for blinding each user’s secret key by AAs, which will facilitate revocation 
of a set of users. 𝑃 is securely sent to each AA in the scheme. Moreover, CAA randomly 
selects 𝑎 ∈  𝑍𝑝 as a part of the master key, and publishes the corresponding public key 
part 𝑔𝑎. The input to this algorithm is 𝑈 which represents the number of attributes in the 
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scheme. CAA generates and publishes ℎ1, . . . , ℎ𝑈  ∈  𝐺 which are random group elements to 
be associated with the 𝑈 attributes in the scheme as attribute public keys. In the scheme, 
each user and attribute authority are identified by identities 𝑢𝑘 and 𝑎𝑖𝑑 respectively, which 
are chosen as random elements in 𝑍𝑝 and assigned to the user and authority by CAA. In 
addition, CAA publishes the threshold 𝑚 that represents the required number of AAs to 
generate each user’s secret key. Figure 5.3 illustrates the procedure of this sub-algorithm. 
The outputs of this sub-algorithm include (a) a part of the public key, 𝒑𝑷𝑲 =
(𝑔,  𝑔𝑎, n,m , ℎ1, . . . , ℎ𝑈), which will be published for access by all the scheme parties, and 
(b) a part of the master secret key, 𝒑𝑴𝑺𝑲 = (𝑎, 𝑃), that will be kept secret by CAA.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2: The proposed multi-authority system algorithms 
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𝑺𝒆𝒕𝒖𝒑𝟐𝑨𝑨(𝒏,𝒎) → (𝑷𝑲𝒊,  𝑴𝑺𝑲𝒊): In this algorithm, the secret sharing scheme (SSSS) is 
used by all the AAs involved to share the second part of the master secret key, denoted 
as 𝒑𝟐𝑴𝑺𝑲. To generate 𝑝2𝑀𝑆𝐾, each 𝐴𝐴𝑖 (𝑖 =  1,2, … , 𝑛) randomly chooses a number 𝛼𝑖 
to be its secret key, where 𝛼𝑖  ∈  𝑍𝑝 and the summation of numbers 𝛼𝑖  chosen by all the AAs 
is defined as 𝑝2𝑀𝑆𝐾 = ∑𝑖=1
𝑛  𝛼𝑖 = 𝛼 . After that, each 𝐴𝐴𝑖 creates a random 
polynomial 𝑓𝑖(𝑥) of degree (𝑚 − 1) where 𝑓𝑖(0) =  𝛼𝑖. Then, each 𝐴𝐴𝑖 computes a 
share 𝑚𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑖 for itself and 𝑚𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑗 for every other 𝐴𝐴𝑗  (𝑗 = 1,2, … , 𝑛 but 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖). These shares 
𝑚𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑗 =  𝑓𝑖(𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑗) are securely sent to each corresponding 𝐴𝐴𝑗 , while 𝐴𝐴𝑖 will keep 
 𝑚𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑖 =  𝑓𝑖(𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖) secret for itself. Once each 𝐴𝐴𝑖 receives (𝑛 − 1) shares from all other 
AAs, it calculates its master secret share 𝑀𝑆𝐾𝑖 = ∑𝑗=1
𝑛  𝑚𝑠𝑘𝑗𝑖 and the corresponding public 
key share 𝑝2𝑃𝐾 = 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝑀𝑆𝐾𝑖=𝑃𝐾𝑖 as the outputs of this sub-algorithm, where 𝐴𝐴𝑖 
publishes 𝑃𝐾𝑖 as its public key. Figure 5.4 shows the steps of this sub-algorithm. 
𝑺𝒆𝒕𝒖𝒑𝟑𝑪𝑨𝑨(𝑷𝑲𝒊) → 𝑷𝑲: This algorithm is executed by CAA that selects m out of n 
shares of the AAs’ public key to generate the scheme public key as follows: 
Figure 5.3: The steps of Setup1CAA sub-algorithm. 
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𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝛼  =  𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)
 ∑𝑖=1
𝑚 (𝑀𝑆𝐾𝑖 ∏
𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑗
 𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑗−𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖
𝑚
𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑖 )
 
 =  ∏𝑖=1
𝑚 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)
𝑀𝑆𝐾𝑖  ∏
𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑗
 𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑗−𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖
𝑚
𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑖
 
= ∏𝑖=1
𝑚 𝑃𝐾𝑖
 ∏
𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑗
 𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑗−𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖
𝑚
𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑖
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Eventually, the following scheme parameters are published by CAA as the output of this 
sub-algorithm: 
Figure 5.4: The procedure of the Setup2AA sub-algorithm. 
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𝑃𝐾 =  𝑔, 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝛼,  𝑔𝑎 , 𝑛,𝑚, ℎ1, . . . , ℎ𝑈. 
Here, part of the master key, 𝛼, is not gained by any of the system entities, i.e. it exists 
implicitly.  Now the scheme master key is defined as 𝑀𝑆𝐾 = (𝑎, 𝛼, 𝑃). 
𝑬𝒏𝒄𝒓𝒚𝒑𝒕(𝑷𝑲, (𝑾, 𝝆),𝑴 ) → 𝑪𝑻: A data owner, before migrating its data 𝑀 (𝑀 ∈  𝐺𝑇 ) to 
the cloud server, encrypts 𝑀 using public key 𝑃𝐾 and LSSS access structure (𝑊, 𝜌) 
specified in Section 4.2.4. To execute the encryption, the owner selects a random vector 
 𝑣⃑⃑⃑  =  (𝑠, 𝑦2, . . . ,  𝑦𝑛) where 𝑦2, . . . ,  𝑦𝑛 ∈ 𝑍𝑝 are used to share secret 𝑠. The algorithm 
computes each value ?̅?𝑖 as ?̅?𝑖   =  𝑣 · 𝑊𝑖, where 𝑊𝑖 is the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ row vector of 𝑊 (1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑙). 
These shares {?̅?𝑖}𝑖∈𝑙 will be encrypted by the owner before outsourcing them to the cloud. 
Thus, the ciphertext is outsourced to the cloud server as: 𝐶𝑇1  = ( (𝑊, 𝜌), 𝐶 =
 𝑀𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝛼𝑠 , 𝐶0  =  𝑔
 𝑠), together with two other vectors. The first one is 𝑣 ̃⃑⃑⃑  = (?̂?1, … , ?̂?𝑙  ), 
which represents the vector of the encrypted secret shares that will be embedded by the 
cloud server in the ciphertext components associated with the attributes. Here, an encrypted 
share ?̂?𝑖 is yielded from ?̂?𝑖 = (?̅?𝑖 + 𝐹𝑖 ) mod 𝑝 for 𝑖 = 1 to 𝑙. Here, {F𝑖 ∈ 𝑍𝑝}𝑖=1
𝑙  are 
randomly selected by the data owner for encrypting the plain-shares {?̅?𝑖}𝑖=1
𝑙  in the 
vector 𝑣.𝑊⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑  ⃑. These components are then published by the cloud as  { 𝐶𝑖̀  =
 𝑔𝑎?̂?𝑖   ℎ𝜌(𝑖)
−𝑟𝑖   ,  𝐷𝑖̀  =  𝑔 
𝑟𝑖}𝑖=1
𝑙  where the blind numbers 𝑟1, . . . ,  𝑟𝑙  ∈  𝑍𝑝 are chosen randomly 
by the cloud server.   
The second vector is  𝑄⃑⃑  ⃑ = (𝑔−𝑎𝐹1 , … , 𝑔−𝑎𝐹𝑙), in which its elements correspond to the 
encrypted shares in 𝑣 ̃⃑⃑⃑⃑ . Both  𝑣 ̃⃑⃑⃑⃑  and  𝑄⃑⃑  ⃑ are used to recover the plain-shares {?̅?𝑖}𝑖=1
𝑙  by 
authorized users. For instance, the first element 𝑔−𝑎𝐹1 in  𝑄⃑⃑  ⃑ is used with the first encrypted 
share ?̂?1 in  𝑣 ̃⃑⃑⃑⃑  to recover the first plain share ?̅?1. The elements of  𝑄⃑⃑  ⃑ are included as 
ciphertext components. Finally, the ciphertext is published by the cloud server as:     
𝐶𝑇 = (𝐶 = 𝑀𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝛼𝑠, 𝐶0 =  𝑔
𝑠, {𝐶𝑖̀  =  𝑔
𝑎?̂?𝑖   ℎ𝜌(𝑖)
−𝑟𝑖   ,  𝐷𝑖̀  =  𝑔 
𝑟𝑖 ,  𝑇𝑖 = 𝑔
−𝑎𝐹𝑖  }
𝑖=1
𝑙
) 
Since the ciphertext components associated with attributes are partially encrypted by the 
cloud server, the outsourcing of computation offered by the cloud is efficiently exploited.    
𝑲𝒆𝒚𝑮𝒆𝒏((𝑚 out of 𝑛 )𝑴𝑺𝑲𝒊, 𝑺) → (𝑺𝑲): This algorithm is run by 𝑚 AAs which are 
selected randomly by a user  𝑢𝑘 to contact separately to obtain their secret key shares 
𝑆𝐾𝑖 that then allow  𝑢𝑘 to compute its secret key 𝑺𝑲.  Each secret key share 𝑆𝐾𝑖 is generated 
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by 𝐴𝐴𝑖 (𝑖 = 1,2, … ,𝑚) based on  𝑢𝑘’s attribute set 𝑺 , and it is securely sent to  𝑢𝑘 by 𝐴𝐴𝑖. 
 𝑆𝐾𝑖 is defined as:   
  𝑆𝐾𝑖 = (𝐾𝑖  =  𝑔 
𝑀𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑔 𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑃(0) , 𝐿𝑖  =  𝑔
𝑎𝑡𝑖 , 𝐿1𝑖
́ = 𝑔𝑡𝑖𝑃(𝑢𝑘), ∀𝑥 ∈ 𝑆     𝐾𝑥𝑖 = ℎ𝑥
𝑡𝑖𝑃(𝑢𝑘))  
Here, the exponent 𝑡𝑖  ∈  𝑍𝑝 is randomly chosen by each 𝐴𝐴𝑖, and the exponent 
𝑃(𝑢𝑘) represents a share calculated by 𝐴𝐴𝑖 (𝑖 = 1,2, … ,𝑚 ) for user 𝑢𝑘 to obtain secret 𝑃(0) 
that needs c + 1 shares to recover.  
Once 𝑢𝑘 collects the 𝑚 secret key shares 𝑆𝐾𝑖, it computes its secret key 𝑆𝐾 as follows:  
𝑲 = ∏𝑖=1
𝑚 𝐾𝑖
 ∏
𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑗
 𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑗−𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖
𝑚
𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑖
 
𝑲 = ∏𝑖=1
𝑚 (𝑔 𝑀𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑔 𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑃(0))
 ∏
𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑗
 𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑗−𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖
𝑚
𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑖
 
𝑲 = 𝑔
∑ (𝑚𝑖=1 𝑀𝑆𝑘𝑖.∏
𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑗
 𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑗−𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖
𝑚
𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑖 )
. 𝑔
∑ (𝑚𝑖=1 𝑎𝑃(0)𝑡𝑖.∏
𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑗
 𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑗−𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖
𝑚
𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑖 )
 
𝑲 = 𝑔𝛼 . 𝑔
𝑎𝑃(0)∑ (𝑚𝑖=1 𝑡𝑖.∏
𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑗
 𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑗−𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖
𝑚
𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑖 )
 
𝑳 = ∏𝑖=1
𝑚 𝐿𝑖
 ∏
𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑗
 𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑗−𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖
𝑚
𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑖
 
𝑳 = 𝑔
∑ (𝑚𝑖=1 𝑎𝑡𝑖.∏
𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑗
 𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑗−𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖
𝑚
𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑖 )
 
𝑳 = 𝑔
𝑎 ∑ (𝑚𝑖=1 𝑡𝑖.∏
𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑗
 𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑗−𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖
𝑚
𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑖 )
 
 
?́?𝟏 = ∏𝑖=1
𝑚 ?̀?1𝑖
 ∏
𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑗
 𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑗−𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖
𝑚
𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑖
 
?́?𝟏 = 𝑔
∑ (𝑚𝑖=1 𝑃(𝑢𝑘)𝑡𝑖.∏
𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑗
 𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑗−𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖
𝑚
𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑖 )
 
 
?́?𝟏 = 𝑔
𝑃(𝑢𝑘)∑ (
𝑚
𝑖=1 𝑡𝑖.∏
𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑗
 𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑗−𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖
𝑚
𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑖 )
 
For all 𝑥 ∈ 𝑆  :    
𝑲𝒙  =  ∏𝑖=1
𝑚 𝐾𝑥𝑖
 ∏
𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑗
 𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑗−𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖
𝑚
𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑖
 
𝑲𝒙  = ℎ𝑥
∑ (𝑃(𝑢𝑘)
𝑚
𝑖=1 𝑡𝑖.∏
𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑗
 𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑗−𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖
𝑚
𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑖 )
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𝑲𝒙  = ℎ𝑥
𝑃(𝑢𝑘) ∑ (
𝑚
𝑖=1 𝑡𝑖.∏
𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑗
 𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑗−𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖
𝑚
𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑖 )
 
For simplicity, let 𝑡 be equal to: 
𝒕 = ∑(
𝑚
𝑖=1
𝑡𝑖. ∏
𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑗
 𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑗 − 𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖
𝑚
𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑖
) 
As a result,  𝑢𝑘’s secret key is defined as: 
𝑆𝐾𝑢𝑘 = ( 𝐾 =  𝑔 
𝛼𝑔 𝑎𝑡𝑃(0) , 𝐿 =  𝑔𝑎𝑡, 𝐿1́ = 𝑔
𝑡𝑃(𝑢𝑘), ∀𝑥 ∈ 𝑆     𝐾𝑥 = ℎ𝑥
𝑡𝑃(𝑢𝑘)) 
To ensure the collusion resistance property, upon each user revocation event, CAA 
generates a proxy key that contains a set of pairs of 𝑐 secret shares (i.e. points of the secret 
polynomial) and the corresponding identities of the revoked users 𝑢𝑖  (𝑖 ∈ {1,2, … , 𝑐}). 
These shares are embedded by the proxy server in a piece of the user’s secret key to 
transform it for decryption. Therefore, the proxy key will be as follows: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑦 𝐾𝑒𝑦 = {< 𝑢𝑖, 𝑃(𝑢𝑖) >}𝑢𝑖∈𝑅 , where 𝑅 is the set of revoked users. 
𝑩𝒍𝒊𝒏𝒅𝑺𝑲 (𝑺𝑲) → 𝑩𝑺𝑲: This algorithm is executed by data user  𝑢𝑘 to blind its key before 
sending it to the cloud server to securely decrypt the ciphertext. The input of this algorithm 
is  𝑢𝑘’s secret key SK. In this algorithm,  𝑢𝑘 selects a random exponent 𝑌 ∈ 𝑍𝑝 to compute 
the blinded secret key: 
𝐵𝐾 = (𝐾)
1
𝑌⁄ = 𝑔 
𝛼
𝑌⁄ 𝑔 
𝑎𝑡𝑃(0)
𝑌⁄  , 
𝐵𝐿 = (𝐿)
1
𝑌⁄ = 𝑔
𝑎𝑡
𝑌⁄ ,   
𝐵𝐿1́ = (𝐿1́)
1
𝑌⁄ = 𝑔
𝑡𝑃(𝑢𝑘)
𝑌⁄ ,   
∀𝑥 ∈ 𝑆    𝐵𝐾𝑥 = (𝐾𝑥)
1
𝑌⁄ = ℎ𝑥
𝑡𝑃(𝑢𝑘)
𝑌⁄  
Finally, the blinded secret key is set as 𝑩𝑺𝑲 = (𝐵𝐾, 𝐵𝐿, 𝐵𝐿1́, { 𝐵𝐾𝑥}𝑥∈𝑆). 
𝑲𝒆𝒚𝑻𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎(𝑩𝑳,𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒙𝒚 𝑲𝒆𝒚) → 𝑩𝑳
𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒙𝒚𝒌𝒆𝒚: The proxy server takes the component 
𝐵𝐿 of user  𝑢𝑘’s blinded secret key and then transforms it by embedding the shares of the 
revoked users in that piece using its 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑦 𝐾𝑒𝑦. The use of the revoked shares will prevent 
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their associated users from using these shares to recover the related plaintext. In addition, 
the proxy uses its information and the identity of non-revoked user 𝑢𝑘 to compute: 
∀𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ {1, … , 𝑐}, 𝑘∉{1,…,c},       𝜆𝑖 =
𝑢𝑘
𝑢𝑘−𝑢𝑖
.∏
𝑢𝑗
𝑢𝑗−𝑢𝑖
𝑗≠𝑖                 (5.1)  
For every non-revoked user 𝑢𝑘, the proxy calculates 𝜆𝑘 using the equation (5.1) and then 
sends it to 𝑢𝑘. In this case, the collusion attack happens only when the revoked users collude 
with the cloud and proxy servers together.  
∀𝑢𝑘 ∉ 𝑅, (𝐵𝐿𝑢𝑘)
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑦𝑘𝑒𝑦 = ( 𝐵𝐿𝑢𝑘  )
∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑃(𝑢𝑖)
𝑐
𝑖=1 = (𝑔
𝑎𝑡
𝑌⁄ )
∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑃(𝑢𝑖)
𝑐
𝑖=1
= 𝑔
𝑎𝑡 ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑃(𝑢𝑖)
𝑐
𝑖=1
𝑌  
𝑫𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒚𝒑𝒕 (𝑪𝑻, 𝑩𝑺𝑲,𝑩𝑳𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒙𝒚𝒌𝒆𝒚) → 𝑴: The decryption algorithm inputs are a ciphertext 
CT, the blinded user’s private key 𝐵𝑆𝐾 and the output 𝐵𝐿𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑦𝑘𝑒𝑦 of the 𝐾𝑒𝑦𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚 
algorithm. Once the user’s attributes satisfy the access structure in the ciphertext and it is 
not on the revocation list, it can recover the message M as detailed below. The values 
 {𝜔𝑖  ∈  𝑍𝑝}𝑖∈𝐼 are supposed to be a set of constants, where 𝐼 = {𝑖: 𝜌(𝑖) ∈ 𝑆} and 𝐼 ⊂
{1,2, . . , 𝑙} such that when {?̅?𝑖}𝑖∈𝐼 are valid shares of a secret 𝑠 which correspond to 𝑊𝑖, 
then ∑ 𝜔𝑖?̅?𝑖 𝑖∈𝐼 =  𝑠. Part of this algorithm, which includes heavy operations, is run by the 
cloud server. The decryption algorithm computes 𝑀 as follows:    
 
𝐵1 =
𝑒(𝐶0 , 𝐵𝐾)
(∏ (𝑒 (𝐶𝑖̀ , 𝐵𝐿1́
𝜆𝑘) 𝑒(𝐷𝑖̀ , 𝐵𝐾𝜌(𝑖)
𝜆𝑘  )𝑒 (  𝑇𝑖 , 𝐵𝐿1́
𝜆𝑘))𝑖∈𝐼
𝜔𝑖
). 𝑒(𝐶0, 𝐵𝐿
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑦𝑘𝑒𝑦)
=
𝑒 ( 𝑔𝑠 , 𝑔 
𝛼
𝑌⁄ 𝑔 
𝑎𝑡𝑃(0)
𝑌⁄ )
(∏ (𝑒 (𝑔𝑎𝜆?̂? . ℎ
𝜌(𝑖)
−𝑟𝑖 , 𝑔
𝑡𝑃(𝑢𝑘)𝜆𝑘
𝑌⁄ ) 𝑒 (𝑔 𝑟𝑖 ,   ℎ𝜌(𝑖) 
𝑡𝑃(𝑢𝑘)𝜆𝑘
𝑌⁄ ) 𝑒(𝑔−𝑎𝐹𝑖 , 𝑔
𝑡𝑃(𝑢𝑘)𝜆𝑘
𝑌⁄ ))𝑖∈𝐼
𝜔𝑖
). 𝑒(𝑔𝑠, 𝑔
𝑎𝑡 ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑃(𝑢𝑖)
𝑐
𝑖=1
𝑌
⁄
)
 
= 
𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)
𝛼 𝑠
𝑌⁄ 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔) 
𝑎 𝑠𝑡𝑃(0)
𝑌⁄
(∏ (𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)
𝑎𝜆?̂?𝑡𝑃(𝑢𝑘)𝜆𝑘
𝑌
⁄ 𝑒(𝑔, ℎ𝜌(𝑖))
−𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑃(𝑢𝑘)𝜆𝑘
𝑌⁄ 𝑒(𝑔, ℎ𝜌(𝑖))
𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑃(𝑢𝑘)𝜆𝑘
𝑌⁄ 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)
−𝑎𝐹𝑖𝑡𝑃(𝑢𝑘)𝜆𝑘
𝑌⁄ )
𝜔𝑖
). 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)
𝑎𝑠𝑡 ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑃(𝑢𝑖)
𝑐
𝑖=1
𝑌
⁄
𝑖∈𝐼
 
= 
𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)
𝛼 𝑠
𝑌⁄ 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔) 
𝑎 𝑠𝑡𝑃(0)
𝑌⁄
(∏ (𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)
𝑎𝜆?̂?𝑡𝑃(𝑢𝑘)𝜆𝑘
𝑌
⁄ 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)
−𝑎𝐹𝑖𝑡𝑃(𝑢𝑘)𝜆𝑘
𝑌⁄ )
𝜔𝑖
). 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)
𝑎𝑠𝑡 ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑃(𝑢𝑖)
𝑐
𝑖=1
𝑌
⁄
𝑖∈𝐼
 
= 
𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)
𝛼 𝑠
𝑌⁄ 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔) 
𝑎 𝑠𝑡𝑃(0)
𝑌⁄
(∏ (𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)
𝑡𝑎(𝜆?̂?−𝐹𝑖)𝑃(𝑢𝑘)𝜆𝑘
𝑌
⁄
)
𝜔𝑖
). 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)
𝑎𝑠𝑡 ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑃(𝑢𝑖)
𝑐
𝑖=1
𝑌
⁄
𝑖∈𝐼
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= 
𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)
𝛼 𝑠
𝑌⁄ 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔) 
𝑎 𝑠𝑡𝑃(0)
𝑌⁄
𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)
𝑡𝑎𝑃(𝑢𝑘)𝜆𝑘 ∑ ( 𝜆𝑖̂ −𝐹𝑖)𝜔𝑖𝑖∈?̀?
𝑌
⁄
. 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)
𝑎𝑠𝑡 ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑃(𝑢𝑖)
𝑐
𝑖=1
𝑌
⁄
 
Where {𝜆̅𝑖 = (?̂?𝑖 − 𝐹𝑖) mod p}𝑖∈𝑙 
𝐵1 = 
𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)
𝛼 𝑠
𝑌⁄ 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔) 
𝑎 𝑠𝑡𝑃(0)
𝑌⁄
𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)
𝑡𝑎𝑠𝑃(𝑢𝑘)𝜆𝑘
𝑌⁄ . 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)
𝑎𝑠𝑡 ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑃(𝑢𝑖)
𝑐
𝑖=1
𝑌
⁄
 
𝐵1 = 
𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)
𝛼 𝑠
𝑌⁄ 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔) 
𝑎 𝑠𝑡𝑃(0)
𝑌⁄
𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)
𝑎𝑠𝑡(∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑃(𝑢𝑖)+𝑃(𝑢𝑘)𝜆𝑘
𝑐
𝑖=1 )
𝑌
⁄
 
𝐵1 = 
𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)
𝛼 𝑠
𝑌⁄ 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔) 
𝑎 𝑠𝑡𝑃(0)
𝑌⁄
𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)
𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑃(0)
𝑌⁄
 
𝐵1 = 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)
𝛼 𝑠
𝑌⁄  
Then the value of 𝐵1 is sent by the cloud to the user who uses the value of exponent 𝑌 to 
compute 𝑈𝐵1 = (𝐵1)
𝑌 = (𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)
𝛼 𝑠
𝑌⁄ )𝑌 = 𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝛼 𝑠.  The decryption algorithm can 
calculate the message 𝑀 as:  
𝑀 =
𝐶
𝑈𝐵1
=
𝑀𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝛼𝑠
𝑒(𝑔, 𝑔)𝛼𝑠
 
𝑷𝒐𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒚𝑼𝒑𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆(𝑷𝑲,𝑲𝑶𝒘𝒏𝒆𝒓, 𝑨, ?́? ) → (𝑬𝑺,  ?̀?⃑⃑  ⃑) and Re-Encryption(𝑷𝑲,𝑬𝑺,  ?̀?⃑⃑  ⃑, ?́?) →
𝑪?́?: These two algorithms are similar to the corresponding ones in Section 4.2.4.   
5.3 Scheme Analysis 
In this section, the analysis of our proposed scheme is presented in terms of security and 
performance. 
5.3.1 Security Analysis 
In our distributed environment, and based on the mentioned security assumptions and 
requirements, we analyse the security of the proposed scheme in terms of data 
confidentiality, collusion resistance, fine-grained access control and forward security. 
Data Confidentiality. We use the following theorem which can be proved in the same way 
as the one in Waters’ system [42] (see Section 3.7.1).  The reason for this is that our scheme 
uses Waters’ system as a basic scheme. In addition, in our proposed multi-authority access 
control scheme, we need to prove that sharing the master secret key in the setup phase, the 
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processes of policy update and user revocation, and the operations of proxy and outsourced 
decryption are secure. 
Theorem 5.1. Once the decisional 𝑞-Parallel BDHE assumption holds, all polynomial time 
adversaries have negligible time to selectively break our proposed CP-ABE scheme, where 
the challenge LSSS matrix is 𝑊∗(𝑙∗  ×  𝑛∗) with 𝑙∗, 𝑛∗ ≤  𝑞. 
Proof. Let 𝒜 be an adversary with a non-negligible advantage against our proposed scheme 
in the selective security game. This adversary selects 𝑊∗ as a challenge matrix where each 
of  𝑙∗ (the number of its rows) and 𝑛∗ (the number of its columns) is less than or equal to 𝑞. 
In our proposed scheme, in the setup phase, the security vulnerability is reduced as a 
consequence of using SSSS by all the attribute authorities in the scheme to implicitly 
reconstruct a part of the master secret key (i.e. 𝛼). Therefore, no entity in the scheme knows 
the value of 𝛼. That means the master secret key is totally secure unless a threshold number 
of attribute authorities collude with each other to reconstruct its value, which can be 
prevented by choosing an appropriate threshold number. On the case when the CAA 
attacked, the other scheme entities keep offering services because part of the master secret 
key is still hidden as well as the CAA does not involve in generating a secret key to each 
user. However, the scheme cannot revoke users or registering new users until the scheme 
manages the issue and CAA returns to work. 
In this game, any secret keys can be queried by 𝒜 unless those keys are able to decrypt the 
simulator ℬ’s ciphertext or the identity 𝑢𝑘 of adversary 𝒜 does not belong to the revocation 
list 𝑅∗, where ℬ has all the secret details about AAs’ secret shares and the secret master key 
and hides them from 𝒜. In this case, we can complete the proof in the same way as the 
single authority system in [42] and our single-authority scheme in Section 3.7.1 and Section 
4.3.1. Therefore, if this adversary wins the selective security game, then ℬ can break the 
security of Waters’ system [42]. 
Collusion Resistance. Each user in our proposed scheme is assigned with a unique 
identity 𝑢𝑘, which is implicitly used to invalidate the main part of the user’s secret key when 
that user is revoked. The approach used for this purpose is SSSS. In addition, the cloud 
server does not take part in the processes of sharing the master key among AAs and the secret 
key generation. Based on the previous considerations, the revoked users will be prevented 
from colluding with the cloud server to gain unauthorized information. On the other hand, 
using CP-ABE meets the needs of preventing the authorised, malicious users from 
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combining their attributes together to access unauthorised information at a higher security 
level. 
Fine Grained Access Control as well as Forward Security. These requirements are also 
achieved as shown in Section 4.3.1.  
5.3.2 Performance Analysis 
We have chosen the multi-authority scheme in [85] to compare with our proposed scheme. 
Most of the existing systems utilize an access tree or AND gate as an access structure, the 
authorities in such systems manage disjoint attribute sets, or these systems assume that the 
cloud is trusted, which are different from the security assumptions and access structure used 
to develop our scheme. Only the scheme in [85] is the most appropriate one for the 
comparison, as it is based on the same security assumptions and supports the LSSS access 
structure as well. The comparison will be in terms of computation and communication 
overheads. Table 5.2 illustrates the capability of our scheme against the system in [85].  
Communication overhead. The required communications in our scheme, which are the 
same as those in [85], are threefold. First, communications between a user and a threshold 
number of AAs are needed for the user to gain its possessed secret key parts for the secret 
key computation. Secondly, communications among all the AAs in the system are required 
to share the master key in the 𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑝𝐴𝐴 phase. Thirdly, the communication between the 
AAs and central authority CAA is necessary for the attribute authority to gain its identity. 
In addition, our scheme needs extra communications among authorized users and the proxy 
server upon each user revocation event, to update their keys. It also requires 
communications between a data owner and the cloud server from one side, and between a 
user and the cloud server from the other side, to outsource the encryption and decryption 
operations, respectively.  
Computation overhead. In our scheme and the system in [85], although a user needs to do 
a lot of computations to compute the secret key from the shares collected from a threshold 
number of AAs, these operations are run only once, and after that the user can store and 
reuse the secret key. Furthermore, although our proposed scheme addresses more issues (as 
illustrated in Table 5.2) such as policy update and user revocation than the compared 
system, our scheme in general incurs no more computation to data owners and users than 
the compared one, which will be supported by our experiment in the next section. This is 
CHAPTER5: THE PROPOSED MULTI-AUTHORITY, REVOCABLE ACCESS CONTROL 
SCHEME 
 
99 
 
because our scheme considers outsourcing the heavy computational operations (such as 
partial encryption and decryption operations) to the cloud server. That makes our proposed 
scheme more practical, particularly to mobile users.  
Table 5.2: Comparative summary of the capability of our scheme against related work 
scheme Policy 
Update 
User 
Revocation  
Outsourcing 
decryption 
Outsourcing 
encryption 
Li et al. [85]  × × × × 
Our scheme √ √ √ √ 
5.4 The Experimental Results and Evaluation 
We have implemented our proposed scheme. The CP-ABE system in [42] was taken as the 
base and adapted to our scheme. The experiment supports our dynamic policy update and 
user revocation processes and relieves the encryption and decryption burden on data owners 
and users, respectively.  
The implementation uses the Java Pairing Based Cryptography (JPBC) library [115]. The 
elliptic curve group of type (A) curves of JPBC is used with a 512-bit base field. The 
experiment is executed on Intel(R) Core (TM) i7- 2006, 3.40 GH CPU, where pairing takes 
about 31 milliseconds. The scheme is implemented with five attribute authorities and the 
threshold number is three. 
Similar to our proposed single authority scheme in Chapter 4, the execution time for a data 
owner to carry out part of an encryption operation will increase linearly with the number of 
attributes in the access structure. Where, we have tested different access policies with 4,10 
and 20 attributes, respectively, for comparing the performance of our proposed multi-
authority scheme with the performance of Li et al. [85]. The results indicate that our scheme 
is more efficient as demonstrated in Figure 5.5 A. The efficiency of our scheme comes from 
outsourcing part of the encryption operation related to creating the components associated 
with attributes, to the cloud server. Consequently, the data owner just needs to calculate the 
vector of shares, encrypt them, and then send the encrypted vector to the cloud. However, 
the data owner in the compared system has to compute the shares and all the ciphertext 
components including the common ones and those associated with attributes.  
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Notably, Figure 5.5 A and Figure 4.9 A are the same. The reason for this is that the 
compared systems Li et al. [85] and PU-CP-ABE [65] are similar to our scheme in terms of 
using the CP-ABE system in [42] as the base. Whereas Li et al.’s scheme [85] develops the 
setup algorithm to employ multiple authorities instead of the single authority in [42], the 
PU-CP-ABE system [65] enhances the CP-ABE system in [42] to support policy update. 
Therefore, the encryption and the decryption operations are almost the same.  Consequently, 
the improvement percentage of our proposed encryption operation is the same as in Section 
4.4. 
In terms of policy update, as mentioned earlier,  the scheme designed by  Li et al. [85] does 
not consider the process of policy update. Despite that, we have measured the execution 
time of our scheme to be aware of the time needed by the data owner to run this algorithm, 
as illustrated in Figure 5.5 B. After the first implementation with 4 attributes, the data owner 
runs the policy update algorithm to update its access policy by increasing the number of 
attributes to 10 and 20, respectively. The dashed line indicates that the execution time 
increases linearly with the number of attributes in the access policy. 
 
Figure 5.5 A: The experimental results of the Encryption algorithm of our proposed 
multi-authority system compared with Li et al.’s scheme [85]. 
To build a feasible scheme that suits many limited-resources IoT devices, we alleviate the 
burden on users by securely outsourcing the heavy computational part of the decryption 
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process to the cloud server and assign light, constant operations which have not been 
affected linearly with the complexity of the access policy, to the data users. Based on the 
theoretical model, our expectation indicates high performance findings.  
The above expectation is also supported by our experiment showing that the execution time 
of the decryption operation of our proposed scheme is more competitive compared with the 
scheme of Li et al. [85] where their time needed for the decryption operation increases with 
the complexity of the access policy and the number of attributes involved in the decryption 
key. That is obvious in Figure 5.5 C, where Li et al.’s system [85] takes 139% more time 
than our technique when 4 attributes are used and this percentage increases to 254% and 
264% when the utilised attributes are 10 and 20, respectively. 
Figure 5.5 B: The experimental results of the Policy Update algorithm of our proposed 
multi-authority scheme.  
In terms of the blind secret key algorithm, in our scheme, the user only carries out some 
constant, exponential operations that are considerably lighter than pairing operations. These 
operations include blinding its secret key and then sending it to the cloud server to compute 
internal results. These results are used by the data user to un-blind them to recover the 
plaintext which is the symmetric key of the encrypted data file. 
The overall results state that our proposed multi-authority scheme has higher efficiency, 
functionality and practicality against the compared system. 
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Figure 5.5 C: The experimental results of the Decryption algorithm of our proposed 
multi-authority scheme compared with Li et al.’s scheme [85]. 
5.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, a new multi-authority CP-ABE scheme is proposed to enhance the system 
security and performance and resolve the problem of a single point bottleneck. Unlike other 
relevant existing systems, we have considered many current critical issues. These include a 
novel policy update process, user revocation and securely outsourcing expensive 
computational operations to the cloud without revealing any unauthorized information while 
preventing collusion attacks. The proposed scheme can provide fine-grained access control 
for public cloud storage. Our literature review, scheme analysis and the experimental results 
show that our scheme is superior over the compared existing multi-authority system and 
traditional single authority CP-ABE. For future work, we intend to minimise the 
communication overhead and develop the scheme to support dynamic attributes. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusions and Future Work  
6.1 Conclusions 
In this thesis, some fundamental issues of storing and sharing sensitive data in an untrusted 
environment have been considered by offering fine-grained access control services while 
protecting the security of such data. In our proposed work, although the system 
cryptographically enforces the data owners’ access policies, it is able to update these policies 
dynamically without incurring a high computational cost.  
Therefore, the major findings of this thesis can be concluded as follows:  
1- Hosting data on the cloud can be vulnerable to loss, breach, or leakage. 
2- Using CP-ABE can provide secure storing large amounts of sensitive data on cloud 
storage with one-to-many access control and embedding access policies. However, 
it needs some refinements. 
3- Any system that does not address the revocation problem, needs to rebuild from the 
beginning to address this issue otherwise, it will not suit storing data on a dynamic 
environment such as cloud computing.   
4- Testing and evaluating our proposed schemes showed that the encryption operation 
scaled linearly with the number of attributes, while in our single authority scheme 
there is just moderate drop in the performance of decryption operation. However, 
this drop is managed in our multi-authority scheme. 
In our project, two access control schemes have been constructed, where most of the 
expensive operations are outsourced to the cloud server to alleviate the burden on the data 
owners and the scheme users, while protecting the confidentiality of their data. In addition, 
the cloud server is prevented from obtaining any unauthorised information. 
In this chapter, the research contributions of the thesis and some future orientation are 
summarised below: 
Single-Authority Access Control Scheme. The main contributions of our scheme that 
rectifies the weaknesses of the existing work are three-fold: 
• Addressing the crucial challenge of dynamically updating policies that are already 
embedded in the ciphertext stored on a cloud server, while mitigating the 
computational cost. Where, this issue is considered complicated in most existing 
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schemes due to the complexity of providing outsourced, cryptographic data 
management with a reasonable computational cost. Handling attributes efficiently 
occurs by setting the users’ access privileges that are customised by policy updating 
and adapting them easily to new circumstances with low-cost communication and 
computation.  
• Building a scheme that is resistant against any collusion attacks between the cloud 
service provider and revoked users. Most of the existing systems assume that the 
cloud server is semi trusted, so they assign some secret information to the server 
and maximise its control privileges. In contrast, our scheme enforces constraints to 
invalidate the secret keys known to revoked-users for data decryption and prevent 
such users and even the cloud server from having useful information. Hence, our 
scheme offers stronger security and easier implementation on the cloud server. 
• Outsourcing core operations of encryption and policy update to the cloud server 
while protecting the confidentiality of data and without revealing any unauthorised 
information. This mitigates the computational burden on the data owners and thus 
rectifies the problems of considerable computation overheads incurred by existing 
systems. 
Multi-Authority Access Control Scheme. In this scheme, we have extended the single 
attribute authority scheme in Chapter 4 to build a multi-authority scheme that enhances the 
scheme security by resolving the key escrow problem, eliminating the trust from one entity 
(i.e. attribute authority) and improving the scheme performance by addressing the single 
point of failure. This scheme leverages and extends some of the existing techniques to 
provide a number of desirable features described as follows: 
• Dealing with the single point of security failure that all single authority systems and 
some multi-authority schemes suffer from. Furthermore, no one entity in our scheme 
has full control of all the information. This resolves the existing work’s weaknesses 
by minimising the trust level of the authority and strengthening the privacy of user 
data. 
• Extending the technique in [85] for the management of joint attribute sets to 
efficiently generate users’ secret keys. The reason for this is that if each authority 
manages a different set of attributes, compromising or crashing an authority makes 
the unavailability of the whole system, which presents a performance bottleneck. 
Therefore, all attribute sets in our scheme are managed by each system attribute 
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authority individually. This extension overcomes most of the aforementioned 
existing systems’ shortcomings (such as a system performance bottleneck). In 
addition, it also addresses the problem of the system in [85] in terms of its inability 
to deal with dynamic attribute changes. 
• Adjusting the desirable properties of our proposed single-authority scheme in 
Chapter 4 to adapt to our multi-authority scheme. Such properties include efficient 
policy update and user revocation that enable the dynamicity and flexibility of 
customising and managing users’ access privileges as well as protecting the scheme 
from collusion attacks. In addition, part of the encryption and policy update 
operations are securely moved to cloud servers. Although addressing the revocation 
issues is already a difficult mission in single-authority systems, it is considered as an 
even more significantly complicated task in decentralised multi-authority schemes. 
Since in such relevant existing schemes, the authorities are usually responsible for 
revoking users/attributes, the complexity of addressing the revocation problem is due 
to no connections among them in a decentralised-setting environment. 
• Outsourcing additional expensive decryption operations to cloud servers, which 
alleviates the computational burden on scheme users. This is in contrast to the 
existing systems that incur high computational costs. 
Consequently, our proposed revocable, decentralized access control scheme with multiple 
authorities efficiently deals with dynamic changes to access credentials and eliminates a 
single point of failure. We propose this scheme to allow securely storing data on a public 
cloud storage system and jointly administrating the system attribute set, where in a distributed 
setting, the most significant problem is revoking a key efficiently. The reason for this issue 
is that it is hard to inform all authorised, administrative entities when a key revocation event 
happens without management by a centralised point. 
Due to the complexity of managing the revocation issues in any system with multiple 
authorities, to the best of our knowledge, our scheme is the first scheme that efficiently 
addresses the revocation issue. It presents two techniques that allow policy update and 
invalidate a user’s secret key to deal with frequent changes to attributes and to prevent 
collusion attacks respectively, while outsourcing heavy computational operations to the 
cloud without revealing any useful information about the data. These techniques are managed 
by the data owner and the proxy server with few efforts. Although it is hard to compare our 
scheme with other systems due to the high capability of our scheme that differs from others, 
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and the differences in security assumptions, the security and performance evaluations 
conducted in this project show that our scheme is secure and more efficient than the related 
work. 
6.2 Future work 
For further work, several directions can be followed to extend the research work in this 
thesis: 
1- Achieving Accountability. In an untrusted environment, one of the potential 
research directions is to make our access control scheme accountable for protection 
against key exposure. Such exposure could occur when the secret decryption key of 
an authorized user is leaked. Since this key is valid, the decryption of the 
corresponding ciphertext is possible. Therefore, an effective mechanism is needed 
to protect the scheme from this threat. 
2- Reducing Communication Overhead. In our proposed scheme, the main limitation 
is that many communications are needed. The resulting communications are due to 
outsourcing the complex, expensive computational operations to the cloud server to 
leverage its powerful, computational resources and to mitigate the burden on data 
owners and users. Investigating an approach to reduce these communications would 
be one of the key aspects to improve the efficiency of this scheme.   
3- Hiding Access Policies. For sensitive policies, one of our substantial future research 
tasks is to explore techniques to enforce the access policies in a ciphertext form but 
hide such policies so that their private information is protected from disclosure 
during policy deployment.   
4- Using Dynamic Attributes. Another core property that the CP-ABE technique 
needs to be extended with is dynamic attributes (e.g. location or time). It is an open 
challenge that would improve the dynamicity of our scheme by adding attributes to 
users’ secret keys to restrict cloud data access in response to attribute changes and 
to enable a dynamic adaptation scheme. 
5- Implementing our Proposed Schemes with A Large Number of Attributes.  
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